A House committee called on the Department of Defense (DOD) Monday to strengthen vetting for U.S. defense contractors to guard against the threat of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence, according to a letter exclusively obtained by the Daily Caller News Foundation.
The House Select Committee on the CCP letter to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth specifically urges DOD to carry out the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) rule mandated by Section 847 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires DOD to thoroughly review U.S. defense contractors and subcontractors to determine the “true individuals or entities who ultimately own or control a business,” according to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency. The letter cites a February 2025 DCNF investigation finding that Jerry Wang, CEO of U.S. defense contractor S&L Aerospace Metals LLC, is listed as an official of multiple CCP influence and intelligence organizations.
The implementation of DFARS has been delayed for almost half a decade, the House Select Committee on the CCP letter states, leaving the U.S. defense industrial base “vulnerable to infiltration and exploitation.”
“Congress enacted Section 847 to ensure rigorous pre-award vetting and mitigation of foreign influence risks in defense contracting, including for unclassified contracts exceeding $5 million,” the letter reads. “Nearly five years after its enactment, this essential regulation remains incomplete, leaving our procurement and supply chains alarmingly exposed to exploitation by the [CCP].”
“Recent investigative reporting underscores the urgency of this issue,” the letter continues. “Specifically, revelations regarding S&L Aerospace Metals LLC — a contractor supplying critical parts for advanced fighter jets, military helicopters, and guided missile systems — highlight profound vulnerabilities. This company’s CEO has documented ties to [CCP] intelligence and influence agencies, posing a significant risk to our military readiness and national security.”
S&L’s CEO, Wang, is listed as an official within multiple arms of a Chinese influence and intelligence service called the United Front Work Department (UFWD), the DCNF reported in February 2025.
The UFWD’s operations are a “blend of engagement, influence activities, and intelligence operations that the [CCP] uses to shape its political environment, including to influence other countries’ policy toward the [People’s Republic of China] and to gain access to advanced foreign technology,” according to the House Select Committee on the CCP.
Among other UFWD positions, the DCNF found Chinese government records and state media reports identifying Wang as a “director” of a UFWD agency called the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA).
COFA is an important platform through which the UFWD co-opts and interacts with overseas United Front figures,” according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), a legislative commission created by Congress to investigate the national security implications of the relationship between the U.S. and China.
Wang’s spokesman denied Wang had “acted in any way that is disloyal” and Wang’s attorney likewise insisted that his client had no ties to foreign political entities after the DCNF inquired about some 13 photos picturing Wang at Chinese government functions alongside high-ranking Party officials and UFWD chiefs. However, when asked if Wang denied being pictured in those photographs, Wang’s attorney replied: “no.”
Iowa Republican Sen. Joni Ernst sent a letter to Hegseth in March 2025 urging DOD to audit “and, if necessary, suspend or cancel all contracts” with S&L following the DCNF’s investigation, which the two-term senator described as “an alarming case of a suspected Chinese proxy infiltrating our defense supply chain, posing a severe national security risk.”
An unclassified Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) document concerning foreign ownership and the implementation of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act’s DFARS rule also cites the DCNF’s February 2025 S&L investigation as a “test case,” a DCSA spokesperson told the DCNF.
DCSA is the federal government’s “largest investigative service provider” and conducts 95% of background investigations for 105 departments and agencies, according to its website. However, the DCSA document reviewed by the DCNF states that although the agency has an over $3 billion budget, it is currently only “able to complete ~13,000 reviews,” or approximately 30% of the reviews required.
One page in the document concerning vetting includes a portion of the DCNF’s February 2025 report next to a disclosure form for government contractors called “Certificate Pertaining To Foreign Interests.” Four boxes on the disclosure form are checked “YES,” including one question concerning executives holding positions with “foreign persons.”
“The document referenced is a presentation to congressional committees and staff used in separate meetings earlier this year,” a DCSA spokesperson said, when asked about the inclusion of the DCNF’s S&L investigation. “Your article was brought to us from a previous meeting with committee members and our team responded with it as a timely and conceptual example of the potential capabilities of full implementation of Section 847 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization act to address concerns with foreign ownership, control or influence (FOCI).”
“This review served as a practical example of FOCI involvement in real-time and our process found the concerns in a quick manner as indicated on the Form 328 in the presentation,” the DCSA spokesperson said. “An opportunity or test case such as this shows the potential impact of Section 847 to our FOCI responsibility to ensure the appropriate involvement or mitigation of foreign entities in the defense industrial base.”
Yet, DCSA has not vetted S&L because “current law does not give DCSA the authority to do so,” the spokesperson said.
“While we cannot validate the DCNF’s reporting, DCSA recognizes the concerns of potential adversarial involvement in the defense supply chain,” the spokesperson said. “DCSA works every day with firms to mitigate FOCI risk and believes full implementation of Section 847 would support our efforts to address this risk area while ensuring effective, cost-efficient risk reduction where appropriate.”
While Section 847 is a step in the right direction, the proposed vetting process will still have significant vulnerabilities even if fully implemented, L.J. Eads, a former U.S. Air Force intelligence analyst, told the DCNF.
“The system leans heavily on self-disclosure, effectively banking on the honesty of adversaries, an assumption that’s anything but secure,” Eads said. “This creates a dangerous opening for the CCP to quietly acquire U.S. defense contractors and operate beneath the radar.”
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