This case involved a class of parents challenging the Pueblo School District 60's decisions to close Hyde Park and Spann elementary schools and to open a new charter school, Pueblo School for the Arts and Sciences, under Colorado's Charter Schools Act. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, and related federal education statutes, claiming the actions disproportionately affected minority and low-income students and deprived them of certain benefits. After consolidating hearings on preliminary and permanent injunctions, reviewing extensive testimony from thirty witnesses, and examining over 200 exhibits, the court denied the motion for a permanent injunction and granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the school board's decisions were not motivated by discriminatory intent, did not violate equal protection or due process, and that the Charter Schools Act was constitutional both facially and as applied. Jurisdiction ended with the final order without ongoing court supervision.
The case involved an insurance company, Allstate, seeking reimbursement from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for personal injury protection benefits paid to its insured who was injured in a bus accident caused by a negligent U.S. Army driver at Fort Carson, Colorado. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the United States, as a self-insured entity, was in compliance with the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act and thus not subject to subrogation claims by the insurer. The reasoning centered on the FTCA's provision that the government is liable only to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, and that the coverage provided through the FTCA and FECA was equivalent to that required by state law, precluding the subrogation action under C.R.S. § 10-4-713.
This case is a civil forfeiture action in rem brought by the United States under 21 U.S.C. § 881 to seize real properties and currency linked to Philip May's conviction for conspiring to purchase cocaine. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and denied the claimant's motion, ordering forfeiture of the Titan Property, the Residence, and the two sums of currency. The core reasoning was that the facts from the arrest, searches, and conviction established the properties' use to facilitate drug trafficking and the currency's connection to the illegal transaction under the statute, with no genuine issues of material fact.
This case involved a Colorado physician whose medical license was suspended by the Board of Medical Examiners after he declined to undergo an evaluation by the Colorado Physician Health Program; the plaintiff sued two board officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging violations of his property, liberty, privacy, due-process, and search-and-seizure rights. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, asserting immunity. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint in full. It held that the officials were immune from damages in their official capacities because they were not “persons” under § 1983 and because the Eleventh Amendment barred suits for damages against the state. In their individual capacities, the prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity for initiating proceedings, the remaining defendant was entitled to qualified immunity for following the Medical Practice Act, and the plaintiff’s additional statutory and state-constitutional claims were either inapplicable or unauthorized.
The case involved claims by Andrea Holdridge against BCS Life Insurance Company and related insurers for denying coverage of her leukemia treatment under a university student health policy, alleging the condition was pre-existing because symptoms appeared before the policy's effective date. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied most of the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact on the policy's effective date and whether the plaintiff had been treated for or advised about the condition beforehand. It granted the plaintiff's motion only to the extent of holding that the pre-existing condition definition in the university booklet controlled over the master policy. The core reasoning applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards, requiring that evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and that factual issues be reserved for the jury when they could affect the outcome.
This case involved claims by Astarte, Inc. and Pacific Separator Manufacturing, Inc. (PSMI) against Scott Marshall for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty arising from agreements to license and operate Tilby sugar cane processing technology, including alleged usurpation of corporate opportunities and conspiracy to render PSMI insolvent. After settling with other defendants, the matter proceeded to a bench trial solely against Marshall. The court ruled in favor of Marshall on all claims, finding that the technology had never operated on a commercially viable basis, that plaintiffs' evidence of lost profits and business opportunities was speculative and insufficient, and that out-of-pocket losses had already been addressed in the settlement with other parties. The decision rested on Rule 52 findings that plaintiffs failed to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence.