This case is a derivative action brought by a holder of 2% of PREIT shares against PREIT trustees and related corporations, alleging violations of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14a-9 in connection with proxy statements soliciting votes to elect trustees. The proxies concerned two real estate transactions—one in Plantation, Florida with FPA Corporation and one involving the Cambridge Apartments in Pennsylvania with Mid-Island Properties, Inc.—and the plaintiff claimed material facts about conflicts of interest and transaction details were omitted. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. It reasoned that whether the omissions were material presented a jury question rather than one for summary judgment, that the proxy statements were not false or misleading without the omitted facts, and that the corporate defendants had no liability because they were not involved in preparing the proxies.
This case involves a Pennsylvania resident suing a Delaware corporation for damages after the corporation filed an equity suit against her alleging slander, libel, and tortious interference with contract, which was dismissed in her favor. Count one asserted a state-law tort claim for malicious use or abuse of process under diversity jurisdiction, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for reputational and emotional harm. Count two asserted a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the prior suit was filed under color of state law to retaliate against and chill the plaintiff's First Amendment speech rights regarding a local hospital project. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that Pennsylvania law requires arrest or property seizure for such a tort claim, that § 1983 does not cover defamation or private misuse of process without significant state involvement, and that the pleadings lacked the required specificity for a civil rights action.
The case involved a dispute over whether a jewelers' block insurance policy issued by Jefferson Insurance covered a burglary loss at Treasure Craft Jewelers' Southampton store. The policy explicitly insured the Levittown premises up to $100,000 and provided $25,000 for property elsewhere, but included an endorsement limiting off-premises custody coverage and a clause stating that coverage would not apply to additional locations without a written endorsement. The plaintiff argued that the Southampton store's contents qualified as 'property elsewhere' under the $25,000 limit and that any ambiguity should favor coverage, while the defendant maintained that the additional-location exclusion barred the claim. The court held that the policy did not cover the loss, reasoning that the contract's plain terms required an endorsement for any additional premises and that the insurer had not assumed the higher risk at the unlisted location.
The case was a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a licensed thoroughbred horse trainer and his wife against the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, the Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission, and various state officials, arising from the handling of a urine sample from the trainer’s winning horse and a related newspaper article. The court dismissed the claims against the commissions and the officials in their official capacities, ruling that the commissions are not “persons” under § 1983 and that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars suits seeking damages from state funds without state consent. Claims against the officials in their individual capacities were dismissed for failure to plead specific conduct violating constitutional rights or, as to the remaining defendants, for failure to state a claim; the pendent state-law defamation count was dismissed without prejudice once the federal claims were resolved.
Plaintiff, a non-civil service policy-making employee of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, brought suit after being placed on unpaid leave and dismissed based on allegations of alcoholism that affected his job performance, claiming violations of due process under the Civil Rights Act because the charges stigmatized his reputation, along with related defamation and conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. The court determined that plaintiff had no property interest in his at-will patronage position under state policy and precedents like Board of Regents v. Roth. It further held that defamation is not cognizable under the Civil Rights Act and that §§ 1985(3) and 1986 require class-based discrimination not present here. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.
The case involved a law school graduate from a California-accredited but non-ABA-accredited institution who was denied permission by the Pennsylvania State Board of Law Examiners to sit for the bar exam under Rule 8 C, which requires ABA accreditation or an equivalent education applicable only to foreign schools; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the denial. The plaintiff filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory relief on equal protection grounds under the Fourteenth Amendment, invoking various federal jurisdictional statutes. The court dismissed the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that there is no inherent right to practice law, the classification between ABA and non-ABA graduates is not suspect and is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in ensuring a competent bar, and thus does not violate equal protection.