This case involved a dispute over whether the Secretary of the Treasury could remit penalties for attempting to evade internal revenue taxes after a seizure of property and entry of judgment. The court held that the Secretary has authority under the remission acts to remit penalties or forfeitures at any time before the money is actually paid over to the collector, and that this power extends to shares claimed by customs officers or others. The core reasoning, drawn from United States v. Morris, was that such interests remain conditional and unvested until payment occurs, the Secretary's discretion is an act of mercy rather than a judicial function, and courts have no power to review or override it once the primary tax has been collected. The Court of Claims had dismissed the claim for a share of the penalties, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The case involved a claim by Kellogg against the United States seeking additional payment under a contract for supplying bricks for the Washington aqueduct. The original contract, made by Captain Meigs on behalf of the United States with Degges & Smith, prohibited assignment or sub-letting, and Kellogg operated only as an agent or employee of the sureties Mechlin & Alexander rather than as a recognized party to the agreement with the government. A congressional resolution authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to settle accounts with the contract parties, but the secretary properly excluded Kellogg and paid the funds to the sureties. The Court of Claims sustained a demurrer to the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding that Kellogg had no legal basis for recovery beyond the partial payment he had already accepted under protest.
The case involved heirs of Stephen Girard challenging the City of Philadelphia's continued administration of a charitable trust under his will after the city's consolidation expanded its boundaries, arguing that the corporation's identity had changed, rendering it unable to fulfill the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the bill, holding that the Consolidation Act did not destroy the corporation's identity or its capacity to hold and administer the trust. The court reasoned that the trust remains valid, the legislature had authority to modify the municipal corporation while preserving its powers and duties regarding the trust, and the heirs lacked any interest or standing to intervene, as only the state could address any potential issues in administration.
This case concerned repeated claims by the legal representatives of George Fisher against the United States for property damage caused by U.S. troops in 1813, which had already resulted in multiple congressional resolutions and five prior payments totaling over $66,000. The court affirmed the judgment denying additional recovery, including interest, after Congress repealed the 1860 joint resolution that had authorized the Secretary of War to investigate and adjust the claims. The core reasoning was that the Secretary acted only in a ministerial capacity under instructions from Congress, not as an arbitrator whose award could create vested rights binding on the government; therefore, the repeal merely withdrew one tribunal without violating any rights, and Congress retained authority to modify or end the claims process.
The case concerned whether a provision in a railroad company's mortgage regarding taxes applied to income taxes owed by bondholders under the revenue act of 1864, and whether the company could withhold such taxes from payments to bondholders. The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling in favor of the railroad's position on the tax issue. The opinion explained that the mortgage's defeasance clause addressed only covenants between the mortgagor and mortgagee to protect against taxes incurred during possession, and had no application to bondholder income taxes. It further noted that the statute facilitated tax collection by authorizing corporations to deduct or withhold the tax amount unless they had contracted otherwise with bondholders, with credits applied to prevent double taxation.
The case concerned a collision between a steam-powered propeller vessel and a sailing schooner, in which the propeller made an abrupt change of course leading to impact. The Supreme Court affirmed the district and circuit courts' rulings that the propeller was solely at fault and liable for the schooner's damages. The core reasoning was that the propeller lacked a competent lookout, which would have detected the schooner from a safe distance, and that the schooner had no legal duty to display a light prior to the 1864 statute and could not reasonably do so amid the sudden peril; because the lower courts' factual findings were supported by evidence, they were not disturbed on appeal.
