In war, the enemy gets a vote – and Russia isn’t happy about it. “The West is fighting us with the hands of the Ukrainians,” Russian strongman Vladimir Putin whined.
The cause of Putin’s discomfort was a surprise Ukrainian incursion into Russia that’s seized more territory in a week than Russia took in Ukraine over the past year.
But as Putin’s diplomats came to the United Nations to complain, their European counterparts were having none of it. “We will not recognize the aggressor as the victim,” said a Slovenian envoy.
Putin’s Russia thought that due to its size and willingness to use brutal force, it would be able to easily topple Ukraine’s government and seize additional territory when it invaded in February 2022.
Instead, Ukraine survived and even pushed back, driving Russians away from its two largest cities, Kyiv and Kharkiv. But significant U.S. and Western equipment arrived slowly, and Ukraine was unable to push Russia back in the South and East, with the Russian army building up an extensive defensive belt that allowed it to blunt Ukraine’s summer offensive last year.
This year, instead of pushing back against layers of minefields and trenches patrolled by increasingly lethal drones, Ukraine built up a large force in its Northeast opposite of the Russian city of Kursk, hundreds of miles from the main fight.
The Russians saw the buildup, but arrogantly thought the Ukrainians incapable of doing anything serious. Then, a week ago, the Ukrainians unleashed a cross-border attack and the poorly trained and led Russian forces collapsed like a house of cards, with Ukrainians capturing hundreds of POWs.
That this attack happened in the Kursk region is all the more interesting. The Battle of Kursk in World War II, one of the largest tank battles in history, led to a decisive Soviet victory.
Kursk’s importance in this conflict is not just symbolic, it is also strategic. The region serves as a critical hub for Russia’s rail network, which is vital for the movement of troops and supplies to support ongoing military operations in Ukraine. Control over these rail lines allows for the rapid deployment of reinforcements and the efficient transport of materials, which are essential for sustaining long-term military engagements. Without fuel, food, water, and ammunition, even the most elite fighting force becomes weak rabble in a fortnight.
The Ukrainian offensive into Kursk also represents a marked shift in strategy and operational art compared to last year’s failed offensive in the South.
In contrast, the 2024 offensive appears strategically coherent and better timed. By launching a surprise incursion into Russian territory, Ukraine has seized the initiative and forced Moscow to react, diverting resources and attention from their efforts to the South in occupied Ukrainian territory.
The element of surprise has been a key factor, catching Russian forces off guard, with the Russians believing the Ukrainians were incapable of anything greater than sabotage operations and small cross-border raids.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has characterized the Ukrainian incursion as a desperate attempt by Kyiv to gain leverage in potential future peace talks. He claims that the offensive is designed to destabilize Russia internally, but insists that the Russian military will prevail. However, the incursion has already led to the evacuation of approximately 121,000 civilians from the affected areas.
Putin has ordered the rapid deployment of reinforcements to the Kursk region, but many of those forces have been sent from the active fight to the South.
Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk appears to be aimed at achieving multiple strategic objectives. First, by seizing and holding territory within Russia, Ukraine strengthens its bargaining position in any future negotiations. Holding Russian territory could give Kyiv significant leverage, making its demands more compelling in the eyes of international observers.
Second, the offensive forces Russia to reallocate its reserves, weakening its defensive capabilities in other areas. This could create opportunities for Ukraine to exploit its interior lines of communication, enabling rapid redeployment of forces to strike at other critical fronts, possibly in the South. The concept of using interior lines to outmaneuver an opponent is a classic military strategy, one that Ukraine seems to be effectively employing in this instance.
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk is not just a tactical maneuver. It is a strategic gambit with a significant potential for influencing the Russo-Ukrainian war. By demonstrating the ability to strike deep into Russian territory, Ukraine has challenged the Kremlin’s narrative that the war is confined to Ukrainian soil.
Ukraine’s offensive shatters the perception of Russian invulnerability and has already eroded Russian public confidence in the Kremlin’s handling of the war while bolstering Ukrainian morale.
More importantly, Ukraine’s battlefield success increases chances for a diplomatic solution.
Chuck DeVore is Chief National Initiatives Officer at the Texas Public Policy Foundation. He served in the California State Assembly and is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. He’s the author of “Crisis of the House Never United.”
The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Daily Caller News Foundation.
All content created by the Daily Caller News Foundation, an independent and nonpartisan newswire service, is available without charge to any legitimate news publisher that can provide a large audience. All republished articles must include our logo, our reporter’s byline and their DCNF affiliation. For any questions about our guidelines or partnering with us, please contact [email protected].
