This case involves bus drivers for SEPTA who brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act seeking compensation for time spent performing required pre-trip safety inspections of buses during swing runs, which were not compensated under their schedule. SEPTA moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the claims were subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement with the union. The court denied the motion after reviewing the CBA and an affidavit from the union president, finding no express provision in the agreement that would require interpretation to resolve the FLSA claims. Prior proceedings had already rejected SEPTA's Eleventh Amendment immunity argument and related appeals.
The case involves plaintiff Jose L. Casillas appealing the Social Security Administration's denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The district court reviewed the ALJ's findings under a deferential substantial evidence standard after the magistrate judge issued a report recommending affirmance. The plaintiff objected to the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment, arguing it improperly weighed medical opinions on physical and mental limitations and posed an insufficient hypothetical to the vocational expert. The court overruled the objections, adopted the report, and affirmed the SSA's decision, holding that the ALJ was not required to fully adopt any medical opinion and had cited sufficient evidence supporting the RFC determination.
This products liability case involves plaintiffs Bruce and Melissa Richetta suing Stanley Fastening Systems after a pneumatic nail gun manufactured by the defendant fell from a ladder, discharged, and injured Bruce Richetta while he worked at a construction site. The plaintiffs pursued a strict liability claim under Pennsylvania law, alleging the nail gun was defectively designed due to the absence of a safety switch or trigger lock, and also sought punitive damages. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the strict liability claim, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the product's design created foreseeable risks that could have been reduced by a reasonable alternative design under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Sections 1 and 2. However, the court granted summary judgment on the punitive damages claim, concluding there was insufficient evidence of outrageous conduct or reckless disregard by the defendant. The decision applied the Third Circuit's prediction in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing that Pennsylvania would adopt the Third Restatement's approach to product defect claims.
In RCN Telecom Services, Inc. v. Toa Pa Vi, L.P., a cable television provider sued a residential developer alleging that the developer's requirement of a trenching fee for access to dedicated public utility easements violated the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. The developer counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the cable provider must pay its pro rata share of trenching costs. The court granted summary judgment to the cable provider, holding that once the utility easements were dedicated to public use, the Cable Act prohibited the developer from conditioning access on payment of a trenching fee while allowing other utilities unimpeded access without such fees.
In Seals v. City of Lancaster, the plaintiff sued the City and Officer Christopher Laser under § 1983 after suffering a head laceration during her 2004 arrest for disorderly conduct outside a bar, claiming the officer used excessive force by grabbing her arms and pushing her to the ground. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim, qualified immunity, state law claims, and punitive damages. The court denied summary judgment on the excessive force claim against the officer, holding that material factual disputes—such as whether the plaintiff was complying with commands or resisting—precluded a finding that the force was objectively reasonable as a matter of law and must be resolved by a jury. It also denied qualified immunity and summary judgment on punitive damages for the same reason, while granting summary judgment on all claims against the City (conceded by plaintiff) and on the state law claims (unopposed).
The case involves a federal prisoner, Kevin O'Neal, who filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the U.S. Parole Commission's authority to impose multiple terms of special parole after revocations of his original term and to forfeit street time credit. This petition followed an earlier similar § 2241 petition that had been denied on the merits by another district court. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the petition as a second or successive petition under the abuse of the writ doctrine because it raised the same grounds as the prior petition. The court found no basis for a certificate of appealability and entered judgment for the respondents.