The case involves plaintiffs R.S.S.W., Inc. (doing business as Goose Island Brewery) and its owner suing the City of Keego Harbor and various city officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants engaged in a campaign of harassment—including excessive police scrutiny, zoning enforcement actions, and other measures—to pressure the brewpub into adopting an 11:00 p.m. closing time instead of its permitted 2:00 a.m. hours, in violation of constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or alternatively for summary judgment. The court denied the summary judgment motion as premature because discovery was incomplete and, applying the liberal 12(b)(6) standard that accepts all factual allegations as true and requires only that a complaint state a viable legal theory, found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged an official municipal policy or custom to support liability against the city. The core reasoning emphasized that the court's role at this stage is limited to assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, not weighing evidence or resolving factual disputes.
The case involves a dispute between Physician Care, P.C. and Caremark, Inc. arising from their joint home infusion services partnerships in Michigan, subsequent buyout and employment agreements, and fallout from a federal criminal investigation into Caremark's billing and referral practices. Caremark pleaded guilty to mail fraud charges related to kickbacks and improper reimbursements, while Physician Care also faced related proceedings. The court addressed motions to exclude evidence of these plea agreements in the civil litigation, which centers on claims such as breach of employment and fiduciary duties. It denied the motions, holding that the pleas are relevant and admissible because they directly bear on the parties' conduct and no adequate substitute exists, even if the evidence is unfavorable.
business & regulatorycriminal lawhealthcareprocedure
This case is an insurance coverage dispute in which Cyberlogic sought a defense from its insurer Farmington under a commercial general liability policy covering advertising injury for claims brought against it in the Wonderware lawsuit. The underlying Wonderware action alleged copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and related counts arising from Cyberlogic's development of a software driver substantially identical to one it had created earlier for Wonderware. The court held that Farmington had no duty to defend because the Wonderware complaint did not allege an advertising injury within the policy's definition. The core reasoning was that the claimed injuries did not arise out of an offense committed in the course of advertising Cyberlogic's goods, as any infringement existed independently of advertising activities and lacked the required causal connection to the insured's advertising.
This case was a class action securities lawsuit in which investors who purchased BEAR securities sued PFS Investments and Primerica, alleging liability for their investment losses; the parties reached a $7.5 million settlement approved by the district court. Plaintiffs' counsel sought one-third of the settlement fund as attorney fees, and after review of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court adopted the recommendation to award the co-lead attorneys 20% of the settlement fund (totaling $1.5 million, inclusive of costs and fees to other counsel) under the percentage-of-the-fund method. The core reasoning was that in common-fund cases like this securities class action, courts must ensure fee awards are reasonable under the circumstances, with either the lodestar or percentage method available, and that the 20% figure appropriately balanced the work performed against concerns over excessive fees in unopposed class settlements.
The case involved defendant Brian Maurice Brown, who was arrested in June 1992 in connection with a cocaine conspiracy investigation but faced a multi-year delay before federal prosecution proceeded. After an indictment was returned in December 1992 and unsealed in February 1993, the government failed to notify Brown's attorney as requested and instead pursued independent arrest efforts that proved unsuccessful; Brown was not taken into federal custody until 1996 following a state arrest, with the case remaining dormant for extended periods due to prosecutorial inattention. Brown moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting violations of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right (the sole issue addressed), the Speedy Trial Act, due process, and Rule 48(b). The court granted the motion, applying the Barker v. Wingo balancing test and finding that the length of the delay, the government's negligence, Brown's assertion of his rights, and resulting prejudice—including the death of an exculpatory witness and presumptive impairment from excessive delay—violated the Constitution.
In this case, plaintiff Douglas Switzer sued his former employers in state court for breach of various employment contracts related to reinstatement, severance, resignation rights, and benefits, plus age discrimination under Michigan law and promissory estoppel. Defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that two of the contract claims implicated rights under ERISA-governed employee benefit plans, creating federal jurisdiction. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that Counts II and IV sought to recover or clarify benefits under ERISA plans and were therefore preempted by ERISA's Section 502(a), which provides the exclusive federal remedy and basis for removal. The court reasoned that resolving those claims would require interpreting the terms, eligibility, and administration of the ERISA plans, and it exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law counts.
