The case concerned whether railroads could offer pick-up and delivery services by motor truck as part of their rail operations without first obtaining certificates of public convenience and necessity under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The plaintiff trucking association sought to enjoin the railroads from implementing new tariffs for these services that had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The court denied the motion for an interlocutory injunction, ruling that the services fell under Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act rather than Part II. It reasoned that decades of Commission precedent and court decisions had treated railroad terminal truck operations as rail transportation, and that the Motor Carrier Act's exception for operations subject to Part I preserved this authority.
This case involved a life insurance company's challenge to the denial of a tax refund for excess profits taxes paid for 1917 under the Revenue Act of 1917. The plaintiff argued that its legally required reserve fund, calculated at over $2.7 million as of the end of 1916, qualified as invested capital and should have reduced its tax liability, but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had excluded it. The court held that the reserve constituted invested capital because it consisted of accumulated premiums and earnings held in a common fund with the company's other assets, used in its business operations without segregation, and serving as a form of capital contributed by policyholders analogous to stockholder capital. The decision also considered the congressional purpose of the tax to target war-related excess profits, which did not apply to insurance companies, and consistency with treatment of similar entities. The court awarded the plaintiff the claimed refund of $15,882.44.
The case involved a Black plaintiff who was a qualified Democratic voter and party member but was denied the right to participate in Virginia's 1928 Democratic primary election solely because of his race, pursuant to a party convention resolution limiting participation to white persons; the defendants were state-appointed election judges and a clerk enforcing that rule. The plaintiff sued for damages under federal civil rights statutes, claiming violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The court overruled the defendants' demurrer, holding that the primary was an integral part of the state's election machinery under comprehensive statutes that regulated its conduct, funding, and administration, making the officials' actions state action rather than purely private conduct. The core reasoning was that the state could not, through delegation or recognition of party rules, authorize racial discrimination in voting that it was itself prohibited from enacting, as this conflicted with constitutional protections against abridgment of voting rights.
The case involved Beverly E. Wilson, a former Navy ensign who deserted his post in 1927 and was dropped from the Navy rolls by presidential order in 1928 after three months of unauthorized absence. He was arrested in 1929 and sought release via habeas corpus petition, arguing he could not be tried by naval court-martial for desertion after his separation from service. The court decided that Wilson could not be subjected to court-martial, ordering his discharge from custody (with bail pending appeal). The core reasoning was that courts-martial possess only limited statutory jurisdiction over persons in military service, and the President's action permanently terminated Wilson's naval status, rendering him a civilian no longer amenable to military tribunals, as confirmed by consistent administrative practice and opinions of multiple Attorneys General.
The case involved a shipyard seeking to enjoin enforcement of a federal workers' compensation award under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act for an employee injured while painting a vessel on a marine railway located on dry land above the high-water mark. The court decided to make the injunction permanent, holding that the federal act did not apply. The reasoning was that although the employment contract was maritime, the injury occurred on land, making the tort nonmaritime, and thus the Virginia state compensation law validly provided the remedy, rendering the federal act inapplicable per section 3(a) of the act.
This case involved a taxpayer who sued to recover additional income taxes assessed and paid on a $35,000 payment he received in 1920 from the American Coal Company, where he served as general superintendent. The payment came from a 1919 board resolution appropriating corporate funds for distribution to officers and employees ahead of a stock sale, which the taxpayer had excluded from his gross income. The court ruled for the plaintiff, holding that the sum was not taxable income. The reasoning was that the payment was a gratuity separate from his salary and fees, with no prior agreement or pension system in place, and even if the corporate action lacked full ratification by stockholders, it did not convert the funds into gains or profits subject to tax; at most, the recipient would hold them as a trustee for the owners.
