The case involved a kosher deli and its owners challenging New York Agriculture and Markets Law provisions that require sellers of kosher food to label it as such and disclose information about their kosher certifier, claiming violations of the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as well as vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the statutes form a neutral labeling and disclosure regime with a secular purpose that neither advances nor inhibits religion and avoids excessive government entanglement with religious matters. The court further concluded that the laws give adequate notice to those regulated and do not create a risk of arbitrary enforcement, so they are not unconstitutionally vague.
religious libertybusiness & regulatorycivil rights
This case arose after Fannie Mae sued Olympia Mortgage Corporation for breach of contract, prompting Olympia (later in receivership) to file cross-claims against the relatives of its former president for allegedly fraudulent transfers made while Olympia was insolvent. The Donner Relatives moved for summary judgment to dismiss the cross-claims under New York Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273 (constructive fraud) and 276 (actual fraud), while Olympia cross-moved for summary judgment on the § 273 claim. The court denied the Donner Relatives’ motion and granted Olympia’s, finding the transfers lacked fair consideration because the relatives provided no services to Olympia and the payments were not part of the president’s documented compensation. It awarded Olympia specific damages against each relative plus prejudgment interest calculated from reasonable intermediate dates based on the timing of the transfers.
In United States v. Apazidis, the defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of making false statements to a federally insured credit union to obtain a loan under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and of twenty counts of engaging in monetary transactions over $10,000 involving criminally derived property under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, based on the use of loan proceeds. The defendant moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions, and also sought a reduction in the $800,000 forfeiture amount. The court denied the motion, explaining that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government and that a rational jury could find each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the loan documents and related testimony from the government's case-in-chief. The court further held that the jury's forfeiture finding was supported and that the defendant's own testimony, if considered, would not alter the outcome.
This case involves Fannie Mae suing various parties, including Samuel Pinter, over fraud and breach of contract by Olympia Mortgage Corporation, a mortgage lender that Olympia’s receiver had already addressed via consent judgment. Fannie Mae moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 to pierce Olympia’s corporate veil and impose personal liability on Pinter, a major shareholder and founder who provided loans and guarantees but observed few corporate formalities. The court examined undisputed facts about Olympia’s undercapitalization, lack of records or meetings, overlapping operations with Pinter’s other entities including a religious nonprofit, and Pinter’s daily involvement and check-signing authority despite claims of limited knowledge. It addressed disputes over whether Pinter was a passive investor or exercised operational control, while noting Olympia’s insolvency and related criminal fraud by other officers. The opinion analyzes these elements to determine if veil-piercing is warranted on the motion.
The case involved ACORN and its affiliates challenging a series of 2010 appropriations provisions that barred them from receiving any federal funding, on the ground that the measures constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder. After consolidating the parties' motions for summary judgment, the court held that the challenged provisions violated the Bill of Attainder Clause. The court reasoned that Congress had specifically identified ACORN, determined its guilt for alleged wrongdoing such as fraud and election-law violations, and imposed punishment by cutting off funding, all without the protections of a judicial trial. Although Congress may legitimately safeguard taxpayer dollars from misuse, the opinion explained, it may not do so by legislatively adjudicating guilt in violation of the constitutional prohibition.
The case involves plaintiff Sunil Parikh, an American of Indian descent employed as an engineer by the New York City Transit Authority, who alleged race and national origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, age discrimination under the ADEA, and related state law claims after being passed over for promotions to construction manager positions in favor of other candidates. The defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims, presenting evidence of the plaintiff's performance issues and the qualifications of the selected candidates. The court analyzed the undisputed facts regarding interviews, evaluations, and reorganization, finding insufficient evidence of discriminatory animus or pretext in the promotion decisions while noting the potential viability of the retaliation claim. It also rejected certain evidentiary proffers by the plaintiff that failed to meet procedural requirements under Rule 56.