This case involved four helicopter pilots suing their employer, Penn Line Service, Inc., under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages from 1972 through 1975. The defendant argued that the pilots were exempt from overtime requirements because they worked in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity. The court determined that the pilots did not qualify for the exemption, as their duties involved piloting helicopters for tasks like fire control and patrols, along with occasional menial tasks, without exercising management, discretion, or independent judgment over others, and were instead highly trained technicians following supervisor directions. As a result, the court awarded specific amounts of overtime pay to each plaintiff based on the hours worked and rejected the defendant's counterclaim for alleged overpaid wages.
This case involved a Title VII lawsuit by the EEOC on behalf of Harriet Baum and other female employees at Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, alleging that the hospital's policy barring use of accumulated sick leave for pregnancy-related disabilities constituted sex discrimination and that Baum's subsequent job elimination was retaliatory after she filed an EEOC charge. The court found the sick-leave policy violated Sections 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII, as it treated pregnancy disabilities differently from other temporary disabilities, and issued a permanent injunction barring the hospital from denying such leave upon proper application. The decision rested on EEOC guidelines requiring pregnancy-related conditions to be handled equivalently under sick-leave plans, along with precedents emphasizing protection against disparate treatment based on sex absent a compelling justification. The court also noted procedural compliance issues did not bar the claim and distinguished contrary Supreme Court authority as inapplicable to Title VII employment cases.
This admiralty case involved a seaman's claims against her employer for maintenance and cure related to an appendicitis illness in 1972 and for unseaworthiness and related damages from two subsequent work-related injuries or aggravations. The court awarded the plaintiff maintenance and cure payments plus interest and attorney fees for the period of her first illness but denied lost wages under that doctrine, finding no basis to expand it beyond food, lodging, and medical care. It rejected the unseaworthiness claim tied to her return to work in late 1972 due to lack of supporting evidence. For the 1974 back injury sustained while lifting a heavy box, the court found the vessel's inadequate manning rendered it unseaworthy, awarded damages for lost wages and pain and suffering, but reduced recovery by two-thirds based on the plaintiff's contributory negligence in not seeking help.
The case was a contract dispute arising from a financing arrangement in which plaintiff Marshall Terkel helped defendants, an Ohio corporation and its officers, obtain a bank loan to equip a restaurant and then leased the equipment to them under an agreement requiring Terkel to purchase the items and forward monthly payments to the bank. After the bank underbilled the monthly amount due to an error that Terkel knew about, he retained the difference instead of remitting the full contracted sum, prompting defendants to stop routing payments through him and pay the bank directly. The court ruled that neither party could recover on the claim or counterclaim. It reasoned that Terkel’s failure to perform his payment obligation constituted a material breach that defeated the contract’s purpose, allowing defendants to discontinue dealings with him, but defendants presented no evidence of damages to support their counterclaim for return of initial payments. Pennsylvania contract law governed the diversity action.
This case involved a Title VII claim by Nicholas Kutska, a part-time Slavic language instructor of Slavic origin at California State College, who alleged that the college's decision not to renew his temporary contract and its failure to consider him for a permanent director position were based on national origin discrimination. The court, after a full trial, entered judgment for the defendant college, finding that it committed no unlawful employment practices. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff established only his membership in a national minority but failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination or that the college's stated reasons—his temporary status, lack of a doctorate, and refusal to acknowledge the temporary nature of the role—were pretextual or had a discriminatory effect on persons of Slavic origin. The court noted that the plaintiff had no property interest in continued employment under state law and that mere allegations of bias were insufficient under precedents like McDonnell Douglas and Griggs.
This case involved a Title VII lawsuit brought by William Larkin, a Black employee of U.S. Steel and member of the United Steelworkers union, claiming that the company and union engaged in racial discrimination by improperly crediting a white coworker with greater seniority after a layoff and plant closure, which resulted in the white employee receiving an overtime assignment that Larkin believed should have gone to him. The court denied class action status because the plaintiff did not demonstrate sufficient common claims among purported class members. After a full trial, the court entered judgment for the defendants, concluding that the seniority decisions followed the neutral terms of the collective bargaining agreement and were not motivated by race. The union had processed Larkin's grievance through the required steps but declined to proceed to arbitration after reevaluating the claim, which the court found was done in good faith without evidence of discriminatory intent.
