Susan Christine O'Meara Getzendanner

This antitrust case involved licensed chiropractors suing the American Medical Association and affiliated medical organizations for allegedly engaging in a conspiracy to boycott chiropractors by enforcing Principle 3 of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics, which barred physicians from professionally associating with unscientific practitioners. The case was on remand from the Seventh Circuit for a new trial after a jury verdict for the defendants was reversed, with the remaining defendants being the AMA, JCAH, and AAOS. The district court applied the rule of reason standard to assess whether the challenged conduct promoted or suppressed competition, holding that ethical guidelines from professional associations could support a finding of an illegal agreement to refuse to deal even without coercive enforcement. The court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the extensive trial record, focusing on the effects of the alleged boycott on trade and commerce.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

This case was a class action civil rights lawsuit by correctional officers and supervisors at the Cook County Department of Corrections against the Sheriff and Executive Director, challenging the constitutionality of General Order 9.8A, which mandated annual (and sometimes more frequent) urine drug testing for all employees without individualized reasonable suspicion, under threat of termination. The court decided to grant declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, holding the compulsory testing program unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and permanently enjoining its enforcement. The core reasoning centered on the significant privacy intrusions of the testing procedures, which lacked justification given the minimal evidence of a drug problem among employees, the availability of less intrusive alternatives like observation by supervisors, and the absence of a demonstrated need to identify specific drugs to advance the employer's interests in safety and security.

civil rightscriminal lawlabor & employment

The plaintiff Van Kooten Holding B.V. sued to register and enforce a Netherlands judgment in Illinois federal court, prompting the defendant Dumarco Corporation to file a breach-of-contract counterclaim. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the counterclaim under Illinois statutes governing foreign judgments, arguing it could and should have been raised in the Netherlands proceeding. The court held that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJR), not the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJ), governs enforcement of judgments from foreign countries such as the Netherlands, because the UEFJ applies only to sister-state judgments entitled to full faith and credit. Under the UFMJR, enforceability and the permissibility of counterclaims are determined by full-faith-and-credit res judicata principles rather than the procedural limits in the UEFJ. Because the parties had briefed the motion under the wrong statute, the court ordered additional briefing on whether the counterclaim is barred by full-faith-and-credit rules or by any implicit incorporation of UEFJ limits.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involves pretrial motions by defendant Roth, a private attorney, challenging a superseding indictment that charged him with two counts of Hobbs Act extortion and two RICO counts based on allegations that he solicited and paid bribes to influence outcomes in pending cases before the Circuit Court of Cook County. The court denied Roth's motion to dismiss the RICO counts, finding that the Seventh Circuit's Yonan decision remained good law after McNally and that the charged conduct sufficiently alleged association with and participation in the affairs of the court enterprise. It also largely denied the motion to strike certain racketeering events, as several alleged actual bribe payments to judges. On the statute of limitations challenge to the Hobbs Act counts, the court granted the motion in part by requiring deletion of new language alleging fear of economic harm, which it viewed as a substantive broadening of the original timely charges, while ordering the government to disclose the names of the accused judges.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved defendant Roth's motion to suppress evidence obtained from Title III electronic surveillance of Judge Olson's judicial chambers in connection with a federal investigation. Roth argued that the government's eavesdropping unreasonably exceeded the authorizing court order and failed to meet the statutory minimization requirement to limit interception of non-pertinent conversations. The court denied the motion after reviewing the record from a related case. It adopted the reasoning and conclusions of a prior opinion in United States v. Costello, finding that monitoring agents had made reasonable efforts to minimize interceptions, followed special procedures for privileged communications, and did not flagrantly disregard the order's limits.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a § 1983 lawsuit by nonunion firefighters challenging the City of Chicago's collection of 'fair share' fees under an agency shop clause in its collective bargaining agreement with the firefighters union, on grounds that the deductions lacked the procedural safeguards required by Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson. The City defendants moved to dismiss, arguing they had no independent duty to establish Hudson procedures, that the Illinois Labor Relations Board provided adequate review, and that an indemnification clause shifted any liability to the union. The court denied the motion, holding that public employers share responsibility with unions for providing adequate explanations, challenge procedures, and escrows under Hudson; that the Board lacked clear jurisdiction over fair share fee disputes under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act; and that indemnification did not justify dismissal of the City defendants.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfree speech

Plaintiff Ewald Peitsch sued Regency Cruises Inc. and Regency Maritime Corp. for personal injuries from a fall aboard their cruise ship during a Caribbean voyage, alleging negligence and invoking both diversity and admiralty jurisdiction while designating the claim as maritime under Rule 9(h). Defendant moved to dismiss for improper venue or transfer to the Southern District of Florida. The court granted dismissal because the admiralty designation meant general venue statutes did not apply; instead, venue required personal jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation under admiralty rules, which plaintiff failed to establish as the defendant was not licensed or shown to do business in Illinois. The court transferred the case to Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) where the defendant resides and does business.

proceduretorts & liability

Plaintiff Arvie Thomas sued the City of Zion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that police officers used excessive force by repeatedly applying a stun gun during his arrest, in violation of his constitutional rights. Counts II and III of the complaint sought to hold the City liable on theories that the officers followed an official policy on stun gun use (including approval by a city commissioner at the scene) and that the City had a policy of inadequate training on proper stun gun use. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment on both counts. It reasoned that the officers' actions did not execute or result from an official policy attributable to the City, and that any deficiencies in the existing training program did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for constitutional rights sufficient to impose municipal liability.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a federal indictment charging defendants with unlawfully dealing in and transferring short-barrel rifles, as well as possessing machinegun receivers, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 under the Gun Control Act of 1968. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that selling unassembled parts never previously combined into working rifles did not constitute dealing in a 'rifle' as defined by the statute. The court granted the motion in part by dismissing Counts I and III-VII, while denying it as to other counts. It reasoned that the statutory definition of 'rifle'—which includes weapons that 'may be readily restored to fire'—does not encompass never-assembled parts, based on the plain language, the contrast with the broader 'machinegun' definition, legislative history rejecting a 'combination of parts' clause for rifles, and the requirement of strict construction in criminal statutes, leaving defendants without fair notice of criminality.

gunscriminal law

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by John M. Branion, Jr., who was convicted of murder in Illinois state court in 1968. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Branion became a fugitive until 1988, and he later sought federal relief on four constitutional grounds, some of which had not been presented to state courts through post-conviction proceedings. The state moved to dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust available state remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, citing the Illinois Relief from Judgments statute and Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The court denied the motion, holding that those state remedies were no longer available because they were time-barred due to Branion's culpable negligence in failing to pursue them while a fugitive, rendering exhaustion unnecessary.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns defendant Bruno Mancari's motion to dismiss indictments or suppress evidence from a 1983 FBI wiretap on his telephone, which was authorized based on allegations of auto theft, racketeering, and later drug distribution, and was challenged under the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act for insufficient justification of investigative necessity, lack of probable cause, and improper extensions or scope. The court rejected the constitutional argument, ruling that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements do not include a least-intrusive-means standard and are satisfied by neutral magistrate review, probable cause, and particularity. On the statutory claims, the opinion acknowledges that Title III imposes additional necessity and procedural limits but finds the application met the core standards, while deferring or addressing related issues like informant reliability and use of evidence for unlisted offenses.

criminal law

This case involves a federal lawsuit in which defendant Joyce E. Tucker renewed her request that the district court abstain from adjudicating the action under the Younger v. Harris doctrine, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. The court decided to deny the motion for abstention or dismissal under Younger, as well as under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The core reasoning was that the facts and principles from Younger and its extensions to certain civil proceedings, along with Pennzoil, do not require abstention because the state proceedings at issue do not involve the kind of important state interests or pending judgments that would mandate federal deference, and there has been no state court judgment on the relevant issues.

procedurefederal power

In Sager v. Hunter Corp., plaintiff Daniel Sager sued his employer and others under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging he was demoted and fired for refusing to pressure his girlfriend to drop her sexual harassment charges against a coworker. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, finding the federal action time-barred. The plaintiff had received his EEOC right-to-sue letter in September 1985 but did not file this federal suit until August 1986, well beyond the 90-day limitations period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Although the plaintiff argued for equitable tolling based on a prior state court filing and other factors, the court rejected these claims because the state action did not assert a Title VII claim, the plaintiff was not excusably ignorant of the deadline, and no defendant misconduct caused the delay.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned an EEOC lawsuit against the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities and a union under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, challenging a collective bargaining agreement provision that allowed the Board to terminate an employee's grievance once the employee filed an ADEA charge with the EEOC seeking resolution of the same matter. The Board moved to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), contending that the provision was a permissible contractual term consistent with arbitration principles from the Steelworkers Trilogy. The court denied the motion, holding that the provision could constitute unlawful retaliation under ADEA Section 4(d) because federal anti-discrimination rights are individual statutory protections that cannot be forfeited through collective bargaining, and the legality of the employer's action is not determined by the CBA's terms.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerned a motion by plaintiff Conticommodity Services to remand its action against former account executive Perl back to state court after Perl removed it to federal court on diversity grounds. Perl removed the case shortly after being properly served in January 1987, but the plaintiff argued removal was untimely because Perl had received a copy of the complaint months earlier in October 1986. The court addressed the meaning of the phrase "receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise" in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and the split among courts on when the 30-day removal period begins. It rejected interpretations requiring perfected service under state law to start the clock, holding instead that the statute's plain language triggers the period upon the defendant's receipt of the initial pleading regardless of whether service was formally completed. The opinion concluded that the legislative history and policy arguments supporting a service requirement could not override the unambiguous statutory text.

procedure

Radionic Industries sued GTE Products for damages after GTE altered the specifications of glo bulbs supplied for Radionic's lighting ballasts, causing over half of the ballasts to fail, and initially denied the change. The complaint asserted civil RICO claims based on alleged mail and wire fraud predicate acts, plus state claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of warranties. The court dismissed the RICO counts, holding that the communications after Radionic discovered the change in 1984 did not qualify as predicate acts under the mail and wire fraud statutes because they occurred after the scheme had reached fruition and were not in furtherance of it. The negligent misrepresentation claim was also dismissed under Illinois law, as the transaction involved the sale of goods rather than information, while the warranty claims proceeded.

business & regulatorycriminal lawtorts & liability

The case involved a company that owned two conflicting patent applications for a food scale invented by different parties, seeking a court declaration of the true inventor to resolve royalty and application issues. The court dismissed the action without prejudice, holding that the plaintiff must first pursue remedies before the Patent and Trademark Office. The core reasoning was that under patent statutes and regulations, the PTO conducts interference proceedings to determine priority, and the plaintiff could demonstrate good cause for such a proceeding despite common ownership due to an uncooperative inventor, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a bankruptcy trustee suing the former president of a bankrupt manufacturing company, along with his son and a former employee, to recover assets transferred without consideration to a new company and to seek damages under RICO for alleged fraud against creditors. The defendants moved to dismiss the RICO claims, arguing insufficient facts to show a pattern of racketeering activity, and sought to remand the bankruptcy count or dismiss certain parties. The court denied the motion to dismiss the RICO count in full, finding multiple predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bankruptcy fraud over an extended period that satisfied the continuity-plus-relationship test for a pattern. However, it dismissed the claims against the son and the former employee for lack of allegations tying them to the full pattern of acts. The decision rested on a fact-specific analysis of the number, timing, and variety of the alleged predicate offenses.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Austin Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 701, the plaintiff general contractor sued the defendant union under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act for damages caused by the union's alleged unlawful secondary boycott activity in support of its primary dispute with a subcontractor. The court held that the plaintiff had standing to sue because the union's actions directly affected the plaintiff's operations and caused foreseeable injury. On damages, the court ruled that the plaintiff could recover only those losses not reimbursed or not reimbursable by the project owner under the cost-plus contract, rejecting recovery for amounts already paid by the owner, as well as attorneys' fees and punitive damages, to avoid double recovery.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a § 1983 lawsuit brought by Ruben Mendez and his minor daughter Elizabeth against Chicago police officers Rutherford and Angelo, alleging that during Ruben's April 1985 arrest, officers pulled him from his car, beat him while handcuffed in front of three-year-old Elizabeth, and later attacked him at the station; Ruben was charged with battery and resisting arrest but acquitted, and Elizabeth allegedly suffered severe emotional trauma from witnessing the events. Plaintiffs asserted federal claims under §§ 1981 and 1983 (including substantive due process for emotional distress) plus pendent state claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. The court granted leave to amend the complaint to add racial animus allegations, denied the motion to dismiss the § 1981 claim, denied dismissal of Elizabeth's § 1983 claim based on Seventh Circuit precedent recognizing protections for emotional well-being under due process, denied dismissal of Elizabeth's state claims, and initially dismissed but later reinstated Ruben's malicious prosecution claim after finding the notice timely under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.

civil rightscriminal lawfamily lawprocedure