The case concerned David Kent Fitch's appeal of his 262-month prison sentence following jury convictions on multiple counts of bank fraud, fraudulent use of access devices, and money laundering. The district court had departed upward from the 41-51 month Sentencing Guidelines range after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Fitch murdered his wife and used her death to commit the offenses. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court could rely on uncharged conduct proven by clear and convincing evidence to support a substantial departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1, and that the record contained sufficient evidence of the murder and its connection to the fraud scheme.
In this case, Monte L. Haney, an African American convicted in state court of aggravated mayhem and other crimes, filed a federal habeas petition alleging that the prosecutor violated Batson v. Kentucky by using peremptory challenges to remove African American jurors from the venire. Haney had not objected to any of the strikes during voir dire or raised the issue on direct appeal. The Ninth Circuit held that a petitioner may not raise a Batson claim in habeas if the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial, because such an objection is required to allow the trial court to remedy any discrimination and to preserve a record for review. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition, aligning with other circuits in treating a timely objection as a prerequisite to a Batson challenge.
The case involved Alex Fayer, an advantage gambler, who contacted the Nevada Gaming Control Board after casinos refused to pay his winnings and then admitted to Agent Vaughn that he had possessed and used false identification documents in the name of James McLynn to gamble. Fayer was arrested for violating NRS § 205.465, though the charges were later dismissed, leading him to sue Vaughn, the Board, and the Mirage Casino-Hotel for false arrest, false imprisonment, conspiracy, battery, and premises liability under state and federal law. The district court dismissed the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Fayer's admissions provided probable cause for the arrest, rendering the claims implausible.
The case concerned a Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor who financed the purchase of a new vehicle by rolling negative equity from a trade-in loan into the new loan secured by the new car. The bankruptcy court and BAP allowed the debtor to bifurcate the loan under 11 U.S.C. § 506, treating the negative equity portion as unsecured debt rather than part of the purchase-money security interest protected by the hanging paragraph of § 1325(a)(*). The panel affirmed, holding that negative equity financing did not qualify as a purchase-money obligation under applicable state law and thus fell outside the anti-bifurcation provision. The decision created a circuit split with eight other circuits that had interpreted the same statute to include negative equity within the protected security interest.
The case involved a dispute between Strikepoint Trading, LLC and Optioneer, LLC against Aimee Sabolyk and Global Asset Advisors, LLC, concerning allegations of trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract, resulting in a permanent injunction and a jury verdict. The defendants appealed the district court's decisions. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot after the plaintiffs' counsel represented that no violations of the injunction had occurred, no further damages would be sought, and attorney fees would only be pursued against one defendant in limited circumstances, leading the appellants' counsel to agree the matter was moot.
The case In re Penrod involved a dispute in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding over whether a creditor, AmeriCredit Financial Services, held a purchase money security interest in the negative equity from a debtor's trade-in vehicle when financing a new car purchase. The debtor, Marlene Penrod, proposed to treat part of the creditor's claim as unsecured because it related to negative equity on her prior vehicle. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's ruling that the creditor did not have a purchase money security interest in the negative equity portion of the loan. The court reasoned that negative equity represents old obligations rather than new value provided for the collateral, consistent with the definition of purchase money security interests under the Bankruptcy Code, which limits such interests to the price of the new merchandise or value enabling its acquisition.