James L. Foreman

This case arose from a dispute over control of the domain name negril.com and associated website, with plaintiffs alleging that defendants converted the site, infringed copyrights, posted derogatory statements, and that Network Solutions, Inc. breached the domain registration agreement by altering ownership. The court addressed motions to dismiss for improper venue by NSI and for lack of personal jurisdiction by other defendants. It determined that a forum selection clause in the March 1999 NSI registration agreement required exclusive jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Virginia and that a substantial part of the events occurred there, making venue proper in Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The court therefore granted NSI's venue motion in part and transferred the entire action to the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, rather than dismissing it.

procedureproperty

In Arclar Co. v. Gates, the plaintiff coal company, as successor to rights granted in a 1905 Warranty Deed to Coal, sued the defendant landowner for specific performance of an option to purchase surface acreage needed for mining operations and for an injunction to prevent interference with a conveyor easement, both arising from deeds conveying coal rights and related surface options in Saline County, Illinois. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds including the 75-year statute of limitations, lack of privity, laches, and the rule against restraints on alienation. The court denied the motion, holding that the claims were not time-barred because the option was a covenant running with the land that had been properly preserved, privity was not required for enforcement against a purchaser with notice, no unreasonable delay or prejudice supported laches, and the option was valid as it was limited to surface needs tied to mining the mineral estate rather than a bare restraint on alienation.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a products liability claim by plaintiff Hanks against defendant Kiswire, Ltd., alleging that a failed wire rope causing injury was manufactured by the defendant. The court addressed multiple pretrial motions, including quashing certain depositions as duplicative, denying a motion to compel those depositions, and striking the plaintiff's expert testimony from Donald Pellow. The expert opinion, which sought to link the failed rope to Kiswire through physical and chemical comparisons, was excluded because it did not satisfy the reliability and relevance requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Without admissible evidence identifying the manufacturer, the court granted Kiswire's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims with prejudice.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerns whether excess Difference In Conditions insurance policies issued to Archer-Daniels-Midland cover marine expenditures (sue and labor costs to protect stranded barges and grain) and grain degradation losses stemming from the 1993 Mississippi River flood. The defendant insurers moved for partial summary judgment on two issues: lack of coverage for the marine expenditures and lack of coverage for the grain cargo. Applying Illinois contract law to the policy language, the court found the policies unambiguously exclude watercraft from coverage, so expenses to protect the barges themselves are not insured. The court also examined whether grain-related claims are barred by exclusions such as inherent vice or whether they qualify as covered perils under the policies' terms.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves a dispute over the scope of coverage under a marine insurance policy issued by Phoenix Assurance Company to Archer-Daniels-Midland Company for the period from July 1, 1992, to July 1, 1993. Phoenix moved for partial summary judgment seeking a ruling that the policy does not cover losses incurred after the policy's expiration date or losses caused by delays in shipment. The court applied Illinois law to interpret the policy's unambiguous language, including its attachment clause, duration of risk clause, and delay exclusion provision, and found that coverage ends on the expiration date unless extended by notice and additional premium, with no coverage for delay-related losses. The court granted Phoenix's motion, holding that post-expiration losses and delay-caused losses are not covered under the plain terms of the contract.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from the Great Flood of 1993, which caused Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) to incur extra expenses obtaining raw materials for its processing plants after widespread crop damage raised costs and disrupted supply. ADM sought coverage for post-October 1, 1993 losses under contingent business interruption and extra expense provisions in difference-in-conditions insurance policies issued by the defendants, but the insurers denied those claims and moved for partial summary judgment. The court denied the motion, holding that the policy language was unambiguous and that coverage under Paragraph 13Q extended beyond the policies' October 1, 1993 expiration date. The reasoning centered on the definition of "Extra Expense" tied to a "Period of Restoration" that the policy expressly stated would not be limited by the policy's expiration.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involves a defendant's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate or correct his 1992 federal sentence, which had been enhanced by a prior 1979 conviction for concealing stolen goods that resulted in a five-year sentence already served or expired. The defendant, filing the motion in the 1979 case, claimed the earlier conviction was invalid on grounds including an involuntary guilty plea induced by threats to prosecute his wife and sought to challenge it collaterally to affect his current thirty-five year sentence. The court denied relief, holding that § 2255 does not apply to already-served sentences and that the motion could not be used to attack the 1979 conviction in that proceeding. Even construing the filing as a writ of error coram nobis under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the court found it barred by laches due to a sixteen-year delay with no explanation provided for the failure to seek earlier relief, and noted additional procedural barriers such as the need to file in the correct case and AEDPA restrictions on successive petitions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM) filing a breach of contract action against several insurance companies after they denied approximately $44 million in claims for extra transportation and raw material costs resulting from the Great Flood of 1993, despite having paid about $11 million. ADM sought partial summary judgment on the applicability of Extra Expense Coverage and Contingent Business Interruption and Extra Expense Coverage provisions in its Difference-in-Conditions policies. The court addressed the propriety of the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, applied Illinois law as the forum state in this diversity action, determined that the policy language was unambiguous, and held that partial summary judgment was an appropriate mechanism for resolving discrete issues such as the meaning of covered property and supplier terms prior to trial.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case concerned a plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 that state officials violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him rehire as a temporary highway maintainer due to political affiliation, and that the use of short-term contracts circumvented the Supreme Court's ruling in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois. After a prior order applying Rutan to temporary employees and granting qualified immunity (leaving only equitable remedies available), the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. They argued the case was moot because they had adopted a new policy barring political considerations in such hiring and that the Eleventh Amendment barred further relief absent an ongoing violation. The court analyzed the motion under Rule 12(c) standards, noting defendants' statements that they would reinstate the prior policy if the Rutan ruling was overturned on appeal, and concluded that declaratory or injunctive relief remained available despite the policy changes.

civil rightsfree speechfederal powerprocedure

This case concerned a garnishment action by Citizens Electric, as class representative, to collect on a consent judgment against Giles Armature, a voluntarily dissolved Illinois corporation, for CERCLA liability arising from hazardous waste contamination at the Missouri Electric Works site; the judgment limited recovery to any available insurance proceeds. Insurers LMC, Bituminous, and FFI moved for summary judgment, contending that the action was time-barred because it was brought more than five years after Giles's 1986 dissolution, in violation of the Illinois Business Corporation Act's corporate survival statute. The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) to determine corporate capacity under Illinois law, noted that the statute generally extinguishes the ability to sue or be sued after five years, and addressed Citizens' arguments that the garnishment was merely ancillary to a timely-filed action, that CERCLA preempted the state limitation, and that individual liability of former officers or shareholders was at issue.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved creditors appealing the bankruptcy court's dismissal of their adversary complaints against corporate officers and directors who had filed for personal bankruptcy. The creditors sought to have certain debts declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) based on claims that the debtors, as officers of an insolvent and later dissolved Illinois corporation, breached fiduciary duties by converting or misappropriating corporate assets. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's orders, holding that the complaints adequately alleged the existence of a fiduciary relationship that arose when the corporation became insolvent or dissolved, along with a potential breach of that duty through failure to preserve assets for creditors. The court reasoned that under the statute, such a fiduciary capacity can create a trust-like obligation distinct from an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship, and remanded the cases for further proceedings while noting that any pre-existing contractual debts would not qualify.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved plaintiff Gary Vickery suing Illinois state officials and Republican Party members, alleging they operated a political patronage system that denied him a renewed six-month contract as a highway maintainer in favor of Republican supporters, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments; he sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and class certification for others similarly affected. The court considered motions to dismiss from the state officials and party defendants, the plaintiff's motions to amend and for class certification, and related filings, while analyzing whether the patronage practices circumvented the Supreme Court's ruling in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois. The core reasoning examined precedents such as Elrod and Branti to determine if protections against politically motivated hiring extended to temporary or successive contract positions, and addressed issues like qualified immunity for damages claims and the propriety of class actions for injunctive relief.

civil rightsfree speechlabor & employment

The case centers on plaintiff Glisson's challenge to the U.S. Forest Service's adoption of an Amended Land and Resource Management Plan for the Shawnee National Forest and its approval of ecological restoration projects in Opportunity Area 6. The plan seeks to restore native hardwood ecosystems by removing non-native pine plantations planted in the 1930s, with the goal of achieving 89 percent hardwoods across the forest. The amended complaint alleges violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and National Forest Management Act, including claims that the agency failed to adequately assess environmental impacts or justify its findings of no significant impact. The court addressed these issues on cross-motions for summary judgment by examining the administrative record, public comments, and the agency's environmental assessments and supplemental impact statements to determine if the decisions were arbitrary or capricious.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

This case concerns a bankruptcy trustee's attempt to claim farmland in Illinois as part of the bankruptcy estate of two debtors who were shareholders in a dissolved Iowa corporation, F.C. Morris & Sons, Inc. The corporation had been involuntarily dissolved in 1977 but continued operations, mortgaging the land to John Hancock in 1978 and conveying portions to land trusts benefiting Intra Illinois and Intra USA in 1981-1982 as part of winding up its affairs. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the appellees, ruling the conveyance valid under Iowa Code § 496A.102, which permits dissolved corporations to convey property indefinitely for winding-up purposes. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that Iowa law governs the corporation's powers post-dissolution and that the transfers occurred during winding up, so the property was not part of the estate; it also declined jurisdiction over the mortgage's validity. The court rejected arguments applying Illinois law and found the acts valid even under a de facto corporation theory.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Williams v. Tomer (In re Tomer), a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the district court consolidated appeals from the bankruptcy court's order addressing the trustee's claims to post-petition commissions on pre-petition insurance policies sold by the debtor and his downline agents. The debtor, an insurance sales director, faced substantial roll-up liability for unearned advances on lapsed policies written by terminated agents, leading to withholdings and setoffs by MILICO and related companies. The court held that under the contracts, the debtor (and thus the trustee) had no entitlement to commissions until his liabilities were satisfied, as the companies could apply setoffs or chargebacks against commissions otherwise due, and affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings on the trustee's recovery attempts and preference claims.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a claim by the guardian of a mentally disabled adult son seeking survivor benefits under his deceased father's ERISA-governed retirement plan sponsored by Maytag Corporation. The plan administrator denied the claim because the plan provided survivor benefits only to spouses and the 1966 divorce decree did not qualify as a qualified domestic relations order under ERISA's rules against assignment or alienation of benefits. The court reviewed the denial under the arbitrary and capricious standard because the plan granted discretionary authority to the administrator, and it analyzed whether the decision complied with ERISA's statutory requirements for domestic relations orders after noting that state-law claims were preempted. The opinion addresses cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts.

labor & employmentfederal powerfamily law

This case concerned whether a debtor's inheritance, received via a will from a relative who died shortly after the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, became part of the bankruptcy estate under federal law. The debtor executed a disclaimer of the legacy under Illinois probate law, directing it to her son, and the bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid that transfer as unauthorized and recover the property. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the trustee, holding that the debtor acquired an interest in the bequest at the testator's death (within 180 days of the bankruptcy filing) rather than at probate, making it estate property under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(A) regardless of the later disclaimer. The court reasoned that while state law defines the nature of the property interest, federal bankruptcy law controls the timing of its inclusion in the estate and rejected contrary state probate rulings or collateral estoppel arguments.

propertyprocedurefederal power

The case is a class action employment discrimination suit brought by Robert Earl Mister, a black job applicant, against Illinois Central Gulf Railroad under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and related statutes, alleging that the railroad refused to hire him and other black applicants due to race in its St. Louis Operating Division. After an initial bench trial resulted in judgment for the defendant that was reversed on appeal, this memorandum addresses remaining issues on the proper measure of damages before resolving motions to disqualify the special master and lift the stay. The court determines the availability and scope of remedies such as back pay, emotional distress damages, punitive damages, and hedonic damages by applying the governing civil rights statutes, reviewing the evidence presented at trial including statistical and anecdotal proof, and limiting recovery to those categories supported by the record and law.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case concerns cross-appeals from a bankruptcy court order in the Chapter 7 proceeding of debtor Henry Fullop, addressing whether the bankruptcy trustee could use strong-arm powers under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) to recover post-petition payments made to Salem National Bank from oil extracted under leases in which the bank held security interests via promissory notes, assignments of working interests, and transfer orders. The bankruptcy court held that the bank had a perfected security interest in the extracted oil and proceeds from all but two leases (Carl Short #3 and #4) by recording the assignments in county recorders' offices, but the interest in oil from those two leases and in production machinery and equipment was unperfected due to lack of timely UCC continuation statements or filings. The trustee appealed the finding of perfection for the other leases, arguing insufficient UCC compliance for extracted oil, while the bank cross-appealed, contending the UCC does not apply at all to these transactions. The core reasoning focused on Illinois law distinguishing oil in the ground (real property) from extracted oil (personal property), the effect of recorded lease assignments on perfection, and the separate requirements for UCC financing statements covering accounts or equipment.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether an insurance policy issued by American Continental Insurance Company (ACIC) to Marion Memorial Hospital covered a malpractice claim arising from complications during the 1985 birth of Dustin Jackson. The policy was a 'claims made' policy effective July 1987 with a retroactive date of June 1985, and it contained exclusions for claims that were made or reasonably foreseeable prior to the policy's inception. The hospital had been aware of the incident's potential to result in a claim due to fetal distress and emergency procedures but did not report it to its prior insurer. The court granted summary judgment to ACIC, holding that the exclusions applied and coverage was properly denied, as the hospital could have reasonably foreseen the claim and the policy's notice requirements were not met through any estoppel or waiver.

business & regulatorytorts & liability