This case involved a dispute over priority of interests in a pleasure vessel that had been sold multiple times through separate federal and state title chains. Maryland National Bank held a mortgage from the original purchaser but failed to record its lien on the New York state certificate of title or retain control of the origination documents, allowing subsequent buyers including claimant Matthew Jones to purchase without notice of the bank's interest. The bank filed an in rem foreclosure action after the original borrower defaulted. The court granted Jones's motion for summary judgment, holding that the bank's negligent conduct justified equitable subordination of its mortgage to Jones's interests under the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. The decision rested on the principle that where both parties are innocent, the party with the power to prevent the fraud bears the loss.
This case involved a challenge to the Defense Logistics Agency's three-year debarment of contractor Joseph Silverman and his sole proprietorship Calendar Chemicals from all federal government contracts, which was based solely on his misdemeanor conviction for conversion of government property stemming from a 1986 form misstatement about his business status as a manufacturer rather than a dealer. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and denied the government's motion, terminating the debarment effective immediately. The decision rested on findings that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because it failed to consider mitigating facts around the conviction, such as Silverman's reasons for pleading guilty and the fact that the government had continued contracting with him for years after the underlying events without issue.
In this case, plaintiff Montes sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act after sustaining injuries when a third vehicle, fleeing a U.S. Border Patrol high-speed pursuit, collided with his truck; the Border Patrol vehicle was not directly involved. The government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting immunity under California Vehicle Code § 17004.7. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action without prejudice, reasoning that the FTCA requires the United States to be treated like a private individual where possible, but absent an analogous private activity, liability is determined by reference to state or local entities under like circumstances. Because the Border Patrol had adopted a qualifying written pursuit policy meeting the statutory criteria, California law immunized the United States from liability for injuries caused by the fleeing vehicle.
The case involved the U.S. government suing Sam Ellis Stores, Inc., a retail business near the Mexican border, to recover a tax refund claimed for a $441,330 loss from Mexican peso devaluation on its 1983 tax return. The government initially focused on the amount of the loss but later shifted to argue it should be treated as a capital rather than ordinary loss, leading to voluntary dismissal after the court limited issues to the loss amount. The defendant then moved for litigation costs under 26 U.S.C. § 7430 as the prevailing party. The court granted the motion, awarding nearly $91,000 in fees and costs, after finding the government's position was not substantially justified based on its pre-litigation actions by IRS agents and shifting legal theories during proceedings. The ruling considered the full scope of government conduct under the statute and prior Ninth Circuit precedent.
This case arose from a 1987 accident at a shipyard where a personnel basket attached to a crane fell onto the deck of the U.S.S. Sacramento, killing six NASSCO employees and injuring six others. The workers and their families sued multiple defendants, including NASSCO (the employer), AMCA, Microdot, Minnesota Liquidating, and Cleveland Machine Controls, under theories such as negligence, products liability, and breach of warranty; the defendants then filed cross-claims against NASSCO for indemnity and contribution. NASSCO moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) barred the cross-claims as its exclusive liability. The court construed the motion as one to dismiss, held that the LHWCA does not categorically preclude non-vessel third-party indemnity claims unless based on an express or implied contractual or tort duty between the parties, and dismissed the cross-claims with leave to amend because the pleadings failed to clearly allege such a basis.
This case involves homeowners who sued their insurer, State Farm, after the company denied a claim for cracks and settling damage to their La Jolla residence, attributing the loss to excluded causes of earth movement and latent defects based on engineering reports. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that genuine issues existed as to whether third-party negligence in the original construction was the efficient proximate cause of the damage. Under California law, including Insurance Code section 530 and precedents like Garvey, an excluded condition does not bar coverage if a non-excluded peril created it, and the policies lacked explicit language excluding concurrent or sequential causes. The court found the contractual terms raised questions of intent or ambiguity that required trial rather than resolution on summary adjudication.
