This case concerned Analytical Systems Corp.'s attempt to enjoin the Small Business Administration from classifying IOCS as disadvantaged and awarding it a non-competitive contract. Plaintiffs argued this violated SBA regulations allowing such awards only when competitive bidding was not feasible. The court determined that plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the factual issue of IOCS's competitive readiness and, more critically, that federal law bars injunctions against the SBA administrator under 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1), leading to denial of the preliminary injunction motion.
In Feldberg v. O'Connell, limited partners in Capital Management Associates sued various defendants including the accounting firm Meahl, McNamara & Co. for preparing an auditors' report containing untrue statements about the market value and marketability of securities owned by the partnership, which allegedly misled the plaintiffs into delaying dissolution of the partnership and converting their interests to cash, resulting in losses. Count Six asserted claims against the firm under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, while Count Eleven asserted related state-law claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and negligence under pendant jurisdiction. The court denied the firm's motion to dismiss both counts, holding that the partnership could be sued as an entity under federal law pursuant to Rule 17(b), that plaintiffs qualified as forced sellers with standing because the broad definition of a "sale" under Rule 10b-5 encompasses liquidations and forced dispositions of securities, and that a later decision by other partners to liquidate the partnership established their position despite the transaction not being fully consummated.
In this case, a plaintiff shipped frozen research materials via the defendant air freight carrier with instructions to store them frozen, but the carrier negligently affixed a label covering those markings, causing the materials to spoil upon arrival before the plaintiff could retrieve them. The court found the carrier negligent and liable for the loss. However, it limited the plaintiff's recovery to the $50 minimum set by the carrier's tariff on file with the Civil Aeronautics Board, as no higher value had been declared on the airbill or additional charges paid. The court rejected arguments that fraud or a material deviation from the shipping contract allowed recovery of the full $30,000 in claimed damages, holding that the tariff provisions were binding and mere negligence did not constitute such a deviation.
This case involved a claim for treble damages and injunctive relief under the Clayton Act, alleging that the defendant insurance company and others combined through membership in the Insurance Rating Board to fix prices for automobile physical damage insurance. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The court granted the motion, holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act rendered the Clayton Act inapplicable because Massachusetts law comprehensively regulated the insurance business, including the activities of rating organizations, with the state commissioner empowered to review and set aside rates after filing. The court further reasoned that the defendant's participation in the state-authorized rating board constituted state action exempt from federal antitrust laws under precedents like Parker v. Brown.
In Medina v. Time, Inc., a U.S. Army captain sued the publisher of Time Magazine for libel over a 1969 article reporting an eyewitness account that the plaintiff had shot a child during the My Lai incident in Vietnam and questioning the lack of charges against him. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It held that the plaintiff, as a public officer and public figure involved in a matter of intense public concern, was required under the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to prove with convincing clarity that the article was published with actual malice. The defendant submitted affidavits detailing its investigation and belief in the truth of the reported facts, while the plaintiff provided no contrary evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to actual malice. The court therefore concluded that the First Amendment protections barred the claim.
The case involved a Rhode Island bank that held a perfected security interest in three Cadillacs under financing agreements with a Rhode Island auto dealer, suing a Massachusetts used-car dealer for conversion after the dealer acquired the vehicles from the original seller without paying and refused to return them or their value upon demand. The court entered judgment for the bank in the amount of $15,150 plus interest from the date of the transaction. The core reasoning was that the buyer did not qualify for protection under UCC § 9-307 as a buyer in ordinary course of business, because the sale occurred at an auction lot in a third state rather than at the seller’s regular place of business.
