Clifford Scott Green

In Greene v. Palakovich, petitioner Eric Greene sought federal habeas corpus relief after his 1996 state conviction and life sentence for second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy arising from a 1993 store robbery and killing. The court considered a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that denied Greene's multiple claims but proposed granting a certificate of appealability solely on his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause challenge to the admission of redacted confessions from non-testifying co-defendants at his joint trial. Overruling the respondents' objections on grounds including the applicability of Gray v. Maryland, harmless error, and procedural exhaustion, the court approved and adopted the report in full, thereby denying the habeas petition while issuing the certificate of appealability on that single claim because reasonable jurists could disagree on the merits under AEDPA standards.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Brenda Schwartz sued her employer Citizens Financial Group and plan administrator Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston under ERISA after her short-term disability benefits were terminated retroactively, alleging she was unable to work due to multiple sclerosis and related conditions. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Citizens' self-funded short-term disability plan was not an employee welfare benefit plan covered by ERISA but instead qualified as a payroll practice exempt from the statute. The court agreed after reviewing the plan documents, funding source from general assets, and lack of insurance features, granting defendants' motion and dismissing the action with prejudice while denying the plaintiff's cross-motion. The decision turned on the absence of ERISA applicability rather than the merits of the benefits denial or procedural fairness claims.

labor & employmenthealthcare

Marie Gallagher sued Sunrise Assisted Living under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that her allergies to facility pets constituted a disability and that the employer failed to accommodate her by keeping animals away from her work area, resulting in her constructive discharge. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It concluded that Gallagher was not disabled under the ADA because her allergies did not substantially limit a major life activity such as breathing, and that she failed to establish a prima facie retaliation claim due to lack of protected activity or adverse employment action.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Plaintiffs owned a multi-unit dwelling that had been subdivided into apartments before a 1979 township zoning ordinance restricted the area to single-family detached dwellings; after state courts upheld enforcement against them and denied nonconforming-use status, plaintiffs sought to limit the units to family use only, which the township rejected while pursuing daily fines in ongoing state litigation. Plaintiffs then filed a federal action under the Fourteenth Amendment, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the state proceedings on due-process grounds. The court granted the township’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Younger abstention doctrine required federal courts to refrain from interfering with the parallel state enforcement action, which implicated important state interests in zoning and provided an adequate forum for constitutional claims without any showing of bad faith or extraordinary circumstances.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a student diagnosed with Tourette’s Syndrome who sued the Neshaminy School District under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging an improper suspension without a required manifestation determination, repeated failure by the district to participate in scheduled due process hearings, and noncompliance with a hearing officer’s order for out-of-district placement and services. The district moved to dismiss the complaint, primarily arguing that the plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies under IDEA and that the other claims were likewise barred. The court denied the motion, holding that the allegations sufficiently pleaded futility of exhaustion due to the district’s conduct and that the plaintiff had stated viable claims under all three statutes when the facts were taken as true.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Michael Henderson sued Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company for breach of contract and statutory bad faith after the insurer denied his claim for theft coverage on a damaged BMW, alleging the denial involved racial bias and unreasonable investigation. The defendant moved to dismiss the entire complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under diversity rules and to dismiss the bad faith count for failure to state a claim. The court denied both motions. It held that the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied because the complaint's good-faith demand for over $100,000 could include punitive damages and other relief available under Pennsylvania's bad faith statute if racial discrimination were proven. It also found the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a viable bad faith claim.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a dispute between Technology Based Solutions, Inc. and its owner James Roberts, and Electronic College, Inc. and its president A. Norton McKnight, over alleged copyright infringement of educational testing materials originally developed in 1975 and later used in a product called PAVE, as well as claims arising from a 1996 settlement agreement following prior arbitration. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement under the Copyright Act, while defendants counterclaimed for breach of the settlement agreement, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, holding that the unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and misappropriation claims were preempted by the Copyright Act because they were equivalent to copyright infringement without an extra element, but a breach of contract claim could proceed if it involved additional rights; the court also granted defendants leave to amend their counterclaim.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Plaintiff Robert DeHart, an inmate at a Pennsylvania state correctional institution, sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their denial of his requests for a strict vegan diet and exemption from wearing leather shoes violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freely exercise his Mahayana Buddhist beliefs. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The court granted the motion, holding that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the asserted constitutional rights were not clearly established in the law at the time the requests were denied, and therefore the court did not reach the reasonableness of the officials' conduct or the underlying merits of the claims.

religious libertycivil rightscriminal law

The case is an appeal by the United States from a November 4, 1993 Bankruptcy Court order in the matter of In re CS Associates that allowed the IRS an unsecured claim of approximately $576,000 instead of treating it as secured. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158 and reviewed the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. After considering the record and the Bankruptcy Court's opinion at 161 B.R. 144, the District Court affirmed the order in full and dismissed the appeal.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case is an appeal by Raymond E. Silk, M.D. from a bankruptcy court order entering judgment against him for approximately $1.5 million in favor of the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 723, concerning a deficiency claim arising from the bankruptcy of the CS Associates partnership. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order in full. The court reasoned that the § 723 action is equitable in nature, making it subject only to the doctrine of laches rather than the statute of limitations in § 546(a)(1), and that laches did not bar the claim; it also held that Silk was not entitled to a jury trial and that the bankruptcy court's calculation of the deficiency fell within its equitable authority.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a dispute in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding over whether the City of Philadelphia could recover post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents totaling over $548,000 from the proceeds of a court-approved sale of the debtor's nursing home facility. United Jersey Bank, holding a first-priority mortgage on the property securing a debt exceeding $3.3 million, challenged the bankruptcy court's order allowing the City to surcharge those proceeds under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling, finding that the taxes and rents were reasonable and necessary costs of preserving and disposing of the property during its marketing for sale and conferred a direct benefit on the secured creditor by enabling the sale that generated net proceeds for the bank. The decision rested on the requirements of § 506(c) that such expenses be reasonable, necessary, and beneficial to the holder of the secured claim, distinguishing them from pre-petition liens that already had priority under state law.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

In Sease v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, student and former student members of the Central High School Gospel Choir sued the School District of Philadelphia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that district policies restricting the choir's use of school facilities, employee involvement, and performances violated their constitutional rights; the district counterclaimed seeking a declaration that its actions complied with the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 et seq. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant and denied it to the plaintiffs. The opinion found that the choir, though a non-curriculum student group meeting during noninstructional time, was impermissibly led and organized by a full-time school secretary who directed practices, handled correspondence on school letterhead, and participated without deducting pay, while also involving non-students such as a paid pianist and former students on a regular basis. These facts violated the Equal Access Act's prohibitions on school employee direction or control of student religious meetings and regular participation by nonschool persons, as well as related district rules, thereby justifying the district's restrictions without infringing plaintiffs' rights.

religious libertycivil rightsfree speech

This case involved a debtor who removed a state-court mortgage foreclosure action—originally filed in 1987 and involving challenges under Pennsylvania's Act 6 notice requirements—to federal bankruptcy court after filing a Chapter 13 petition. The bankruptcy court issued a report recommending remand, which the district court adopted. The court granted the plaintiff's motion in part and remanded the proceeding to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). It reasoned that the matter was a non-core "related" proceeding, that discretionary abstention was warranted due to comity with the state court that had handled the case for years and issued the underlying judgment, and that the issues were based solely on state law with no federal questions present.

propertyprocedurefederal power

This case concerns a dispute over indemnification from an escrow fund established in connection with the 1987 sale of Ecusta Corporation stock to P.H. Glatfelter Company. Glatfelter claimed reimbursement for approximately $3.2 million in underpaid 1986 taxes it discovered and voluntarily paid after the acquisition, relying on contractual warranties that Ecusta had paid all taxes due. The defendants refused payment, arguing that the claim was invalid without an official government notice of deficiency. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that an official assessment is not required because the stock purchase and related agreements incorporate the tax code's definition of deficiency, under which unpaid taxes become due and owing when returns are filed.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case involved plaintiff Christopher J. Peterson, a former officer of an insolvent securities firm, suing the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, one of its employees, and Bear Stearns & Co. after the Exchange denied him membership due to unpaid debts from his prior firm and statements that he would never work on the Exchange again. Peterson alleged antitrust conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, defamation, tortious interference, Hobbs Act violations, and RICO claims, seeking damages, injunctive relief, and admission to the Exchange. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint in part and denied them in part. It denied dismissal of the antitrust claim under Sherman Act §1 and the Clayton Act because the complaint alleged sufficient facts supporting conspiracy, illegal conduct, injury, and a possible per se violation or adverse market effect. Other claims, including those under RICO, were addressed separately with partial dismissal based on the failure to adequately plead violations of the underlying statutes.

business & regulatory

This case concerns whether Liberty Mutual Insurance must cover cleanup costs incurred by Triangle Publications (as owner of Philadelphia Newspapers) at a New Jersey Superfund site under comprehensive general liability policies in effect from 1965 to 1969; the EPA had identified Triangle as a potentially responsible party under CERCLA for toxic waste that leached from an unlined lagoon where used press-cleaning solvent had been stored. Liberty Mutual moved for summary judgment on three grounds: that no covered "occurrence" had taken place, that equitable cleanup costs did not qualify as "damages," and that Triangle had given untimely notice. The court denied all three motions after determining that Pennsylvania law governed, that genuine factual disputes existed over when any occurrence manifested and whether the costs constituted covered damages, and that the insurer had not shown prejudice from the asserted late notice.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved providers of sexually explicit 'dial-a-porn' telephone message services challenging the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute (66 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 2905) that required preambles disclosing costs and content, nine-digit access codes for explicit material obtainable only by written application, procedures to block minors, and related enforcement by telephone companies and the Public Utility Commission. Plaintiffs argued the requirements violated the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by burdening protected speech. The court found the access code mandate and associated provisions unconstitutional, reasoning that they imposed substantial financial and administrative costs on providers, deterred adult access to lawful content, and were not narrowly tailored given less restrictive alternatives such as customer-requested blocking, while noting that parents hold primary responsibility for supervising minors rather than the state imposing broad barriers on adult speech.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiffs obtained a business loan from defendant Eastern Financial Services secured by residential mortgages to purchase and operate a lunch truck, but after the business failed and they filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy, they alleged violations of Pennsylvania usury laws, prepayment penalty prohibitions, and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. The bankruptcy court determined the loan was exempt from interest rate limits as a business loan but violated prepayment rules and UDAP, awarding only loan balance elimination and attorney fees without proving actual damages. On appeal, the district court affirmed the fee award of $5,358.05 plus costs, ruling that challenges to the underlying merits judgment were untimely under Third Circuit precedent following White v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, and that the lodestar calculation with reductions for unsuccessful claims and accepted hourly rates was reasonable.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute between St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company and the Insurance Placement Facility of Pennsylvania over the allocation of liability for fire damage to commercial property insured by both parties under policies held by the buyers and sellers. The court determined that because the policies covered distinct insurable interests of the buyers and sellers, the "other insurance" clauses required pro rata sharing of the actual cash value of the loss, with St. Paul responsible for any additional replacement costs upon compliance with its policy terms. The reasoning centered on Pennsylvania law recognizing separate insurable interests for vendors and vendees, the absence of replacement cost coverage in the Fair Plan policy, and the specific provisions in St. Paul's policy regarding actual cash value versus replacement.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved former officers of a local union lodge challenging the international union's imposition of a trusteeship over the lodge, along with the officers' suspension and subsequent internal union charges, as violations of Title III of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and the union's constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, reinstatement, and damages after the trusteeship was imposed in 1986 due to the lodge's financial arrears and administrative issues. The court denied the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction, while granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the trusteeship was established and maintained in good faith for allowable statutory purposes such as correcting financial malpractice, followed the union's constitutional procedures including a fair hearing, and thus enjoyed a statutory presumption of validity that the plaintiffs failed to rebut with clear and convincing evidence.

labor & employment