Born 1938 · Miami, FL
United States v. Cofield
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2002-08-29
This case concerns a motion to suppress evidence in a federal drug possession prosecution arising from a police encounter at a train station, where officers claimed the defendant abandoned a bag containing cocaine base after refusing consent to search. On remand following an appellate decision, the district court conducted a full evidentiary hearing and sustained objections to the magistrate judge's report. The court granted the motion to suppress, finding the officers' accounts of the defendant's behavior, abandonment of the bag, and related events not credible due to inconsistencies with physical evidence, other testimony, and the officers' own practices of conducting warrantless searches without obtaining warrants even when consent was refused.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2002-06-28
The case involved plaintiff Alfred Dana suing E.S. Originals, Inc. and related defendants for patent infringement occurring before Dana assigned U.S. Patent No. 4,158,922 to L.A. Gear in 1993, without transferring rights to sue for past infringements. Dana moved for partial summary judgment on liability, seeking to apply offensive collateral estoppel based on 1995 partial summary judgment rulings from a prior California lawsuit by L.A. Gear against the same defendants, which had found the patent valid, enforceable, and infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. The Florida district court addressed only the procedural issues, examining whether the California determinations were final judgments on the merits that were actually litigated, whether the consent decree limited their preclusive effect to the parties in that action, and whether Dana was in privity with L.A. Gear such that the rulings could bind the defendants here. The court considered arguments that the issues had been fully litigated in the prior case despite the settlement and that relitigation would be improper.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2002-02-28 · cited 2×
The case involved Glaxo Wellcome suing Andrx Pharmaceuticals for patent infringement after Andrx filed ANDAs to market generic versions of Glaxo's sustained-release bupropion drugs (Wellbutrin SR and Zyban) before the expiration of Glaxo's '798 patent, which covers formulations using high molecular weight hydroxypropyl methylcellulose (HPMC) to control drug release. The court denied Glaxo's motion for partial summary judgment on infringement of Claim One and granted Andrx's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement. The core reasoning was that Andrx's products employ a distinctly different technology, using only low-viscosity HPMC as a protective coating on controlled-release pellets rather than the release-controlling HPMC specified in the patent claims, as confirmed by Andrx's separate patent on its formulation.
business & regulatoryhealthcare
Slattery v. Neumann
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2002-02-22 · cited 4×
John Slattery, a retired police sergeant, sued the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his reassignment from the aviation unit and subsequent disciplinary proceedings violated his First Amendment free speech rights by retaliating against his FAA complaint about falsified maintenance records and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that the transfer resulted from substantiated charges of unsafe flying witnessed by multiple employees, not from protected speech, and that Slattery's resignation was voluntary rather than a constructive discharge, as he faced potential discipline for untruthfulness but chose to retire instead of pursuing appeals or hearings. The court found insufficient evidence of an adverse employment action or that the disciplinary actions lacked substantiation.
civil rightsfree speechlabor & employment
Millman v. KEMPER NAT. SERVICES PLANTATION, FL.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2001-05-24 · cited 1×
Maureen Millman sued Kemper National Services under ERISA, alleging that the company wrongly terminated her long-term disability benefits by finding she was no longer totally disabled under the policy. The court granted Kemper's motion for summary judgment, holding there was no genuine issue of material fact requiring trial. The ruling was based on the plan's grant of discretion to the administrator and evidence from multiple physicians, including Dr. Goldberg and an independent examiner, showing Millman could perform sedentary work on a part-time basis, which outweighed her primary physician's later contrary opinion.
labor & employmenthealthcare
Demyan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2001-04-11 · cited 7×
This case involves an employee's claim for long-term disability benefits under a group insurance policy issued by Sun Life to his employer, after he underwent surgery and radiation for throat cancer. Sun Life denied the claim, citing an oncologist's determination of no cancer recurrence and minimal work restrictions, despite statements from the employee's physician noting severe weakness, hoarseness, and inability to work, along with the employer's assessment that he could not perform his job duties. The court reviewed the denial under the arbitrary and capricious standard and found it unreasonable because the decision was not supported by a fair interpretation of the claim file evidence. The court denied Sun Life's motion for summary judgment and instead granted summary judgment to the employee.
labor & employment
United States v. Smith
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2000-11-09 · cited 1×
The case involved Terrence Smith, who was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine and possession of cocaine after a sting operation. The indictment did not specify the drug quantity, which under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and the career offender guidelines could trigger a mandatory life sentence given Smith's criminal history, and the jury made no finding on quantity. The court addressed Smith's motion for downward departure, holding that under Apprendi v. New Jersey, any fact (other than a prior conviction) increasing the statutory maximum must be charged in the indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, so the court could not itself find the 55.6 grams to support the enhanced sentence. As a result, the court applied the lowest drug quantity under the guidelines or statute for sentencing purposes.
criminal lawprocedure
Thacker v. Singletary
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2000-09-19
The case involved Jeffrey Thacker's federal habeas corpus petition challenging the use of two 1990 Florida drug possession convictions to enhance his 1994 burglary and theft sentences. Those 1990 convictions arose from reverse sting operations in which police manufactured and sold crack cocaine, conduct later ruled a due process violation under the Florida Constitution by the state supreme court in State v. Williams. Thacker had exhausted state post-conviction remedies, including motions under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 and 3.800(a), before filing in federal court. The district court held that the prior convictions were void and could not be used for sentencing enhancement, that no procedural default barred review of the 3.800(a) claim, and that the resulting sentence was illegal because it rested on an overstated criminal history. The court therefore granted habeas relief and remanded the case for resentencing that excluded the 1990 convictions.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
United States v. Morrison
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2000-08-15
This case involves the resentencing of defendants Morrison and Hernandez, who were convicted of conspiracy and possession of stolen auto parts offenses but acquitted on other counts and not charged with vehicle theft. On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the district court reconsidered whether hearsay evidence supported enhancing their sentences by attributing the value of entire stolen vehicles as relevant conduct. The court evaluated testimony from a detective, including uncorroborated statements from an admitted car thief, and found it sufficiently reliable for a seven-point enhancement based on stolen parts but unreliable for proving Morrison stole six vehicles, which would have justified an eleven-point increase. It also rejected a restitution calculation for investigative costs due to lack of evidence. The original 1994 judgments and sentences were ratified with the adjusted calculations.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Cofield
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2000-08-14 · cited 2×
This case involved a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the defendant's luggage at a train station, where officers approached him based on a drug interdiction profile and a canine alert. The defendant, an African-American man, argued that the detention and search violated his Fourth Amendment rights, while the government contended that he had abandoned the bags by throwing them down and disclaiming ownership after twice refusing consent to search. After a de novo review of the magistrate judge's recommendation, which had credited the officers' testimony and found abandonment, the district court sustained the defendant's objections. The court granted the motion to suppress the cocaine base found in the bags, concluding based on the testimony, audio recording, and circumstances that the defendant had not abandoned his expectation of privacy. The decision turned on factual determinations regarding the sequence of events during the stop and search conducted over the defendant's protests.
criminal lawcivil rights
Rivers v. Health Options Connect, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2000-02-29 · cited 1×
This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the sister of a patient who died shortly after a managed health care plan denied a request for extended hospital stay based on a physician reviewer's determination that further hospitalization was not medically necessary. The defendant removed the state court action to federal court, asserting that the claims were completely preempted by ERISA because they arose from an employer-sponsored health plan. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that the claims focused on the quality of medical care and decisions regarding medical necessity rather than enforcement of rights to benefits under the plan terms. The decision relied on the distinction between quality-of-care claims, which are not completely preempted, and claims for denial of plan benefits, which would fall under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.
healthcarefederal powertorts & liability
Pannu v. Iolab Corp.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 2000-01-31 · cited 3×
This case involves a patent infringement dispute over an intraocular lens invention patented by Dr. Pannu, with Iolab raising an affirmative defense that Dr. Link should have been named as a co-inventor based on his contribution of a one-piece construction idea. After a remand from the appellate court requiring a jury trial on inventorship, the district court considered a motion for judgment as a matter of law following presentation of all evidence. The court granted the motion, holding that Iolab failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Link was a joint inventor, as required to overcome the presumption of validity for the named inventor on the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 282. The decision dismissed the co-inventorship defense and reinstated the prior judgment of infringement against Iolab.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Brent v. United States
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1999-08-02 · cited 1×
This civil rights case arose from U.S. Customs inspectors at Miami airport detaining and subjecting an African-American woman returning from Nigeria to an extended series of searches and indignities, including a strip search and transport for x-rays, based on a race-linked profile and her reaction to another passenger's treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, asserting that their discretionary actions did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court denied qualified immunity to inspectors Schor and Ellis, finding a jury question existed as to whether their decisions to escalate to invasive searches were reasonable, but granted immunity to the remaining inspectors whose roles were more limited or ministerial. The core reasoning focused on whether each defendant's conduct could be viewed as violating established Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable seizures and searches.
civil rightscriminal lawfederal power
Federal Trade Commission v. Slimamerica, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1999-06-30 · cited 12×
The Federal Trade Commission brought this action against SlimAmerica, Inc., Frank Sarcone, and Robert Wyman alleging violations of the FTC Act through deceptive advertising of a weight loss product called Super-Formula consisting of three diet pills. The court found that the defendants made false and unsubstantiated claims about the product's effectiveness, including dramatic weight loss without diet or exercise, and that Sarcone had a history of similar fraudulent schemes. Based on these findings, the court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting future deceptive practices, required a performance bond for future business activities, voided certain asset transfers, and ordered the defendants to pay over $8 million in consumer redress.
business & regulatory
First Montauk Securities Corp. v. Four Mile Ranch Development Co.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1999-03-17 · cited 19×
The case involved First Montauk Securities Corp., a NASD member firm, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction to prevent NASD arbitration of claims brought by Four Mile Ranch Development Co. alleging fraud, negligence, and securities violations by a broker associated with First Montauk in connection with collateralized mortgage obligations. First Montauk argued there was no written arbitration agreement, Ranch was not its customer, and the dispute did not arise from its business since no transactions appeared on its books. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that NASD By-Laws and Code of Arbitration Procedure Rules 10101 and 10301, to which First Montauk was bound as a member, constituted enforceable written agreements requiring arbitration of eligible customer disputes arising from the member's business activities. The court reasoned that these rules, authorized by the NASD Board and incorporated into membership obligations, applied here without needing a separate customer agreement, resolving doubts in favor of arbitration.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Abbey v. Bill Ussery Motors, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1999-02-28 · cited 2×
This case involves a patent infringement claim by the plaintiff against defendants for products allegedly infringing U.S. Patent No. 4,387,685, which describes a fluidic control system requiring an interior passage in a movable spool. Following a Markman hearing, the court construed the patent claims to require the presence of an interior passage in the accused devices. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supported by the plaintiff's admissions that their devices lack this feature. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact and concluding that the defendants' products do not infringe the patent as a matter of law.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Abbey v. Bill Ussery Motors, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1999-02-26 · cited 3×
The case involves a patent infringement claim by plaintiff Harold G. Abbey against defendants regarding U.S. Patent No. 4,387,685, which covers a fluidic control system with a movable spool in a casing. The court construed the claims of the reexamined patent, ruling that they require a spool with an interior central parabolic venturi flow passage in addition to an exterior passage, based on the plain language of the claims, the specification, and prosecution history. The court also granted partial summary judgment, holding that the reexamined claims were substantively changed during reexamination and thus cannot be enforced against infringing devices made or sold before the reexamination certificate issued on February 3, 1998, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 307 and 252.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Cramer v. Chiles
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1999-01-08 · cited 28×
This case was a class action lawsuit brought by individuals with developmental disabilities residing in private intermediate care facilities against the State of Florida, challenging a 1996 state law (HB 1621) that eliminated Medicaid reimbursement for private ICF/DD facilities while preserving state-operated ones with insufficient capacity. The court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, ruling that the law violated federal statutes including Title II of the ADA by denying eligible individuals a choice between institutional care and the Home and Community-Based Waiver program. The core reasoning was that each plaintiff qualified as a person with a disability entitled to public services under the ADA, the programs constituted public services, and the legislation summarily removed options without providing adequate alternatives or notice, necessitating a transitional plan developed by an appointed panel with retained jurisdiction for enforcement.
civil rightshealthcare
Klein v. FLORIDA, DEPT. CHILDREN & FAMILY SERV.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1998-12-31 · cited 2×
The case involved a former state employee who sued her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that complications from menopause prevented her from arriving at work by 8 a.m. and that her employer failed to provide reasonable accommodations such as a later start time. The plaintiff also claimed a pre-existing bipolar disorder as a separate basis for discrimination, though she had not disclosed it to her employer. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the temporary symptoms described did not substantially limit a major life activity and therefore did not qualify as a disability or handicap under either statute. The court further reasoned that the employer could not have discriminated on the basis of the undisclosed bipolar disorder. Because no qualifying disability was established, the court did not reach questions of reasonable accommodation or the employer's stated reasons for termination.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Florida · 1998-12-31 · cited 1×
This case involved a former clerical employee suing her manufacturing employer for alleged pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act after her termination following three months of employment, along with common-law claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment after considering the pleadings, discovery, and arguments, finding no genuine issues of material fact. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court determined that the employer articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination based on the plaintiff's poor attendance, absenteeism, and tardiness, which the plaintiff did not sufficiently rebut as pretextual. The court also dismissed the emotional distress claims, noting the absence of any legal basis for negligent infliction and the lack of extreme or outrageous conduct required for intentional infliction under Florida law.
labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability