Ben Charles Green

This case involves a diversity jurisdiction lawsuit by Michigan plaintiffs (injured truck driver Robert Tomlinson, his wife seeking loss of consortium, and truck owner Roger Harris) against Ohio defendants (drunk driver Robert McCutcheon and tavern owner Charles Taylor) for damages from a rear-end collision on the Ohio Turnpike caused by McCutcheon after drinking at Taylor's bar. Taylor moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ohio law imposed no duty or liability on him for serving beer to an intoxicated patron who later injured third parties. The court denied the motion, holding that R.C. § 4301.22(B) (prohibiting sales of alcohol to intoxicated persons) creates negligence per se liability for a tavern keeper when such service proximately causes injury to others, as the statute was enacted to protect the general public's health, safety, and welfare. The ruling was based on Ohio Supreme Court decisions such as Mason v. Roberts and Taggart, which recognized that liability for tavern owners can arise under this statute independent of blacklisting provisions in R.C. § 4399.01.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs Joanne Macko, Helen Merteneit, and John Szabo sued the City of Willoughby Hills and various officials, claiming they faced criminal indictments and arrests in retaliation for circulating recall petitions against the mayor and council members, which implicated their First Amendment rights. The defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment, prompting the court to review the record facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, including the rejection of the petitions, a failed mandamus action in the Ohio Supreme Court, selective indictments for petition-related offenses that were later dropped, and the absence of charges against others who committed similar acts. The court outlined the legal standards for summary judgment under Rule 56, addressed claims involving alleged conspiracy and discriminatory prosecution under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and considered issues such as res judicata and the sufficiency of pleadings after extensive discovery.

civil rightsfree speechelectionscriminal law

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Edward Ted Floyd, who was convicted in Ohio state court of twelve counts of aggravated robbery plus one count each of rape and kidnapping, resulting in a sentence of 15 to 150 years. After his state appeals were denied, Floyd raised multiple claims in federal court, including that identification testimony was tainted by suggestive police conduct, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge certain evidence or seek a separate trial, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. The court first addressed the exhaustion requirement under Rose v. Lundy, concluding that the unexhausted identification claim had no available state post-conviction remedy because it did not render the conviction void or voidable and could not be raised via delayed appeal. On the merits, the court rejected all claims, finding that counsel had in fact opposed joinder, that the identification and other evidence was not constitutionally defective, and that a rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on victim identifications and recovered items. The petition was therefore denied in full.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involves a former meat department employee who resigned and sued her employer and two supervisors, alleging sexual harassment through repeated unwanted advances, comments, and physical contact, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, along with pendent state tort claims for emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending there were no material facts in dispute and that the claims were legally insufficient. The court denied the motion after reviewing the record, including depositions and affidavits, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the conduct created a hostile work environment under Title VII and whether the supervisors' actions supported claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law, which permits such damages when conduct is wanton or outrageous.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved plaintiff Mary Ann Brunn, a civil service employee in the City of Cleveland's utilities office, who was summarily suspended for five days after allegedly directing a racial slur at a coworker. She sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the suspension deprived her of a property interest in continued employment without due process and caused stigmatization. The court granted leave to amend the complaint to allege falsity of the charges and denied the city's motion to dismiss the property-interest claim. It reasoned that city charter and civil service rules created a legitimate expectation of suspension only for cause, establishing a state-law property interest, and that due process requires at minimum notice and an opportunity to respond before such a suspension. The stigma claim was addressed as moot pending amendment.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the Internal Revenue Service petitioning to enforce a summons under 26 U.S.C. § 7604 requiring Leaseway Transportation Corp. to produce internal audit reports from its subsidiaries as part of an audit of consolidated tax returns for 1975-1978. The court granted enforcement of the summons after a hearing. It found that the IRS had followed proper procedures in a large-case audit, the requested reports were not already in the agency's possession, and Leaseway had not shown an improper purpose. The core reasoning was that the reports may be relevant because they contained references to transactions, timing adjustments, correcting entries, and record-keeping practices that could shed light on the correctness of the tax returns.

taxesfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involves plaintiff Michele Lachman, now residing in Ohio, suing several Louisiana-based banks and credit card entities for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Billing Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as well as common-law tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy, stemming from disputed charges on a stolen VISA card and subsequent collection efforts. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in Ohio, arguing insufficient contacts with the state, or alternatively for lack of venue or transfer. The court applied Ohio's long-arm statute and federal due process standards to evaluate whether the defendants' prior business dealings with the plaintiff, including card issuance and billing while she was in Louisiana and after her move, constituted transacting business or causing tortious injury in Ohio sufficient for jurisdiction. It concluded that minimum contacts existed to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a savings and loan association holding a first mortgage on property in Cleveland, where the city demolished a deteriorated building without providing notice to the mortgage holder. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the demolition deprived it of a protected property interest without due process of law. The court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the issue of liability, finding that the mortgagee's interests required notice before the city could raze the structure, which was not provided despite the city's inspections and plans over several months. On damages, the court rejected a presumption of full mortgage value loss and instead held that compensation must reflect the actual difference in the mortgage's value immediately before and after the demolition, accounting for any pre-existing conditions or residual value.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

Brush Wellman, Inc., a major beryllium producer, sued the Department of Labor under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain drafts of an economic impact statement and related comments prepared during OSHA's 1975-1977 rulemaking on occupational exposure standards for beryllium. The agency withheld ten documents, claiming they qualified as predecisional deliberative materials exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). After reviewing the undisputed facts of the multi-draft process involving agency staff and outside consultants, the court granted summary judgment to the Department of Labor. It held that the documents were intra-agency memoranda protected to preserve candid advice to decision-makers, that the exemption applied regardless of any prior voluntary releases in other proceedings, and that the agency had met its burden under de novo review.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedurefederal power

The case involved a white male plaintiff, John E. McLaughlin, who sued his former employer, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, alleging racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He claimed that due to the company's affirmative action plan required by a federal contract, he was not recalled to his seasonal crane operator position, which went to a less-qualified black worker instead. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of reemployment because his work was temporary and seasonal through a union hiring hall, that the affirmative action plan was lawful under the Supreme Court's Weber decision, and that there was no governmental action to support the constitutional claims.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved taxpayers seeking a refund on their 1968 federal income taxes after reclassifying gains from the sale of stock acquired under a qualified employee stock option plan from ordinary income to long-term capital gains. The court addressed whether the sales qualified for capital gains treatment under IRC Sections 421 and 422, given that the stock was not held for the required three-year period. The court held that the taxpayer made disqualifying dispositions by voluntarily selling the shares to the acquiring company before the holding period expired, even though a subsequent merger would have compelled the sale, resulting in ordinary income treatment for most of the gain. However, a portion of the gain was allowed as capital gains based on the difference between the fair market value at exercise and the sale price. The decision turned on the voluntary nature of the sales and the statutory requirements for qualified options.

taxes

This case is an appeal under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) from a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decision denying registration of the trademark “Fabrece,” opposed by Faberge, Inc. The court addressed the defendant’s motion to quash service of process made by certified mail on a local sales representative in Ohio and to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The court held that venue was not proper in the Northern District of Ohio under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because the defendant is not incorporated, licensed, or doing business in Ohio in a manner that establishes residency for venue purposes, and the claim did not arise there. Service was also invalid under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 because the recipient was not an officer, managing agent, or authorized agent, and no federal statute or Ohio long-arm statute authorized extraterritorial service. The court quashed service and ordered the plaintiff to obtain proper service or consent to transfer to the Southern District of New York within forty-five days or face dismissal.

procedure

This case involves IRS jeopardy assessments under 26 U.S.C. § 6851 against Norris Lamar Bailey for 1972 taxes and against his sister Mabel Dolores Coleman as a transferee, followed by seizure of two Cadillacs. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the assessments and sales of the vehicles until a Tax Court determination or settlement. The court addressed the government's motion to dismiss under the anti-injunction provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 7421. It deferred ruling on the motion as to Bailey pending the Sixth Circuit's decision in Rambo v. United States, which addresses whether a notice of deficiency is required after a § 6851 termination. As to Coleman, the court denied the preliminary injunction and motion for return of the 1973 Cadillac, finding § 7421(b) applicable and insufficient showing of probable success on the merits regarding ownership, while ordering the IRS not to dispose of the vehicle in the interim.

taxesfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a three-count complaint by Shelter-Lite against Reeves Brothers alleging patent infringement of coated fabrics, unfair competition through false sales materials, and antitrust violations via discriminatory sales terms. The defendant moved to dismiss the first two counts for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which governs patent actions and requires either the defendant's residence or acts of infringement plus a regular and established place of business in the district. The court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and denied dismissal, finding that the defendant's salesman maintained a dedicated business office in his home in the Northern District of Ohio, operated under substantial company control with itineraries approved by the home office, and conducted sales of the accused products there, satisfying the venue statute. The court noted an alternative basis for venue on the patent claim through pendent jurisdiction tied to the diversity-based unfair competition claim.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a prosecution motion in a federal bank robbery case requiring defendant Willie B. O’Neal, who was in custody and had grown a beard, to shave for an identification lineup because witnesses described one of the perpetrators as clean-shaven. The defendant resisted on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds. The court granted the motion and ordered the defendant to appear clean-shaven. The core reasoning, drawn from precedents such as Holt v. United States, United States v. Wade, and United States v. Blank, was that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence and does not bar compelled changes to physical appearance for identification purposes.

criminal lawprocedure

This case under the Federal Tort Claims Act arose from the 1967 deaths of sixteen skydivers who jumped from a B-25 aircraft into Lake Erie due to the plane's mislocation relative to the planned landing site at Ortner Airfield. Plaintiffs contended that an air traffic controller at the Oberlin center misidentified the aircraft on radar and provided incorrect guidance, while the government argued that pilot hypoxia or the jumpers' decision to exit over clouds constituted the cause or contributory negligence. After reviewing testimony, radar tapes, and expert evidence, the court ruled for the plaintiffs on liability, determining that controller misidentification was the proximate cause and that the skydivers reasonably relied on the jump signal without independent means to assess conditions below.

torts & liability

This case under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act involved a claim by International Wire that a union engaged in an illegal secondary boycott by pressuring another company to stop using the plaintiff's mineral insulated cable. The union moved for summary judgment, arguing that a prior National Labor Relations Board ruling dismissing a similar unfair labor practice complaint under Section 8(b)(4) was res judicata. After initially denying the motion for lack of sufficient evidence of the NLRB proceedings, the court granted summary judgment on renewal when the defendants submitted the full administrative record. The court reasoned that the issues were identical, the parties had a full and fair hearing before the NLRB, and the administrative decision therefore barred relitigation in the damages action.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved multiple lawsuits by schoolchildren and chaperones injured when the M/V George Washington ran aground, seeking damages for physical and psychic injuries from the vessel owner. After consolidation of the actions, the defendant raised the Limitation of Liability Act defenses in a single answer, prompting plaintiffs to move to strike the aggregate limitation defense on grounds that only a timely petition under 46 U.S.C. § 185 could limit liability across all claims. The court denied the motion, holding that 46 U.S.C. § 183 permits a shipowner to assert a single limitation fund against all claims from one occurrence even without a § 185 petition, and that a single answer suffices in consolidated proceedings because consolidation serves administrative convenience without altering substantive rights or prejudicing claimants.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a claim by Ohio Brass Company against Allied Products Corporation for breach of contract due to improperly heat-treated stainless steel pins supplied under a 1962 agreement. The defendant sought summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations under Ohio's Uniform Commercial Code provision. The court determined that while the four-year limit applied since the deliveries occurred after the UCC's effective date, the limitations period could be tolled under Ohio law because the defendant, a foreign corporation, was not qualified to do business in Ohio until 1968, potentially preventing personal service. The motion was denied due to unresolved factual issues regarding whether the defendant's salesman in Ohio qualified as a proper agent for service, which would affect tolling.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves plaintiffs Bruce King, a grand jury witness, and Wayne Fisher, a prospective demonstrator, who filed a class action in federal court seeking to enjoin enforcement of two state court orders from the Portage County Common Pleas Court. The first order prohibited grand jury witnesses from giving interviews or making public statements about the investigation into the May 1970 Kent State University events, while the second broadly restricted picketing, parading, and leafleting near the courthouse in connection with the grand jury proceedings. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and the court also considered the abstention doctrine. The court denied the motion to dismiss, declined to abstain after noting the state court's deference to federal proceedings, and granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the state orders violated the plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

free speechcivil rightsfederal power