In Iturbe v. Wandel & Goltermann, Technologies, Inc., a Chilean-born employee sued her former employer after being terminated from a North Carolina manufacturing plant, alleging Title VII discrimination along with state-law claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge. The defendant moved to dismiss the state claims and the request for attorneys' fees. The court granted dismissal of the breach-of-contract claim, finding that North Carolina's employment-at-will doctrine barred enforcement of a promise of continuing employment absent additional consideration recognized under state precedent, and also dismissed the standalone attorneys'-fees claim because no statutory authority supported recovery on the state claims. The court denied dismissal of the wrongful-discharge claim, holding that the plaintiff had adequately alleged termination in violation of the company's written layoff policy that prioritized job performance and seniority, which could constitute the bad-faith discharge recognized in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.
This case involves the executors of John Hill's estate suing Montclaire Housing Partners, Tricap, and Shelby Kaplan under the North Carolina Securities Act for rescission of Hill's 1985 purchase of 450 limited partnership units, claiming the unregistered securities were not exempt from registration, involved material misstatements or omissions, and constituted fraud; defendants counterclaimed for payment on a $350,000 promissory note executed as part of the purchase, with multiple intervenors asserting interests in the note after its assignment. The matter came before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment following removal from state court. The court analyzed whether the preliminary offering to Hill should be integrated with the subsequent offering under the factors from Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, concluding the offerings were part of a single plan with common characteristics that precluded exemption from registration, and addressed defenses including estoppel and waiver under the state securities statute.
This case involved an appeal by National Westminster Bank USA challenging a bankruptcy court order that approved the Chapter 7 trustee's retention of the law firm Ross & Hardies as special counsel to pursue a lender liability claim against the Bank on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of RPC Corporation. The firm had been representing Walter Ross, RPC's former CEO and personal guarantor on the Bank's loans, in related litigation in New York, and Ross had agreed to fund the firm's work for the estate under a contingency arrangement. The Bank objected on grounds of potential conflicts of interest arising from the firm's dual representation and Ross's status as a purported secured creditor. The district court affirmed the order, holding that the firm held no interest adverse to the estate, that Ross was an unsecured creditor entitled only to pro rata distribution, and that the arrangement served the estate's best interests because the trustee would control any settlement and other potential claims against Ross had been investigated and were time-barred.
This case involved a former retail employee who sued her employer after her manager allegedly sexually harassed her through non-consensual touching and suggestive comments, leading to her departure from the job. She brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery (against both the manager and employer), plus negligence and wrongful discharge against the employer. After the employee voluntarily dismissed her claims against the manager with prejudice, the court granted summary judgment to the employer on the emotional distress, battery, and wrongful discharge claims, finding no independent liability and that the discharge did not fit an exception to North Carolina's at-will employment doctrine. The court denied summary judgment on the negligent retention claim, determining that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the employer knew or should have known of the manager's conduct.
This case concerned a dispute over $10,638 in cash seized during a 1987 drug raid in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where local police found cocaine and weapons, leading to state charges against Robert Alston that were later dismissed. After the DEA adopted the seizure for federal administrative forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881, the state superior court issued orders directing return of the cash to Alston, prompting the United States to seek declaratory relief against conflicting state orders. The court granted summary judgment to the United States and Police Department, holding that the Police Department holds clear title. The core reasoning was that the federal government's adoption of the seizure established exclusive federal jurisdiction from the date of the original seizure under 28 U.S.C. § 1355, depriving state courts of authority to order disposition of the res.
The case involves a §1983 civil rights action brought by Ronald Reagan against Deputy Sheriff Sammy Hampton and Sheriff Paul McCrary, alleging that Hampton used excessive force without probable cause during an incident at a private party, violating Reagan's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that McCrary negligently or recklessly failed to supervise Hampton, creating a policy or custom of such conduct. After the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed several claims, the court considered the defendants' motion for summary judgment, focusing on whether the claim against Hampton was timely under the applicable statute of limitations and whether Reagan presented sufficient evidence to establish liability against McCrary. The court analyzed the Supreme Court's directive in Wilson v. Garcia to borrow the state's personal injury statute of limitations for §1983 claims, noting complications in North Carolina due to multiple such statutes, and emphasized that §1983 liability requires more than negligent conduct by a supervisor. It concluded that summary judgment was appropriate on both the timeliness issue for Hampton and the lack of evidence for McCrary's liability under the applicable standards.