Phillip S. Figa

This case involves a Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit brought by Sharon Bethel, as conservator for David Bethel, against the United States for injuries sustained during surgery at a Veterans Administration Medical Center in 2003. The plaintiffs had initially asserted medical negligence claims based on events in the operating room and later moved to amend the complaint to add a claim for negligent credentialing and privileging of one of the anesthesiologists. The court denied the motion to amend, finding it futile because the new claim had not been exhausted through the required administrative tort claim process. Under the FTCA, a plaintiff must present a written statement describing the injury and a sum certain damages claim to the appropriate agency, which allows the government to investigate; the original administrative filing only described the surgery-day events and did not mention any pre-surgery credentialing failures. Because the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and strictly construed, the proposed amendment could not proceed.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a pro se prisoner plaintiff alleging that prison guards used excessive force against him in October 2001, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, after he refused to wear orange pants while in segregation. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The plaintiff responded that his mental incompetence following the incident tolled the limitations period until at least July 2004 and prevented him from filing a timely grievance. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the motions, noting that allegations must be accepted as true and that dismissal on limitations grounds is inappropriate unless no facts could support tolling. With no objections filed, the District Court adopted the recommendation and denied the motions to dismiss.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act brought by relator Bobby Maxwell against Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., alleging the company submitted false records to avoid paying royalties to the government. A jury awarded damages to the United States, but the court subsequently dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the relator did not qualify as an original source under the FCA's public disclosure bar. The court denied the United States' motion to stay entry of judgment to consider intervention and the relator's motion to enter judgment on behalf of the United States. The core reasoning was that once the court determined it lacked jurisdiction, it had no authority to consider motions to intervene or enter judgment, and unlike in Rockwell, the government had not intervened to provide an independent basis for jurisdiction.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case was a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which relator Bobby Maxwell, a federal auditor with the Minerals Management Service, alleged that Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas underpaid royalties on offshore oil leases by selling oil below market value. After a jury verdict for the relator, the court reconsidered subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The core reasoning was that Maxwell did not qualify as an "original source" because he obtained the underlying information during his official audit duties and disclosed it to superiors involuntarily as part of his employment responsibilities, rather than through a voluntary disclosure to the government as required by the FCA's jurisdictional bar. The court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case was a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by prisoner Glenn Rosenstein challenging Bureau of Prisons regulation 28 C.F.R. § 570.21, which limited community corrections center (CCC) placement to the last ten percent of an inmate's sentence and no more than six months. The district court, bound by the Tenth Circuit's published decision in Wedelstedt v. Wiley, held the regulation invalid because it supplanted the five individualized factors that 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) requires the BOP to consider for all inmate placement and transfer decisions. The court therefore granted the petition to the extent of ordering the respondent to reconsider Rosenstein's CCC application in good faith without regard to the regulation, while denying the motion for preliminary injunction as moot.

criminal lawfederal power

This case involves post-trial and post-appeal motions for attorneys' fees and costs arising from a licensing agreement dispute in which a jury found defendant Heumann liable for breaching a confidentiality provision but found defendant Geerdes not liable. Following a Tenth Circuit decision that affirmed the jury verdict and prevailing-party fee award to Geerdes but reversed and remanded the reduced fee award to the plaintiff, the district court addressed renewed motions from the plaintiff and Geerdes along with related procedural requests. The court granted the plaintiff's motion in part, awarding it $189,000 in fees (allocated jointly and severally or severally among defendants) and $3,870.83 in costs against Heumann and Shidler; granted Geerdes' motion in part, awarding her an additional $116,000 in fees and $4,461.14 in costs against the plaintiff; and resolved ancillary motions for extensions and to strike by finding no prejudice from any timing issues. These awards were determined based on the appellate mandate, prior fee orders, and evidence of reasonable hours and rates after excluding previously decided items.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves Four Corners Nephrology Associates and Dr. Mark Bevan suing Mercy Medical Center of Durango after the hospital hired its own nephrologist, entered an exclusive agreement, and barred the plaintiffs from providing nephrology services at the facility, allegedly to monopolize the market. The plaintiffs asserted twelve claims including violations of the Sherman Act and Colorado Antitrust Act for monopolization, conspiracy, tying arrangements, as well as tortious interference and denial of privileges. The court addressed a motion to set the trial location, ultimately granting the defendant's request to hold the trial in Durango rather than Denver. The decision rested on factors such as the convenience of parties and witnesses, the location of events and evidence in the Four Corners region, practical considerations for an economical trial, and the interest of justice in having a local jury from the affected southwest Colorado counties decide issues arising in that area.

business & regulatoryprocedurehealthcare

The case concerned a Colorado state trooper's claim for uninsured motorist benefits under his personal auto policy after he was shot three times by the driver of a stolen vehicle during a traffic stop for following too closely. The insurer filed for declaratory judgment that no coverage was available, while the trooper counterclaimed for breach of contract, bad faith, and deceptive trade practices. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer and dismissed the counterclaims, ruling that the injuries did not qualify for coverage because they did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured vehicle as the policy required. The court explained that the policy limited coverage to bodily injury caused by an accident from the vehicle's use, but the intentional shooting was a separate criminal act for which the car was merely the site rather than the cause.

criminal lawgunsproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Kirk Tone, a bus driver employed by the Regional Transportation District (RTD), who was terminated after a work-related back injury when he was deemed unable to safely return to driving buses and no other position was found for him. Tone sued RTD under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging failure to reasonably accommodate his disability, discrimination by treating him less favorably than non-disabled employees, and wrongful termination based on a record of impairment or perceived disability. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. The core reasoning was that Tone did not qualify as disabled under the ADA because his impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity such as sitting, as shown by medical reports and his own testimony about working long hours driving an armored truck afterward.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case arose from a February 2002 incident in which plaintiff Barton was detained by Denver police officers, handcuffed, and charged with interfering with police authority; the charge was later dismissed for lack of probable cause. Barton sued the officers and various city officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest, unlawful search, excessive force, and malicious prosecution, and also asserted common-law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress, plus a request for injunctive relief based on an alleged policy of covering up police misconduct. The magistrate judge recommended granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that qualified immunity barred the excessive-force claim, that there was insufficient evidence of malice to support the malicious-prosecution claims, and that certain other claims failed as a matter of law, while allowing the unlawful-arrest and search portions of the first claim and part of the outrageous-conduct claim to proceed. The district court reviewed the magistrate's 36-page recommendation and the parties' objections to it.

civil rightscriminal lawtorts & liability

This case involves a debt collection action filed in Colorado state court by NCO Financial Systems against the Yaris for unpaid medical services, where the Yaris filed a third-party complaint against their insurer CIGNA claiming it failed to cover the expenses under an ERISA plan. CIGNA removed the case to federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction based on the ERISA claim in the third-party complaint. The court ordered the case remanded to Arapahoe County District Court, concluding that third-party defendants may not remove an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). The core reasoning adopts the majority judicial view that removal statutes must be strictly construed to allow removal only by the original defendant or defendants, that the claims here are not separate and independent, and that removal would create risks of inconsistent judgments while harming judicial economy.

procedure

This case was a consolidated shareholder derivative action brought by multiple plaintiffs on behalf of Carrier Access Corporation, a Delaware corporation, against its officers, directors, and a related LLC, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, abuse of control, gross mismanagement, waste of assets, Sarbanes-Oxley violations, and unjust enrichment based on improper financial reporting for 2003-2004, misleading press releases, and insider stock sales by certain defendants. The court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the nominal defendant corporation and individual defendants, dismissing the action without prejudice. The core reasoning was that under Delaware law the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead demand futility, as they did not allege particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that a majority of the six-member board was disinterested and independent or that the challenged conduct was not a valid exercise of business judgment, with the four independent outside directors not accused of insider trading and no facts shown to question their independence or the audit committee's oversight. The objection to the magistrate's discovery order was denied as moot.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a negligence lawsuit brought by a plaintiff against Target Stores after she tripped over a box in a store aisle, suffering injuries including a broken ankle. The defendant removed the case from Colorado state court to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction more than 30 days after the complaint was filed, arguing that it only recently learned the damages exceeded $75,000 through discovery responses. The court decided to remand the case to state court, holding that removal was untimely. The core reasoning was that the civil cover sheet filed with the complaint, which indicated the plaintiff sought more than $100,000, constituted "other paper" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) that started the 30-day removal clock when served on the defendant.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over whether an automobile insurer had made an adequate offer of enhanced personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under Colorado law. Plaintiff Ruth Lust, injured in a 2002 car accident, sued State Farm seeking reformation of her policy to remove the $50,000 PIP limits after her medical costs exceeded that amount, alleging the insurer failed to properly offer higher coverage options as required by C.R.S. § 10-4-710(2)(a). The court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that the insurer had mailed renewal notices and explanatory pamphlets detailing the enhanced PIP options (P4 and P8 coverages) to the plaintiff on multiple occasions before the accident. The court held that these mailings satisfied the statutory duty to offer the benefits, distinguished the requirements from those for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage under a different statute, and noted that no written rejection was mandated for enhanced PIP.

business & regulatory

In Enriques v. Noffsinger Manufacturing Co., a long-term employee sued his former employer alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and violations of Title VII, along with state law claims for promissory estoppel, outrageous conduct, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing following his termination. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the promissory estoppel claim, finding the allegations sufficient under Colorado law at the pleading stage, but granted dismissal of the outrageous conduct claim for failing to meet the required elements and the breach of covenant claim because it cannot alter the terms of an employment contract or limit at-will discharge absent an independent promise. The decision was based on accepting the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true and applying Colorado precedents on contract and tort claims in employment contexts.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

This case involved an Orthodox Jewish inmate at a Colorado state prison who sued the warden under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that denial of permission to wear required religious garments (a yarmulke and talit katan) during transport for medical treatment violated his First Amendment free exercise rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), resulting in an 18-month delay of eye surgery. The court granted in part the warden's motion for summary judgment by dismissing the RLUIPA claim, denied the warden's motion to dismiss that claim on constitutional grounds, and denied the inmate's motion to uphold the RLUIPA claim, while setting the remaining First Amendment claim for trial. The core reasoning was that a 2001 administrative regulation change allowing Jewish inmates to wear such garments during transport rendered the RLUIPA claim moot, that RLUIPA is constitutional under precedents from other circuits, and that qualified immunity and statute-of-limitations defenses did not fully resolve the First Amendment claim at this stage.

religious libertycriminal lawcivil rights

In Apa v. Qwest Corp., the court considered a notice of attorney's lien filed by the plaintiff's former counsel seeking $4,645.48 in reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs after the attorney withdrew from the case. Following a settlement between the pro se plaintiff and defendant Qwest, with settlement funds deposited into the court registry subject to the lien, the plaintiff objected to the lien amount. Applying Colorado statutes and ethics rules governing attorney's charging liens, the court partially allowed the lien for reasonable costs such as adjusted in-house copying, deposition transcripts, and postage while disallowing certain September 2005 copying charges and interest, resulting in an award of $3,022.86 to counsel and the balance to the plaintiff.

procedure

This case involved a pro se plaintiff, a licensed attorney, who filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state and county officials, including a water court judge and a county sheriff, alleging violations of his Fifth, Fourteenth, Eighth, and First Amendment rights arising from an adverse state water court ruling, contempt findings, brief jail confinement, and alleged inadequate medical care while incarcerated. The district court overruled the plaintiff's objections and adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss and the sheriff's motion for summary judgment while denying the plaintiff's various motions for injunctive relief, summary judgment, and an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred jurisdiction over claims inextricably intertwined with the ongoing state water court proceedings and that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of personal involvement, deliberate indifference, or an unconstitutional custom or policy to support claims against the sheriff. The dismissals were with prejudice, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In Osborn v. Qwest Corp., plaintiff Sharon Osborn, a former Qwest management employee, sued Qwest, the Qwest Management Separation Plan, and the Qwest Employee Benefits Committee under ERISA Section 510, alleging that her December 2003 termination following an off-duty altercation was intended to prevent her from receiving severance benefits available during a reduction in force, and that the denial of her administrative claim for benefits breached fiduciary duties under Section 404. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the termination resulted solely from misconduct violating the company code of conduct, was unrelated to the later RIF, and that the plan entities were not proper parties. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether interference with benefits was a motivating factor in the discharge and whether the claims process provided a full and fair review, precluding summary judgment on the Section 510 and fiduciary claims.

labor & employment

This case involved Consumer Crusade, Inc. filing claims in Denver District Court against Fairon & Associates, Inc. and Patrick Fairon under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) for alleged violations related to unsolicited faxes or calls. The defendants removed the action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The court, acting sua sponte, ordered the parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded, citing multiple federal circuit decisions holding that 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) grants exclusive jurisdiction over private TCPA claims to state courts. Despite arguments that diversity jurisdiction allowed the case to proceed in federal court, the court concluded that the TCPA's structure and legislative intent, combined with Tenth Circuit precedent requiring narrow construction of removal jurisdiction, precluded federal jurisdiction even on diversity grounds. The case was therefore remanded to Denver District Court.

procedurefederal power