The case involved a Florida resident, Christina Ghionis, who was injured while skiing at Deer Valley Resort after renting bindings and skis; the bindings were incompatible with her boots, contrary to advice from the rental shop technician, and failed to release when she fell in crud snow during a lesson. She sued for negligence, product liability, and breach of warranties. Deer Valley moved for summary judgment based on a signed release agreement, the Utah Inherent Risks of Skiing Act, and its status as an equipment lessor rather than a manufacturer or seller. The court denied the motion, finding the release ambiguous and unenforceable to bar the claims, that the Act did not preclude suits involving rented equipment or inadequate instruction, and that lessors can be subject to strict liability for defects in products they place into the stream of commerce.
The case involved a dispute between WKB Enterprises, which provided letters of credit to secure equipment leases from Ruan Leasing Company to a third party (Conway), and Ruan, after Conway defaulted and Ruan drew on the letters by certifying delinquency in lease payments. WKB sued Ruan for fraud, defamation, and unjust enrichment, claiming the letters were intended only for a future lease between WKB and Ruan, not the Conway lease, and that Ruan's demands to the banks were deceptive. The court denied WKB's motion for summary judgment and granted Ruan's motion, dismissing all claims. It reasoned that the bank could not have reasonably relied on Ruan's statements for a fraud claim, that defamation per se was unsupported without special damages given the known circumstances of the transaction, and that unjust enrichment was unavailable because WKB had not exhausted its legal remedies by pursuing a contract claim.
In TEP and KJC v. Leavitt, the plaintiffs challenged Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2(1), which prohibited and voided marriages involving persons with AIDS. The court granted the defendants' unopposed motion for summary judgment, declaring the statute invalid as applied to AIDS and enjoining its enforcement. The decision rested on the finding that the law violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as AIDS qualifies as a disability under these federal statutes, and federal law preempts conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause. The court also validated the marriages of the affected classes from their inception.
This case involves plaintiff C. Scott Wolt's motion to disqualify the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau from representing defendants Sherwood Corporation and Manchester Tank & Equipment Corporation in a personal injury lawsuit. Wolt had previously settled related state court claims against Petrolane Gas Service, with the settlement terms allegedly including a restriction preventing Petrolane's cause-and-origin experts from being made available to Sherwood's counsel. The court found that the settlement likely included this expert witness limitation and that Petrolane may have breached it by approving the firm's representation of Sherwood, but concluded that these facts did not compel disqualification of Sherwood's chosen counsel. The decision rested on the principle that the settlement agreement did not override a party's right to select its own attorney in the absence of a direct ethical violation requiring disqualification under applicable rules.
In United States v. Sandoval, the defendant moved to suppress cocaine found during a vehicle search and statements made after his arrest, arguing that a Utah Highway Patrol traffic stop for speeding was a pretext, that he was illegally detained, that his consent to search was not voluntary or was exceeded in scope, and that no Miranda warning was given. The court denied suppression of the cocaine, finding the stop legitimate based on observed speeding, that the officer's actions after returning the license and registration were supported by reasonable suspicion from the defendant's evasive answers and prior record, and that the defendant's consent to search the vehicle and fuel tank was voluntary and not limited. However, the court granted suppression of the post-arrest statements made before the Miranda warning. The reasoning centered on Fourth Amendment standards for pretextual stops, reasonable suspicion, consent, and the timing of custody requiring Miranda protections.
This case concerns a motion to withdraw the reference from bankruptcy court to the district court in an adversary proceeding filed by the Chapter 7 trustee against Jean Bob Inc. The trustee sought damages for breach of a management agreement related to a nightclub and turnover of a $10,000 certificate of deposit under 11 U.S.C. § 542. Jean Bob demanded a jury trial, declined consent to final judgment by the bankruptcy court, and asserted a setoff as a defense based on alleged violations and conversions by the prior trustee. The court analyzed whether it must await the bankruptcy court's core/non-core determination under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) before deciding withdrawal and whether pleading setoff waived Jean Bob's Seventh Amendment jury trial right, considering distinctions between setoffs, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses under bankruptcy rules like Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7013.
