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Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
Adhered closely to Goller v. White's prospective abrogation of immunity and to the Esser insanity standard rather than adopting new tests. Ertl v. Ertl ↗ State v. Shoffner ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
Upheld the state's power to condemn scenic easements for a national parkway and legislative determinations of public purpose. Kamrowski v. State ↗
PurposivismTextualism
Parsed the first sentence of the antitrust statute as independently prohibiting restraints of trade separate from its commodities clause. State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc. ↗
Affiliations
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit — appointed by Lyndon B. Johnson
Party: Democratic →A.B., Cornell UniversityBA, Cornell UniversityJD, Mount Mary University
The case concerned whether the Milwaukee Braves baseball team's relocation and the American League's related decisions violated Wisconsin's antitrust statute, sec. 133.01, by restraining trade and monopolizing commerce within the state. The Wisconsin Supreme Court examined the facts showing that major league baseball operations had been terminated in Wisconsin through agreements among the defendants. The court reasoned that the first sentence of the statute broadly prohibits combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, separate from the second sentence's focus on articles or commodities, and that the conduct described could constitute an unlawful restraint or monopolization. It also addressed potential defenses, including whether the statute applied to a service business, whether state regulation would conflict with federal commerce policy, and whether the franchise move was reasonably decided.
This case involves a criminal defendant appealing his conviction, challenging the jury instructions on the insanity defense. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adhered to its prior Esser decision, requiring proof of lack of capacity to understand the nature and quality of the act or to distinguish right from wrong. The court reasoned that no evidence showed injustice under this standard when the state bears the burden of proof, and it declined to adopt alternative formulations such as the ALI test or product-of-mental-disease test used elsewhere. The opinion surveyed legislative changes in other states but concluded that Wisconsin's approach remained adequate without statutory amendment.
The case involved a passenger, Barbara Sulkowski, who was injured when the car driven by Robert hit a parked vehicle; she sued for damages from her facial laceration and other injuries, while defendants argued she was contributorily negligent for failing to maintain a proper lookout and potentially distracting the driver. The court held that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to submit the issue of her contributory negligence to the jury, that the $10,000 damage award was not excessive given the permanent scar, and that she could recover the reasonable value of future care even though she married after the injury. The reasoning emphasized that a passenger is not held to the same standard of lookout as the driver, that her brief glance at the driver immediately before impact did not support a negligence finding, and that recovery rights for care are determined based on circumstances at the time of the injury. The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
This case arose from a 1957 car-train collision at a Wisconsin highway-rail crossing where a standing freight car obstructed the road at night, injuring plaintiff McLaughlin. The trial court ordered a new trial limited to one damages element while making other rulings, prompting appeals on negligence findings, damage calculations including medical expenses, and appellate jurisdiction over mixed orders. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that it could review the entire order on appeal from the partial new-trial grant, that the railroad was negligent as a matter of law for leaving the crossing blocked without warnings, and that certain medical costs were recoverable; it modified the order by reinstating a $1,931.39 damages figure and affirmed as modified.
The case involved a dispute between the Village of West Milwaukee and the City of West Allis over fiscal authority in a school district formed under Wisconsin's city school plan after reorganization, which spans multiple municipalities. The court addressed whether the common council of West Allis or a broader 'fiscal board' (including representatives from attached territories) held power to approve the school budget and levy property taxes, as well as whether interest earned on school funds belonged to the city or the school district. The court affirmed declarations that the fiscal board has sole authority to approve the budget and levy taxes under statutes like secs. 40.807, 40.809, 40.813, and 40.815, and held that interest on school funds must augment the funds controlled by the fiscal board rather than the city's general funds. This conclusion rested on the statutory structure for reorganized districts, which gives the fiscal board representative control over a wider tax base, distinguishing it from prior precedent in Board of Education v. Racine. The court reversed one declaration and remanded for further proceedings.
The case involved landowners challenging the state's authority to condemn 'scenic easements' along the Great River Road (a national parkway project) to preserve views of natural landscapes for the traveling public, arguing that such easements were not a public use and lacked adequate standards or equal application. The court affirmed the judgments upholding the takings, concluding that the legislature had validly determined the protection of scenic resources to be a public purpose and had provided sufficient guidance to the highway commission for acquiring the easements via eminent domain. The core reasoning relied on legislative history from 1939 onward defining scenic easements as restrictions on future development (while allowing continued agricultural use) without needing physical public occupancy, noted prior recognition of scenic enjoyment as a public right, and held that once public use and necessity are established, owners cannot claim equal protection violations based on selective application to different properties.