Sandra J. Feuerstein

In this case, pro se plaintiff Jay Gusler, a firefighter, sued the City of Long Beach, its volunteer fire department, and various officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, alleging retaliation for his protected speech, association, and petitioning activities in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, along with related state claims, arising from disputes over staffing, department operations, complaints, and internal matters. The district court reviewed objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation on defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). After de novo review of the disputed portions, the court modified and accepted the report, granting dismissal of the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action in full; dismissing certain Section 1983 claims against individual defendants without prejudice; dismissing portions of the first and third causes of action based on unprotected speech or conduct; denying the motion as to the remaining claims; and granting plaintiff leave to amend specific aspects of his complaint. The reasoning centered on whether the alleged speech and petitions were protected under the First Amendment, the sufficiency of conspiracy and equal protection allegations, and the application of qualified immunity.

free speechcivil rightsprocedurefederal power

This case involves the SEC's civil enforcement action against Tomo Razmilovic, a former president and COO of Symbol Technologies, alleging violations of federal securities laws through financial misstatements and related misconduct. After Razmilovic refused to appear for an in-person deposition in the United States, the court entered a default judgment against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for failing to comply with discovery orders. The court then conducted a bench trial on remedies and determined that Razmilovic must disgorge approximately $41 million in ill-gotten gains from compensation, stock options, and sales tied to the fraud period, along with prejudgment interest calculated from specific dates, a $1 million civil penalty, and permanent injunctions barring him from serving as an officer or director of public companies and from future securities law violations.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Allstate Insurance sued Dr. Charles Leo Cooper, alleging he conspired with attorney Arthur Bogoraz to defraud the insurer by submitting no-fault benefit claims through Sharp Radiology, P.C., a medical professional corporation that was allegedly fraudulently incorporated and controlled by the non-physician Bogoraz in violation of New York Business Corporation Law requirements for physician ownership and operation. The claims included violations of the federal RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d)) along with New York General Business Law § 349, common-law fraud, and unjust enrichment, based on an alleged agreement to split the improperly obtained insurance proceeds. On Cooper's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court dismissed only the § 349 claim and denied dismissal of the remaining claims. The court reasoned that the complaint's factual allegations, including Bogoraz's affidavit and the details of the ownership and profit-sharing arrangement, were sufficient to state plausible claims under the RICO provisions at the pleading stage.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved a former student suing her school district and several officials under Section 1983, Title IX, and New York state law, claiming violations of due process and negligent supervision after she was allegedly sexually harassed and photographed following an off-campus drinking incident in April 2005. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint in full. It held that the plaintiff failed to show deliberate indifference or an official policy or custom that caused any constitutional violation under federal law, and that the state-law tort claims were barred by failure to serve a timely notice of claim. The opinion also noted the absence of evidence linking school officials' actions to the harassment or to any deprivation of educational access.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a commercial lease dispute for a gasoline service station in New York, where Spa 77 G L.P. sued Motiva Enterprises LLC under diversity jurisdiction for unpaid rent, real estate taxes, repairs, and related costs after the lease term ended on June 30, 2006. Motiva had removed underground tanks but faced ongoing environmental remediation obligations due to petroleum contamination, and it also brought a third-party indemnification claim against sublessee Sergio. Spa 77 moved for summary judgment, which the court granted in part and denied in part. The court awarded Spa 77 holdover rent damages for the period until Motiva satisfied key lease conditions like equipment removal and site repairs, based on the lease terms and New York law, but denied recovery for real estate taxes and certain repair costs due to insufficient evidence of actual expenses.

propertybusiness & regulatoryenvironmentprocedure

This case involved T-Mobile Northeast LLC's application to the Incorporated Village of East Hills and its Zoning Board of Appeals for variances and a special exception permit to install eight wireless telecommunications antennas on an existing building's rooftop along with related equipment. The Village denied the application in December 2009, prompting T-Mobile to sue under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)) and New York CPLR Article 78, alleging the denial was not supported by substantial evidence and violated federal requirements. After defendants failed to properly contest T-Mobile's factual statements, Magistrate Judge Boyle recommended granting summary judgment to T-Mobile, finding the denial lacked substantial evidence and recommending an injunction to issue the permits. With no objections filed, District Judge Feuerstein adopted the Report in full, granted the motion for summary judgment, and ordered the Village to approve the facility.

business & regulatoryfederal power

Zibiz Corporation, a Delaware company based in New York, sued FCN Technology Solutions, a Maryland company, in federal court under diversity jurisdiction for breach of contract, tortious interference with business opportunity, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The claims stemmed from the parties' agreements to partner on a bid for a U.S. Air Force IT project in Hawaii after Zibiz had conducted demonstrations there, with allegations that FCN later submitted its own bid using Zibiz's information. FCN moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, holding that FCN had not transacted business in New York in a manner creating a substantial nexus to the claims, as the contracts were neither negotiated nor executed in New York and the alleged breaches occurred outside the state.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, wireless provider MetroPCS sued the Village of East Hills after the village zoning board denied its application for a special exception permit and variances to install six antennas on an existing commercial building to address a coverage gap. The court granted MetroPCS's motion for summary judgment, holding that the denial violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The decision rested on findings that the record lacked substantial evidence supporting the denial and that the board had unreasonably discriminated against MetroPCS by approving similar applications from other carriers without distinguishing safety, aesthetic, or visual concerns. The court ordered the village to issue the requested permits and variances. An Article 78 claim under New York law was not addressed as the federal claim provided sufficient relief.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproperty

This case involves plaintiff Tracy Lee Cohn, a customer service representative employed by utility companies, who alleged employment discrimination based on her disability from a spinal injury, along with a hostile work environment and retaliation under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and NYSHRL. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 21 and 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the ADA claims as time-barred because the plaintiff filed more than 90 days after the prior action's final judgment, dismissing NYSHRL claims against certain individual defendants for failure to state a claim, but allowing the Rehabilitation Act claim against the corporate defendants and some NYSHRL claims to proceed.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Vincent Castanza sued the Town of Brookhaven and various officials after town employees entered his property in 2005 to remove items deemed litter under the town's Sanitary Code, alleging trespass, emotional distress, and violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It dismissed the trespass claim because the town was authorized to enter the property under local code provisions allowing abatement of nuisances, and it dismissed the emotional distress claims for lack of evidence of extreme conduct or a special duty. The court allowed the substantive due process claim under § 1983 to proceed against the Town, finding that issues of material fact remained regarding whether the town's actions were arbitrary or conscience-shocking.

civil rightspropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a debtor who filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection and later converted the case to Chapter 7. While the Chapter 13 case was pending, the debtor, acting as an officer of his company, sold trucks that were property of the bankruptcy estate and directed the proceeds to his wife and other entities instead of using them to pay creditors or turning them over to the estate. The bankruptcy court denied the debtor a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(B) after finding that the transfers were made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. The district court affirmed, holding that the post-petition transfers of estate property satisfied the statutory requirements for denial of discharge and that the debtor's explanations did not overcome the evidence of improper intent.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved former seasonal and part-time police officers employed by the Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach who sued the village, its officials, Suffolk County entities, and others after their employment ended in 2006. The plaintiffs alleged that they were terminated in retaliation for complaining about departmental misconduct, such as the hiring of uncertified officers and on-duty alcohol consumption, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for First Amendment and due process violations, plus various state law claims including defamation and civil conspiracy. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the defendants' summary judgment motions in part, dismissing the federal and state free speech retaliation and due process claims with prejudice due to lack of protected activity, causation, or other required elements. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismissed them under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

civil rightsfree speechlabor & employment

This case involves a police officer's lawsuit against the Village of Rockville Centre, its police department, and officials, alleging employment discrimination, retaliation for complaints about misconduct, due process violations related to termination, and related claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, New York Human Rights Law, and other statutes. The district court conducted a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report recommending partial denial of the defendants' summary judgment motions and overruled the defendants' objections to that report. The court accepted the report in full, granting summary judgment to dismiss claims including Title VII against individuals, Monell liability, due process (finding no stigmatizing statements), Title VI, and breach of contract, while allowing Title VII retaliation claims against the Village, New York Human Rights Law claims, and certain personal-capacity § 1981 and § 1983 claims to proceed. The reasoning centered on the absence of clear error in the magistrate's application of summary judgment standards, requirements for prima facie retaliation cases, personal involvement of defendants, and qualified immunity analysis.

civil rightslabor & employmentfree speechprocedure

This case involves a Caucasian police sergeant employed by the Village of Southampton who sued the Village, its Board of Trustees, and various officials, alleging racial and political discrimination in a failure to promote him to detective sergeant and chief of police positions, as well as retaliation for filing EEOC charges and reporting misconduct such as ticket-fixing. The plaintiff claimed violations of federal civil rights statutes including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, Title VII, and related state laws, asserting that a less-qualified Black officer was promoted to gain political support and that he faced adverse actions for his political affiliations and complaints. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and on the pleadings. The court denied dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and abstention, denied dismissal of the Title VII claims (with limited leave to renew), but granted dismissal of the Section 1985 claims and all claims against individual Village Board trustees, and dismissed official-capacity claims against remaining individuals as redundant to the claims against the Village and Board.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned a challenge by ferry operators and a terminal owner to the Town of East Hampton's Ferry Law, enacted in 1998 as part of a comprehensive transportation plan. The law restricted ferry speeds, passenger capacities, and vehicle transport to address longstanding traffic congestion on the South Fork of Long Island, which multiple studies had linked to population growth, limited roads, and seasonal tourism. The court examined the town's adoption process, including moratoria, public hearings, and recommendations against expanded ferry service, while noting alternative travel routes and the plaintiffs' existing operations to out-of-state destinations. It evaluated the law's application to interstate passenger ferries amid evidence of increasing regional transportation demands.

business & regulatory

In Yerushalmi v. Shibolelth, the appellant appealed a bankruptcy court order that dismissed one cause of action but denied dismissal of six others in an adversary proceeding seeking to determine the nondischargeability of a state court judgment debt under bankruptcy code provisions and to deny discharge. The district court addressed the appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal, which argued that the bankruptcy order was interlocutory and that the appellant had not properly sought leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and related rules. The court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the order did not finally resolve any discrete claim, that no controlling question of law with substantial grounds for difference of opinion existed to justify interlocutory review, and that the collateral order doctrine did not apply because review remained available after final judgment.

procedure

This case involved a former employee suing his employer, Maxim Healthcare Services, for retaliation under Title VII, Section 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law after he opposed the company's alleged discriminatory hiring policies against women and minorities. Following a bifurcated trial, the jury found the defendant liable for retaliation and awarded the plaintiff $137,935 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. The defendant moved for a new trial or remittitur of the punitive damages. The court denied the motion for a new trial, concluding that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and did not constitute a miscarriage of justice, but granted remittitur on the punitive damages award after considering due process limits and the relationship to the compensatory damages.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Modeste v. Horn, petitioner Ronald Modeste, who had been convicted after a bench trial of third-degree assault and second-degree harassment, sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The district court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. It reasoned that, under New York's youthful offender procedure, the adjudication was not a criminal conviction, the maximum potential sentence was six months, and the offense was therefore classified as petty, so that no jury trial was required by clearly established federal law; the court also noted that the state appellate court had rejected related claims as meritless or unpreserved.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved members of the South Country Peace Group who sought a preliminary injunction requiring the Incorporated Village of Bellport to issue a parade permit for their annual World Peace Vigil without mandating proof of liability insurance or an indemnification agreement. The plaintiffs had marched on sidewalks in 2006 after their permit application was denied and challenged the insurance and indemnity requirements as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech under the First Amendment and New York Constitution. The court denied the injunction, holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because the Village had offered reasonable alternatives such as sidewalk marching or securing a sponsor, and any potential chilling effect on speech was too conjectural without evidence of specific injury. The Village's cross-motion for sanctions was held in abeyance.

free speechcivil rights

In McCrary v. County of Nassau, a pro se plaintiff brought two related § 1983 actions alleging that Nassau County, District Attorney Rice, and Court Clerk Hecht violated his civil rights by allowing false police testimony before a grand jury in his robbery case, failing to disclose or correct it, refusing to prosecute the officers and ADA involved, and dismissing his cross-complaints against them pursuant to an alleged county policy of ignoring criminal complaints filed by accused persons against police. The court addressed motions for judgment on the pleadings and dismissal under Rules 12(c) and 12(b)(6). It denied Nassau County's motion in the first action (06-CV-3048), granted in part and denied in part the motions by Nassau County and Rice in the second action (06-CV-4982) while granting Hecht's motion to dismiss entirely, primarily on grounds of prosecutorial immunity for Rice, lack of personal involvement by Hecht, and partial sufficiency of equal protection claims against the county under precedents like Myers v. County of Orange.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure