Alfred Albert Arraj

This diversity case involved James Burrill suing his former employer, GTE Government Systems Corporation, for breach of an implied employment agreement and breach of an express covenant of good faith and fair dealing after his termination as Program Manager. Burrill alleged that GTE's employee handbook and oral representations created enforceable obligations that were violated when he was laid off without following certain procedures, despite the absence of an express written contract for a definite term. GTE moved for summary judgment, contending that Burrill was an at-will employee under Colorado law whose termination did not give rise to a claim. The court denied summary judgment on both claims, holding that factual questions existed as to whether the handbook's policies rebutted the at-will presumption by forming an implied contract or an express covenant of good faith, and that promissory estoppel issues also warranted trial. The court granted the plaintiff's separate motion to dismiss his outrageous conduct claim.

labor & employmentprocedure

This diversity case involved Telectronics, a pacemaker manufacturer, suing its insurer United National Insurance for breach of contract and bad faith after United declined to share in defense costs for a products liability suit brought by a patient whose device allegedly malfunctioned. The underlying injury spanned multiple policy periods, with United's policy covering only three of the twenty-three months at issue. The court granted partial summary judgment, ruling that United must pay a pro-rata share (approximately 13%) of defense expenses under a time-on-the-risk allocation, even though notice was late, while denying sanctions against the plaintiff. The decision rested on Pennsylvania precedent applying a continuous-trigger approach to occurrence-based liability policies and rejecting strict forfeiture for delayed notice absent prejudice.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case is an employment discrimination action brought by a federal employee under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The plaintiff requested a jury trial on her ADEA claims, prompting the defendant to move to strike the request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). The court granted the motion, ruling that no jury trial right existed for federal employees under the ADEA prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and that the 1991 Act did not alter this by providing for jury trials in ADEA cases or applying retroactively, since it contains no reference to age discrimination and lacks the affirmative statutory language required by Supreme Court precedent. The court therefore denied the jury trial request on the age discrimination claims while treating related filings as a motion to amend.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a Title VII sex discrimination claim by Mary Wilson Murphy against the Veterans Administration, alleging that its requirement for VA hospital chaplains to be ordained clergymen unlawfully barred women from Catholic chaplain positions because the Roman Catholic Church does not ordain women as priests. The facts showed Murphy met all other criteria but was rejected due to lack of ordination and ecclesiastical endorsement. The court held that the ordination requirement violated Title VII as it had a discriminatory impact on women and was not justified, since requiring only ecclesiastical endorsement would adequately serve the VA's needs for qualified chaplains. It therefore ordered the VA to remove the ordination requirement from its regulations, permitted Murphy to reapply for endorsement and the position, denied back pay, and awarded attorney fees.

civil rightslabor & employmentreligious liberty

The case involves a third-party complaint filed by Resurgens against the law firm Kirkpatrick & Lockhart alleging legal malpractice, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation arising from the firm's representation of Central Corporation (now Resurgens) in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in Florida. K&L moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing insufficient minimum contacts with Colorado under the state's long-arm statute. The court analyzed whether Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) permits nationwide service of process in this non-core but related proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), following precedent that such jurisdiction exists where the malpractice claims may impact the bankruptcy estate. It also examined K&L's contacts with Colorado, including directing bankruptcy notices and communications to Colorado creditors and shareholders, concluding that jurisdiction was proper on both grounds.

procedure

The case involved a breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claim by D.D.J. Development against N & N International and Sheriff Ali regarding a financing agreement for a real estate project in Colorado, which was removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand, finding proper diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, and denied the defendants' motions to dismiss for insufficiency of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. It reasoned that service of process was adequate based on affidavits showing a summons was served, and that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Colorado because they negotiated and entered into a loan agreement specifically for developing a hotel in the state, satisfying the Colorado long-arm statute and due process requirements.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Coherent, Inc. bringing federal claims for trademark infringement and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, along with a state unfair competition claim, against Coherent Technologies, Inc. for its use of a similar name in the field of coherent laser radar systems. After a bench trial, the court adopted stipulated facts detailing the plaintiff's incorporation history, incontestable federal registrations for the COHERENT mark on lasers and related goods since the 1970s, its substantial sales and advertising, the defendant's 1984 incorporation and focus on lidar systems for government and commercial clients, and the absence of the defendant's name on products. The core reasoning examined the descriptive nature of the term coherent in science, the mark's acquired secondary meaning under Section 2(f), definitions of trademarks and service marks, likelihood of confusion, and the scope of fair use defenses.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit in which a jury apportioned fault as 20% to the plaintiff, 20% to defendant Sharp, and 60% to non-party Club Med, awarding total damages of $66,500 after Club Med had settled pretrial for $50,000. The court considered two issues under Colorado law: whether to combine the liability shares of a defendant and a settling non-party defendant when comparing them to the plaintiff's negligence, and how a pretrial settlement affects the final recovery. It held that the negligence of Sharp and Club Med should be combined (40%) and compared to the plaintiff's 20%, permitting recovery, and that the verdict must be reduced by the percentages of fault attributed to the plaintiff and the settling non-party (80% total), yielding a $13,300 judgment against Sharp. The core reasoning drew on C.R.S. §§ 13-21-111, 13-21-111.5, and 13-50.5-105, along with precedent such as Mountain Mobile Mix, to combine fault shares for comparison purposes and deduct by proportionate fault rather than settlement amount.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns whether defendant Orkin Exterminating timely removed a civil action from Colorado state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Plaintiffs moved to remand, contending that Orkin received a copy of the filed complaint by mail on September 30, 1989, more than thirty days before filing its notice of removal on November 9, 1989; Orkin maintained that the period began only upon formal service on October 20. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that receipt of the initial pleading "through service or otherwise" triggers the thirty-day clock and that the evidence established such receipt in September. The court denied Orkin's request to certify the statutory interpretation issue, denied its motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel, and denied plaintiffs' request for Rule 11 sanctions.

procedure

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Wendy’s of Colorado Springs under Title VII on behalf of male employee Guy Case, claiming he was denied a demotion and discharged because of his sex. After a bench trial, the court found that the EEOC did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Wendy’s actions amounted to disparate treatment based on sex. The evidence instead showed that Case’s termination resulted from ongoing scheduling disputes and his refusal to work assigned weekend shifts, which were applied consistently with business needs and seniority rules. The court therefore entered judgment for the defendant and denied attorney’s fees.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a disparate treatment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 brought by plaintiff Alan Padilla against United Air Lines, alleging racial discrimination in his termination from a temporary ramp-serviceman position. The court had previously found that United discriminated against Padilla and awarded him limited back pay covering only the 89-day temporary employment period. On post-trial motions, the court rejected Padilla's argument that United bore the burden to prove he would not have obtained permanent employment absent discrimination, distinguishing the facts from cases like Day v. Mathews because Padilla had no legitimate expectation or evidence of seeking a permanent role. The court granted Padilla's motion in part by ordering United to expunge any adverse notations from his personnel records that would hinder future rehire consideration and denied the defendant's motions to amend the judgment or for a new trial.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case arose from a 1988 skiing collision at Snowmass Ski Area in which minor plaintiff Michael Giebink was injured by defendant Kevin Fischer while taking a ski lesson from defendant Jennifer Lang, an employee of defendant Aspen Skiing Company (ASC). Plaintiffs brought multiple claims against ASC and Lang, including common-law negligence for premises maintenance and supervision, a statutory claim under Colorado's premises liability statute, and an attractive nuisance claim. On defendants' motion to dismiss, the court held that C.R.S. § 13-21-115 provides the exclusive remedy against landowners and therefore dismissed the Third and Seventh Claims and portions of the Fourth Claim that relied on common-law negligence or implied a "should have known" standard. The court denied dismissal of the Fifth and Sixth Claims alleging negligent supervision by the ski instructor. The Ski Safety Act was found not to conflict with or override the later-enacted premises liability statute, and attractive nuisance was deemed inapplicable because the plaintiff was not a trespasser.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a copyright infringement claim by NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), a television station, against Broadcast Information Services, Inc., which sold a videotape copy of KCNC's "Wednesday's Child" news segment to the station itself after the broadcast. KCNC sought relief including statutory damages and attorney's fees under 17 U.S.C. §§ 411(a) and 411(b), but the defendant moved for partial summary judgment on those remedies. The court granted the motion, holding that the work had not been "published" under the Copyright Act's definition because there was no distribution of copies to the public or offers for further distribution, public performance, or display, and the registration certificate left the publication date blank. The court also found that KCNC failed to meet the pre-fixation notice and timing requirements of § 411(b) for live transmissions, limiting available remedies to injunctive relief and actual damages.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a workplace injury where plaintiff Jeff McHargue's hand was crushed in a plastic injection molding machine made by defendant Stokes, leading to claims of negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability based on alleged design defects in the machine's safety features. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing issues including a statute of repose and insufficient evidence of defectiveness. The court analyzed the machine's design, safety interlocks on front and rear gates, evidence of alternative safer designs, and determined that the ten-year statute of repose does not bar the claim, while noting that evidence of alternative designs can support a finding of defect but does not automatically prove it.

torts & liability

This case was a civil enforcement action by the United States on behalf of the EPA against Louisiana-Pacific Corporation for alleged violations of the Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations at two waferwood manufacturing facilities in Colorado. The court found that the facilities were major stationary sources located in attainment areas and that the company had begun actual construction without obtaining the required PSD permits, constituting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 7475 and 40 C.F.R. § 52.21. Core reasoning focused on the statutory definitions of major emitting facilities (based on potential emissions of 250 TPY or more), the mandatory permitting process prior to construction, and the factors for assessing civil penalties including the seriousness of the violation, economic benefit to the defendant, and ability to pay.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involves two commercial airlines challenging Pitkin County's increases in landing fees and terminal rental charges at Aspen/Pitkin County Airport as excessive, unreasonable, and discriminatory under federal and state law. The airlines alleged violations of the federal Anti-Head Tax Act, the Sherman Act, federal nondiscrimination requirements, the Supremacy Clause due to federal preemption, and a Colorado statute limiting airport fees to reasonable amounts. On the county's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court denied dismissal of the Anti-Head Tax Act claim, finding the complaint's allegations sufficient to proceed, but granted dismissal of the antitrust, discrimination, and preemption claims. The court reasoned that the first claim's facts, taken as true, could establish a violation, while the remaining claims lacked legal basis even under liberal pleading standards.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case was a civil enforcement action by the United States on behalf of the EPA against Louisiana-Pacific Corporation alleging violations of the Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration regulations at two Colorado waferwood plants, seeking an injunction and civil penalties for failure to obtain required permits before construction and operation. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court examined whether the facilities qualified as major stationary sources or major modifications due to their potential to emit over 250 tons per year of pollutants like VOCs and CO, after accounting for operational limits in state-issued permits. The court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding emission potentials and PSD applicability, rejected estoppel and other defenses for lack of affirmative government misconduct, and indicated that violations would need to be resolved at trial while noting that reliance issues could affect penalty amounts.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Robert Therrien, a pilot hired by United Air Lines in March 1986 and terminated two months later, who sued alleging breach of an implied contract of employment, promissory estoppel, outrageous conduct, and violations of the Colorado Labor Peace Act. The court granted United's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all remaining claims. It reasoned that multiple signed disclaimers in applications and the employee handbook established at-will employment as a matter of law, precluding implied-contract or estoppel claims; that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of outrageous conduct; and that the labor-peace claim was barred by the six-month statute of limitations.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned third-party plaintiff Badger Oil Corporation's motion to release a supersedeas bond consisting of a cash deposit posted by defendant National Oil Company to stay execution of a $145,220.95 judgment entered against it in 1985. National filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 1985, and after the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment in 1987, National contended that the deposit was property of the bankruptcy estate protected by the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The court held that the funds were not part of the estate because they were held in custodia legis by the Clerk of the Court, with National retaining only a contingent reversionary interest that terminated upon affirmance of the judgment. The court therefore granted Badger's motion and ordered the Clerk to release the deposit plus interest to Badger.

procedureproperty

In Terry v. Avemco Insurance, plaintiff C. Glenn Terry sued his aircraft insurer after his 1957 Luscombe T8F plane was destroyed in an emergency landing, claiming the company negligently failed to add requested full hull coverage following a July 1983 phone call in which he also arranged for a bank lienholder to be added to the policy. The existing policy excluded in-flight damage, and Terry admitted the written terms provided no coverage, but he alleged he had relied on the insurer's agreement to modify the policy. Defendant Avemco moved for summary judgment, arguing that Terry's failure to review policy statements over three years barred any negligence claim as a matter of law or constituted contributory negligence. The court denied the motion, holding that a tort claim for negligent failure to procure requested coverage is distinct from contract claims, that an insured's failure to read the policy does not automatically bar relief in this agent-insurer context, and that comparative negligence questions under Colorado law present factual disputes for a jury rather than resolution on summary judgment.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory