The case concerned claims by a fair housing organization that developer ERGS, Inc. violated the Fair Housing Act by constructing the Sierra Sage apartments without required accessibility features for disabled persons. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time-barred under the FHA's two-year statute of limitations. The court denied the motion, finding a triable issue as to whether the alleged violations formed part of a continuing discriminatory practice that extended into the limitations period, given the seamless timing and similar features of ERGS's subsequent Silver Lake development, which was still under construction when suit was filed. The court reasoned that ERGS's direct involvement in both projects, unlike the prior dismissal of claims against a separate entity, allowed the continuing violation doctrine to apply and prevent the limitations period from running.
This case arose from an IRS levy on funds plaintiff Mallard Automotive Group owed to a third party as nominee for taxpayer David Smith, followed by a settlement agreement in which plaintiff deposited $1 million and provided a $200,000 letter of credit. Plaintiff asserted claims for wrongful levy under 26 U.S.C. § 7426, refund under § 7422, and contract-based claims, but conceded the latter two belonged in the Court of Federal Claims. The court initially dismissed the wrongful levy count for failure to meet the nine-month statute of limitations under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(c), then on reconsideration granted the motion but upheld dismissal, holding that the dispute was at its core a contract interpretation issue governed by the settlement agreement and thus subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims rather than an independent tax claim in district court. The final order granted reconsideration yet dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Steven White, an artist who sells paintings with environmental and Native American themes in public spaces, sued the City of Sparks under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the city's roadway and sidewalk vendor licensing ordinance (SMC §§ 5.59 et seq.) violates his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing a prior restraint, being vague and overbroad, and restricting protected speech. The city countered that the provisions are valid time, place, and manner restrictions that do not apply to mere display of art and that White lacked standing for an as-applied challenge because he never applied for a license. The court analyzed cross-motions for partial summary judgment, concluding that visual artistic expression qualifies as protected speech under the First Amendment and that the city's policy exempting such speech from sales bans in parks must be assessed under intermediate scrutiny to determine if the restrictions are narrowly tailored to significant government interests and leave open ample alternative channels, while noting it was not evaluating the underlying ordinance in isolation.
This case involved a challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) decision to dispose of over 6,000 acres of public land in southeastern Lincoln County, Nevada, under the Lincoln County Land Act of 2000, to allow for expansion by the city of Mesquite. Plaintiffs sought summary judgment arguing that BLM's environmental assessment was inadequate under NEPA because it failed to fully analyze cumulative impacts on endangered species habitat, water resources in the Virgin River, air quality, and other reasonably foreseeable projects such as a power plant. BLM cross-moved for summary judgment, defending its consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service, biological opinion, and environmental review as sufficient. The court reviewed the administrative record to assess compliance with NEPA's requirements for evaluating environmental effects before approving the land privatization.
In this case, plaintiffs John and Pamela Nichols, along with their insurer State Farm, sued Mayflower Transit and its agent Olsen & Fielding after their household goods were destroyed in a trailer fire during an interstate shipment from California to Nevada, bringing state-law claims including breach of contract, negligence, misrepresentation, and unfair claims practices. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all state claims and dismissed Olsen & Fielding as a party. It held that the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, completely preempts state-law causes of action for loss or damage to goods in interstate commerce. The core reasoning relied on Supreme Court precedent that Congress enacted the Amendment to establish uniform national rules governing carrier liability under bills of lading, thereby superseding all state regulations on the subject, and on the principle that a disclosed agent of the carrier has no independent liability under the federal statute.
business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability
The case arose from the bankruptcy of Pegasus Gold Corporation and its affiliates, which had mining operations in Montana subject to the state's Metal Mine Reclamation Act. DEQ filed claims in the bankruptcy and entered into the Zortman Agreement and confirmed reorganization Plan that created RSC to perform interim reclamation work at the Zortman sites. After disputes led to termination of RSC's contract and hiring of Spectrum, the trustee and RSC sued DEQ and Spectrum for breach of the agreements, fraud, interference, and related claims. The bankruptcy court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds, and the district court affirmed. The court held that DEQ waived Eleventh Amendment immunity through its extensive participation in the bankruptcy proceedings and the close connection between the claims and the confirmed Plan.
business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal powerprocedure