Robert Allen Grant

In this bankruptcy adversary proceeding, Fibre Form Corporation sought a declaratory judgment that an account receivable owed to the debtor Nova Tool & Engineering was held in constructive trust for its benefit because the receivable allegedly resulted from the debtor's misuse of Fibre Form's misappropriated trade secrets, excluding it from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(d). The Chapter 11 trustee moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, holding that the receivable is property of the estate. The reasoning was that under Indiana law, a constructive trust is merely an equitable remedy that does not create a property interest until imposed by a court, and no such trust had been imposed pre-petition; moreover, recognizing an unadjudicated constructive trust would conflict with bankruptcy's policy of ratable distribution among creditors, following the Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Omegas Group.

propertyfederal powerprocedure

This case involves the determination of attorneys' fees in a Title VII class action lawsuit brought by female employees against Uniroyal, Inc., which was settled out of court after the company's debarment from federal contracts. On remand from the Seventh Circuit, the district court addressed three remaining issues: the proper lodestar amount for services before the district court, whether any reduction was needed in the $200,000 quality bonus due to higher appellate fees, and whether the requested appellate fees were excessive. The court calculated a lodestar of $1,547,471 after reviewing detailed time records and adjustments, reduced certain claimed hours for excessiveness and lack of billing judgment, and declined to reduce the quality award while applying a 10% reduction to appellate fees.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case is a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by federal prisoner Stokes challenging his 1975 conviction for conspiracy to distribute narcotics, claiming he was incompetent to stand trial due to a prior mental health commitment from 1967-1969. After an initial denial, reversal and remand by the Seventh Circuit, additional psychiatric evaluations, record reviews, and hearings, the district court denied the petition. The court reasoned that the trial record showed Stokes could consult with counsel and participate effectively, that he had operated a structured drug distribution enterprise requiring competency, and that psychiatric reports and other evidence established no recurrence of mental health issues after his 1969 discharge, satisfying the appellate mandate.

criminal lawprocedure

In McBride v. Soos, plaintiff Arthur J. McBride sued two Elkhart County sheriff's deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights and Missouri's extradition statutes by seizing and transporting him from Missouri to Indiana without following required procedures such as prompt judicial hearings, time-limited commitment warrants, and a pre-extradition hearing under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The district court initially dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. After a bench trial, the court ruled for the defendants on the ground that they lacked personal involvement in the alleged procedural violations, as they had reasonably relied on information from superiors and Missouri officials that McBride had validly waived extradition and that all paperwork was complete.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case was a class action lawsuit filed by female employees at Uniroyal's Mishawaka plant alleging sex discrimination in hiring, seniority, layoffs, and other employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The litigation, which lasted seven years, ended in a settlement providing the plaintiff class with over $9 million in monetary relief plus reinstatement and other systemic changes, with Uniroyal agreeing to pay reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The court calculated a reasonable fee award by determining the lodestar amount based on documented hours worked and hourly rates, then adjusting for factors including risk, quality of representation, and delay in payment, while crediting an interim payment of $300,000. It ultimately entered judgment for plaintiffs' attorneys in the net amount of $533,679.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case is a class action Title VII lawsuit brought by female employees against Uniroyal and their union, alleging sex discrimination in employment practices including segregated layoffs, discriminatory starting pay rates, and refusal to consider women for jobs restricted to men. The court had previously entered partial summary judgment establishing a prima facie case of discrimination on those issues based on the company's failure to respond to requests for admissions. Addressing cross-motions for summary judgment on class liability, the court ruled that the prior findings were not dispositive and that the company could present defenses such as business necessity, while also addressing jurisdictional issues over pre-1969 layoffs as potential continuing violations, union liability for discriminatory collective bargaining agreements, and the need to focus on inter-class disparate effects at this stage.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case arose from the construction of Rogers High School, where general contractor Hall subcontracted work to plaintiffs like Midland, Miller, and others, who sued Hall for withheld retainage and payments after the owner (Schools) withheld funds from Hall due to alleged defects; Hall filed counterclaims and Schools separately sued Hall, leading to consolidated actions. Hall moved to compel arbitration and dismiss Schools' complaint based on the general contract's arbitration clause. The court granted the motion, holding that federal policy strongly favors enforcing arbitration agreements and that forcing Hall to litigate would create conflicts with state court proceedings and compulsory counterclaim rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case was a class action civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Indiana state prisoners transferred from a reformatory to the state prison, challenging their placement in segregation without hearings and various prison conditions and practices, with the remaining issue being a literature censorship program that barred receipt of certain published materials. The court granted declaratory relief, holding that the Indiana Department of Correction's statewide regulation on literature censorship and the prison's actual practices violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The core reasoning applied the standard from Procunier v. Martinez, requiring that any censorship of inmate mail further substantial governmental interests in security, order, or rehabilitation and be no greater than necessary to protect those interests; the court found the regulation and practices failed this test because they permitted overly broad restrictions without the required justification or narrow tailoring, even though the censored material was published content rather than personal correspondence.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rights

This habeas corpus petition challenged a 1962 murder conviction in Indiana state court on two grounds: deprivation of the right to competent counsel and violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial due to pretrial publicity and courtroom conditions. The petitioner had been convicted of killing a police officer during a burglary, with evidence including testimony from accomplices and occurrence witnesses; the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and in related state proceedings. The court examined extensive newspaper coverage from the time of the crime through trial, including articles highlighting the petitioner's prior record, bail release issues, and the judge's political platform, as well as the fact that the petitioner was presented to the jury in handcuffs and leg irons. The opinion analyzed whether the combination of publicity and trial conditions created an atmosphere of prejudice that could not be treated as harmless error under Supreme Court precedents such as Sheppard and Estes.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a bank seeking to recover funds stolen from an armored truck operated by Indiana Armored Service, Inc., by suing Sun Insurance Company of New York and related agents who had issued an insurance policy to the armored service. The bank alleged misrepresentation, negligence, and related claims, asserting that the defendants had misled it about the policy's coverage, which excluded losses unless the truck was manned by at least two armed guards. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after allowing the bank to add a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. It held that there were no genuine issues of material fact, as the alleged misrepresentations did not induce the bank's use of the armored service—given that the policy terms matched an earlier identical policy the bank had reviewed—and the two-guard requirement was a clear condition of coverage rather than an excluded peril.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned the validity of a patent issued to plaintiff BEC Pressure Controls Corp. after its application was initially deemed abandoned by the Patent Office for late payment of the issue fee under 35 U.S.C. § 151 without the required delayed fee and cause showing. The Commissioner revived the application following a supplemental petition, but defendant Dwyer Instruments moved for summary judgment arguing the revival exceeded authority. The court granted the motion, ruling that strict compliance with the statute's deadlines and procedures is required to effectuate its policy of expediting patent prosecution, and the facts did not constitute a rare situation justifying accommodation or waiver by the Commissioner.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was brought by a class of inmates transferred for disciplinary reasons from the Indiana Reformatory to the Indiana State Prison, challenging their placement in segregation units (I.D.U. and D.O. Seclusion), conditions of confinement, and restrictions on mail communication with attorneys. The district court transferred the trial site to a visitors' lounge inside the prison for logistical convenience and security, conducted an unannounced inspection of the facilities, and heard extensive evidence on staffing shortages and other operational issues. The court concluded that injunctive relief was warranted to address the constitutional deficiencies identified, directing plaintiffs to submit proposed findings and a decree that would include requirements such as an adequate law library. Core reasoning rested on the trial record, including witness testimony and on-site observations, establishing that existing practices violated inmates' rights while emphasizing the need for practical remedies without assigning personal blame to prison staff.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case was a class action brought by inmates of the Indiana Boys School, a medium-security state facility for boys aged 12-18 (including some non-criminal offenders), challenging institutional practices under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of rights to rehabilitative treatment. The court upheld its jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rejected Eleventh Amendment and other challenges, and ruled that the school's use of corporal punishment via supervised beatings with a thick board violated the Eighth Amendment, ordering its immediate end based on unanimous expert testimony that it served no rehabilitative purpose and precedents such as Jackson v. Bishop. It further examined the administration of major tranquilizing drugs by non-medical staff without prior evaluation or monitoring, noting serious side effects and deviation from medical standards, and found that the overall treatment program (including the Quay classification system) provided inadequate individualized rehabilitation, falling short of constitutional minima. The court deferred final relief pending additional submissions on appropriate standards.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a claim by the administratrix of a decedent's estate against Aetna Casualty for uninsured motorist coverage under an automobile liability policy issued to the decedent, who was killed when his owned but uninsured motorcycle collided with another uninsured motorcycle. The policy contained an exclusion barring coverage for bodily injury to an insured while occupying a vehicle (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured. An Indiana statute required that automobile liability policies provide uninsured motorist coverage for the protection of persons insured under the policy. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the policy exclusion conflicted with the statute, which takes precedence and mandates coverage for insured persons irrespective of their ownership or insurance interest in the vehicle involved.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Willoughby, who was convicted of robbery after a jury trial and sentenced to an indeterminate term of two to twenty-five years under Indiana law. He did not challenge his conviction but argued that the sentencing statute and his sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments due to disproportion with the determinate ten-to-twenty-year penalty for the greater offense of armed robbery. The court upheld the validity of the conviction and found no basis for immediate release but determined that the excess portion of the sentence beyond twenty years was void under federal constitutional standards. It therefore ordered that the state could not retain custody of the petitioner beyond July 1986, relying on recent Supreme Court precedent allowing habeas relief short of full release to cure sentencing defects while the conviction remains intact.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a patent infringement lawsuit brought by the owners and licensees of U.S. Patent No. 3,115,138, titled “Evacuator,” against Quest, Inc. and its president for manufacturing and selling a competing portable surgical suction device called BelO-Pak. The plaintiffs sought an injunction and damages, including treble damages for alleged willful infringement, while the defendants denied infringement, asserted the patent was invalid or unenforceable due to misuse, and counterclaimed for violations of federal and Indiana antitrust laws. After a bench trial, the court held the patent valid and infringed, rejected the misuse defense, and ruled for the plaintiffs on the counterclaims. The decision rested on findings that the patented self-contained spring-driven evacuator improved upon prior art methods like electric pumps or evacuated bottles by enabling ambulatory use, that the defendants had knowledge of the invention, and that the antitrust claims failed for lack of proof regarding the relevant market and any resulting damages to the defendants.

business & regulatory

This case involved taxpayer Bertha O. Howell's claim for a refund of gift taxes paid on 45,085 shares of Massachusetts Investors Trust (a mutual fund) that she gifted in 1964. She valued the shares at their net asset value of $16.10 each, but the IRS assessed a deficiency using the higher public offering price of $18.66 per share under Treasury Regulation § 25.2512-6(b), which the taxpayer paid before suing. The court upheld the regulation and denied the refund, reasoning that it was consistent with the fair market value standard in I.R.C. § 2512(a) because mutual funds can be treated as distinct entities rather than mere conduits to their underlying investments, allowing valuation at the replacement cost (public offering price) rather than redemption value. The court rejected arguments that the regulation was arbitrary or inconsistent with market valuation principles applied to other securities.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over whether a life insurance policy became effective under a binding receipt before the applicant's death. William A. Thorne, as receiver for Atlas Lumber and Door Company, sued Aetna Life Insurance Company after Robert Reynolds, the company's president, applied for a $100,000 policy in December 1964, paid the initial premium, and received a binding receipt conditioning coverage on the company's determination that Reynolds was insurable as a standard risk following a medical exam. Reynolds died in a plane crash in January 1965 without a policy being issued, and Aetna later returned the premium, citing that no insurance had taken effect. The court found that Reynolds had not completed required medical examinations, that he was known to be a substandard risk, and that insufficient medical evidence existed to determine insurability, so the condition precedent was not met and no coverage applied. The court entered judgment for the defendant.

business & regulatory

Fides Publishers Association sued the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 to recover $2,893.31 in taxes assessed for 1958 after the IRS retroactively revoked its section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. The case presented two issues: whether Fides qualified as an exempt organization operated exclusively for religious and educational purposes, and if a tax was due, whether it could write off inventory and amortize plate costs that year. The court reviewed evidence showing Fides had grown from small beginnings into a profitable operation with net sales over $221,000, 26 employees, standard industry pricing for profit, and substantial advertising, while publishing religious works tied to the Catholic Action movement. Based on these facts, the court addressed whether the commercial aspects disqualified Fides from exemption and how any tax deficiency should be computed.

taxesreligious liberty

In this case, plaintiffs injured in a rear-end collision on an Indiana toll road sought to amend their complaint against the truck driver's employers to add a claim that the employers were negligent in hiring and retaining an unsafe driver with a prior record of negligent driving. The court denied the motion to amend the complaint. The core reasoning was that Indiana law recognizes employer liability only through respondeat superior when the employee acts within the scope of employment (which defendants admitted), rendering a separate negligent-hiring theory inapplicable and irrelevant to third-party claims, and no Indiana authority supported extending it to ordinary motor vehicles.

torts & liabilityprocedure