Clarkson Sherman Fisher

The case involves a former employee of General Electric suing for employment discrimination after not being rehired for a Quality Assurance Specialist position, claiming bias based on his history of depression and other mental health issues under both the federal Americans with Disabilities Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Following a Third Circuit remand, the district court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment on the LAD claim. The court reasoned that the LAD defines 'handicapped' more broadly than the ADA's 'disability' standard, allowing coverage for the plaintiff's actual mental conditions or for being perceived as handicapped, which raised a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved the State of New Jersey's appeal from a bankruptcy court's denial of its motion to lift the automatic stay so it could pursue a civil fraud lawsuit in state court against debtor Peter Mocco, who had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy while the suit was pending. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, holding that the State was barred from proceeding because it had failed to file a proof of claim or nondischargeability complaint by the deadline set in the bankruptcy case. The court rejected the State's sovereign immunity argument, reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply since the State was not a defendant in the bankruptcy proceeding and had been scheduled as a creditor with notice of the deadlines. It further noted that the confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 11 plan discharged any unfiled claims, consistent with Bankruptcy Rule 3003 and relevant precedent.

federal powerprocedure

The case involved Dennis Gaul, an AT&T employee diagnosed with depression and stress disorders, who sued AT&T for failing to accommodate his disability by transferring him away from a stressful project with a difficult colleague, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act; he also asserted breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on the company's employment manual and policies. The court granted AT&T's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The core reasoning was that Gaul's requested accommodation was not reasonable as a matter of law, AT&T had no contractual obligation it breached given the lack of a reasonable need for accommodation, there was no constructive discharge because Gaul went out on disability leave rather than resigning amid intolerable conditions, and plaintiff offered no evidence of bad faith by the employer.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a former Bell Atlantic employee who sued the company and a supervisor in New Jersey state court, alleging gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, plus claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing related to unpaid vacation time, disability benefits, and length-of-service calculations. The defendant removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and the plaintiff moved to remand it. The court denied the motion to remand, finding that Counts Five and Six of the complaint were preempted by ERISA and Section 301 of the LMRA because they concerned rights under an employee benefit plan and a collective bargaining agreement, thereby presenting federal questions that conferred jurisdiction on the federal court.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves a declaratory judgment action by DNA Plant Technology Corp. against Navigators Insurance Company seeking coverage under an all-risk policy for the loss of hybrid tomato seeds shipped from Thailand to California. The central issue was which party bears the burden of proving that the loss occurred within the policy's territorial limits of the United States. The court held that the plaintiff must establish as part of its prima facie case that the seeds arrived in the United States and were lost after arrival. The reasoning was that the territorial limitation is a basic coverage requirement rather than an excluded peril, so the all-risk nature of the policy does not shift the burden on that issue, analogous to proving a loss occurred during the policy period.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case arose after Kenneth Clark, suspected of bank robbery, was fatally shot in the back by an accidental discharge from a shotgun carried by Hamilton Township Police Detective Donald Buchko during the FBI-assisted execution of an arrest warrant and search warrant at Clark's residence. Clark's estate brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Buchko, other officers, and the township, alleging constitutional violations including failure to train on proper weapon handling and suspect apprehension. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissing the federal constitutional claims because the record contained no evidence of prior similar incidents, deliberate indifference, or a conscious choice not to train officers, and it dismissed the remaining state-law claims without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved data entry operators suing Unisys and Pertec under the New Jersey Products Liability Act, alleging that design defects and inadequate warnings in the CMC-108 keyboard caused their upper extremity disorders such as carpal tunnel syndrome. Plaintiffs offered expert opinions from ergonomists, engineers, and a physician to establish causation between keystroking on the keyboard and their injuries. The court evaluated the experts' qualifications and methodologies under the Daubert framework for reliability. It granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to exclude the testimony, barring the opinions of Drs. Kroemer, Thompson, and Glucksberg while permitting Dr. Rosenberg's differential diagnosis, which relied on physical exams, work histories, and other factors without needing additional epidemiological studies or exhaustive alternative-cause testing.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the enforceability of a financing agreement between Paul Dopp and Bob Yari, under which Yari provided funds for Dopp's ongoing litigation and living expenses in exchange for a share of any proceeds. After the underlying suit concluded with a substantial recovery, Dopp refused to pay the $1.5 million due under the contract, leading both parties to file suit. The court granted Yari's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and denied Dopp's cross-motion, holding that the agreement was enforceable as a joint undertaking with contingent returns rather than a loan subject to New Jersey's criminal usury statute. The court reasoned that the transaction lacked fixed maturity or interest terms typical of loans, any potential return was speculative and not usurious, and enforcement did not violate public policy.

business & regulatorycriminal law

This case involved a dispute over whether a professional liability insurance policy required National Union Fire Insurance Company to defend attorney Norman Shabel against claims by former clients seeking recovery of allegedly excessive fees from settlements. The clients' state court actions alleged various claims including negligence, breach of contract, and conversion, but sought only the return of fees. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that the policy's exclusion for claims seeking the return or reimbursement of legal fees applied, as the nature of the relief requested was the recoupment of fees rather than other damages from malpractice.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from business disputes among shareholders and officers of several Delaware corporations (including AEI, IDP, and MedTech) with operations in New Jersey, where plaintiffs Coyer and AEI sued Hemmer for converting shares and breaching fiduciary duties by failing to disclose information related to a prior shareholder derivative suit, and Hemmer responded with counterclaims and third-party claims alleging breaches of employment contracts, fiduciary duties, fraud, and economic duress. On a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court dismissed counts 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 in full, along with counts 1, 5, and 6 as to certain parties like Mrs. Coyer, Barus, and AEI. The reasoning centered on the counterclaims' failure to plead sufficient specific facts to support the alleged claims, such as economic duress or aiding and abetting, without addressing broader questions like whether New Jersey recognizes certain torts.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves pretrial motions in a federal civil rights lawsuit brought by plaintiff Robert Harrington, a school superintendent, against various defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, alleging conspiracy and related claims. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to adjourn the September 6, 1995 trial date, which had already been postponed twice, because the requests were tied to counsel's vacation plans and further delay was unwarranted. On reconsideration of its prior order, the court clarified that counts two and three were intended as § 1983 claims rather than the § 1985/§ 1986 claims it had previously assumed, leading to adjustments under the law-of-the-case doctrine while noting the absence of class-based animus allegations. The court also affirmed the magistrate judge's denial of leave to file a fourth amended complaint due to undue prejudice, delay, and futility. Finally, it addressed but did not resolve in the excerpt a motion for sanctions against the plaintiff and his attorney for alleged bad-faith conduct.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved the Secretary of Labor suing the trustees of employee benefit and profit-sharing plans for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty under ERISA sections 404(a)(1)(B) and (C) by purchasing stock in Statewide Bancorp, Inc., which later became worthless after the company's 1991 bankruptcy. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the 1988 purchases, contending those claims were time-barred by ERISA's six-year statute of limitations. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the claims alleged ongoing omissions (failure to divest or diversify) rather than discrete acts, so the limitations period began when the trustees could still have cured the breach, which was as late as 1991 when the stock retained value.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a school superintendent who sued the township board of education and individual members after they voted to relieve him of his duties following a board election that changed its composition, though the board continued paying his full salary under the contract. Plaintiff alleged violations of his First Amendment free speech rights and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy claims, and retaliation under New Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). The court granted partial summary judgment to defendants, dismissing the Fifth Amendment claim as inapplicable to state actors and the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because full compensation meant no deprivation of a protected property interest occurred. It also dismissed the conspiracy and willful injury counts but denied summary judgment on the CEPA claim, allowing potential compensatory damages beyond the contract payments already made. The rulings rested on federal constitutional limits, the absence of an actionable property deprivation under state law interpretations, and CEPA's broad remedial provisions.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a public employee's lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging a county health board's drug-testing policy after he was suspended for refusing to provide a urine sample without any individualized suspicion or triggering event under the policy. The policy, which required testing for new hires, during annual physicals, and for cause, was later rescinded along with the plaintiff's suspension and withheld pay. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims, holding that the request for a urine sample implicated constitutional protections even though no sample was provided. It granted qualified immunity to the individual supervisor but denied it to the board, and granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability, reasoning that the policy as applied to him constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments without reasonable suspicion.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Moody v. Township of Marlboro, plaintiff Michael Moody sued his employer, the Township of Marlboro, and its Chief of Police, alleging he was passed over for promotion in retaliation for filing an earlier lawsuit claiming violations of his constitutional rights. Moody sought to testify about an alleged statement by the Chief's attorney during a break in a deposition from the prior case, in which the attorney reportedly said Moody could never expect to be promoted. Defendant Walker moved to bar this testimony as inadmissible hearsay. The court granted the motion, holding that the statement did not qualify as a non-hearsay admission by a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) because the attorney was acting outside the scope of the agency relationship when speaking during the deposition break rather than in the course of the proceedings.

procedurecivil rightslabor & employment

This case involves a contractual dispute between Ilan-Gat Engineers, an Israeli housing contractor, and Shelter Systems Corp., a New Jersey manufacturer, arising from a 1990 agreement for the purchase of prefabricated housing units and an exclusivity clause designating Ilan-Gat as Shelter's agent in Israel. Ilan-Gat sought judgment on the pleadings for a 6% (or alternatively 3%) commission on Shelter's later sale of units to another Israeli builder for Tender 321, arguing that admitted facts entitled it to payment and that the forum selection clause barred certain defenses. The court denied the motion, holding that disputed issues of material fact existed regarding whether Ilan-Gat timely paid for prior units (which could void the exclusivity clause), the scope of Ilan-Gat's permitted activities under the agency relationship, and the authority of a Shelter representative who referenced the higher commission rate. Resolution of these defenses, including potential breaches by competition or late payment, required discovery beyond the pleadings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a police officer who sued his township and supervisors after receiving discipline for opposing an alleged illegal quota system for issuing summonses, asserting claims under the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the state constitution, and New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). A jury awarded the plaintiff $780 on the First Amendment and CEPA claims, but the district court later granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the federal constitutional claim and the Third Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff then sought nearly $176,000 in attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting provision of CEPA. The court determined that the plaintiff was a prevailing party on the CEPA claim, which was factually intertwined with the dismissed federal claims, but concluded that the limited success warranted a substantial reduction from the lodestar amount. Applying standards analogous to those in Hensley v. Eckerhart, the court awarded $25,000 in fees as reasonable under N.J.S.A. 34:19-5(e).

labor & employmentcivil rightsfree speech

The case concerns plaintiffs' claims that defendants infringed their copyrights on unique miniature golf course hole designs and engaged in unfair competition by operating a similar course in New Jersey. The court granted plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint adding allegations about copyright registration and interstate commerce. It dismissed the unjust-enrichment, conversion, and quantum meruit counts as preempted by federal copyright law because they were based on the same facts as the infringement claims, but it denied summary judgment on the copyright infringement and remaining unfair-competition claims, finding no preemption for palming-off allegations and unresolved factual disputes. The rulings rested on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards, preemption analysis under the Copyright Act, and liberal amendment rules under Rule 15.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This insurance coverage dispute arose when Nestlé Foods Corporation sought indemnification and defense costs from Aetna Casualty & Surety Company under general liability policies for environmental cleanup obligations imposed by state and federal authorities at the Lone Pine Landfill, where wastes from Nestlé's New Jersey manufacturing plant had been disposed. The parties stipulated that property damage triggering coverage had occurred, leaving the applicability of the expected/intended exclusion and the pollution exclusion as the central issues on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court denied Nestlé's motion as to the expected/intended defense, granted it as to the pollution exclusion (precluding Aetna from asserting that defense at trial), and denied Aetna's motion in its entirety, including requests to dismiss claims under the personal injury liability endorsement and for punitive damages. The decision rested on the absence of sufficient evidence for summary judgment on the expected/intended issue and on New Jersey precedents interpreting the pollution exclusion in the environmental liability context.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a standing bankruptcy trustee who challenged the United States Trustee's unilateral reduction of his percentage fee from 8.5% to 5.5% for the 1994 fiscal year, alleging arbitrary action and seeking court approval of a higher rate based on his proposed budget. The United States moved to withdraw the reference of the proceeding from the bankruptcy court to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), contending that the matter required consideration of non-bankruptcy federal statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) governing the Attorney General's authority to set trustee compensation. The district court granted the motion for withdrawal, concluding that resolution of the dispute necessitated substantial and material analysis of those other federal laws regulating activities affecting interstate commerce and that legislative intent supported removing administrative functions like fee-setting from judicial oversight.

procedurefederal powerbusiness & regulatory