This case involves Ansaldo Componenti, S.P.A.'s challenge to the Department of Commerce's final results of an administrative review under section 751(a) of the Tariff Act, which determined antidumping duties on large power transformers from Italy based on sales from the 1970s. Commerce used "best information available" to calculate margins after Ansaldo repeatedly failed to provide timely and complete data on home-market sales or to explain its relationships with related customers, despite multiple requests and questionnaires. Ansaldo argued that its home-market customers were affiliated through government ownership, making third-country sales the proper basis for comparison, but the court found these submissions inadequate and delayed. The court affirmed the agency's determination as supported by substantial evidence and consistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), dismissing the action.
The case concerned a customs broker's challenge to the Treasury Secretary's decision suspending his license for 90 days after convictions for receiving stolen merchandise and conspiracy. The convictions were later set aside, but the agency proceeded on charges of disreputability under 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b); following an earlier remand for due process violations, the penalty was reduced from revocation. The plaintiff argued that the term "disreputable" was unconstitutionally vague and that the suspension was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the suspension, holding that the statute is constitutional when read with implementing regulations that provide notice of prohibited conduct, and that the agency acted within its authority, followed required procedures, and based its decision on relevant factors and evidence.
This case involved the U.S. government bringing an action against Joan and David Helpern Co., Inc., a footwear importer, for alleged violations of 19 U.S.C. § 1592 based on false statements in 1978 customs entries for Italian boots that understated the applicable duty rate. The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming the government's multi-year delays in initiating and prosecuting the case violated due process and 19 U.S.C. § 1604, or alternatively for dismissal under Rule 41(b)(2) for failure to prosecute. The court denied both motions, holding that the speedy trial test from Barker v. Wingo did not apply because no property was seized and that dismissal with prejudice was a drastic remedy unwarranted here given shared responsibility for delays and unproven prejudice at this stage, though it allowed the motion to be renewed after trial.
The case involved a domestic producer of brass fire protection products seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Commerce to expand an antidumping order covering certain imports from Italy to include five additional products. The International Trade Commission had determined that those five products did not cause material injury to U.S. industries, while two others did, leading Commerce to limit the order accordingly under the Tariff Act of 1930. The court held that antidumping duties may only be imposed on merchandise for which both less-than-fair-value sales and material injury have been found, and that the statutory scheme requires the order to align with the injury determinations. It further ruled that mandamus was unavailable because the plaintiff had not pursued available review under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a and because the agency action was not a purely ministerial duty. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The case involved Seaside Realty Corp. seeking relief after U.S. Customs seized sixty-two containers of coffee in Puerto Rico under 18 U.S.C. § 545 and 19 U.S.C. § 1592, with the government pursuing forfeiture in district court. The plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment that no § 1592 violation occurred, return of the coffee, or alternatively a mandamus order compelling the government to file an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1582 regarding § 1592. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the district court already had authority over the seized merchandise and the forfeiture issues, and that the declaratory and mandamus requests were premature or sought to compel discretionary rather than ministerial acts.
This case concerned the classification and liquidation of plastic polypropylene bags imported from Canada in 1975 and 1976. The importer challenged the Customs Service's liquidation of the entries under a higher duty rate in 1983, arguing that the entries should have been deemed liquidated earlier under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a) at the lower rate asserted at entry. The court decided that the statute does not apply to entries made before its effective date of April 1, 1979, and thus the later liquidation was proper, denying the importer's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the case. The reasoning was based on the plain language of the statute and its enacting legislation, which specified application only to entries on or after 180 days after the 1978 enactment without retroactive effect.