In this case, former UBS financial advisor Brooks Lewis filed a putative class action in California state court alleging that the company's practice of structuring recruitment bonuses as employee forgivable loans violated the California Labor Code and Unfair Competition Law. UBS moved to compel arbitration under multiple agreements the plaintiff had signed, including a U-4 registration form, promissory notes for the bonuses, a compensation plan, and an account reassignment agreement, all of which contained arbitration provisions and class action waivers. The district court granted the motion, finding the arbitration clauses enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, that the class action waivers were valid following the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, and that the plaintiff's individual claims fell within the scope of the agreements. Because all remaining claims were subject to arbitration, the court exercised its discretion to dismiss the action rather than stay it.
In this class action, plaintiff Maritza Pinel alleged that defendant Aurora Loan Services engaged in unfair and unlawful practices through its mortgage Workout Agreements, which required borrowers to make stipulated payments to avoid foreclosure but ultimately allowed Aurora to proceed with a trustee's sale without proper notice or opportunity to cure despite timely payments. Aurora moved to dismiss the first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion in part, dismissing only the claim under the unlawful prong of California's Unfair Competition Law to the extent it relied on an alleged violation of Civil Code § 1689(b)(2), and denied the motion as to all remaining claims, concluding that the allegations adequately supported the other causes of action concerning the agreement's terms, postponements, and foreclosure process.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued an out-of-state insurance company in California state court for breach of contract and bad faith after denial of disability benefits, along with a petition for a writ of mandamus against the California Insurance Commissioner to revoke approval of the policy. After the state court sustained the Commissioner's demurrer without leave to amend, the insurance company removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing lack of complete diversity and improper removal. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that the demurrer order was not final for removal purposes because the state appellate process had not been exhausted, and that the dismissal was not a voluntary act by the plaintiff under the voluntary/involuntary rule. The court also rejected the defendant's untimely fraudulent joinder arguments and found that the plaintiff had a plausible claim against the Commissioner.
This case concerns efforts by Wells Fargo Bank, as trustee of the Clara Poppic Trust, to recover costs for cleaning up perchloroethylene contamination at commercial property in Berkeley that had been used for a dry cleaning business called Cal Cleaners. The plaintiff brought cost recovery and contribution claims principally under CERCLA against former lessees and operators of the business, as well as cross-claims and third-party claims involving equipment manufacturers. The court addressed a series of motions for summary judgment, partial summary judgment, dismissal, and judgment on the pleadings filed by defendants including Renz, the Estate of Dennison, Umstead, Hoyt, and others. The analysis focused on lease assignments from the 1970s, operator status, and arranger liability under CERCLA, applying the Supreme Court's Burlington Northern standard requiring intentional steps toward disposal or treatment of hazardous substances.
In Oster v. Standard Insurance, plaintiff Brent Oster sued Standard Insurance Company under ERISA to reverse the denial of long-term disability benefits under his employer's plan. The district court had previously entered judgment for the plaintiff, finding that Standard abused its discretion by failing to conduct a full and fair review and by improperly discounting medical evidence. In this order, the court adopts the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granting the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs and awarding $156,720 in fees, $8,095.18 in expenses, and $35,753.40 in prejudgment interest under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), as the plaintiff prevailed and no special circumstances justified denial.
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a petitioner convicted and sentenced to death in California state court in 1980 for first-degree murder, assault, robbery, and related crimes from two incidents. After extensive procedural history including prior dismissals and summary judgments on most claims, the district court addressed the petitioner's claims regarding shackling during trial and related ineffective assistance of counsel. The court granted the petition in part on Claim 2(c) and Claim 9, vacated the conviction and death sentence, and ordered the state to release or retry the petitioner. The core reasoning was that the shackling violated the petitioner's rights in both the guilt and penalty phases, and trial counsel's inadequate response constituted ineffective assistance under applicable standards, overcoming procedural defaults via cause and prejudice.
