This case is a products liability action brought in West Virginia state court by a resident plaintiff against multiple out-of-state corporate and individual defendants, alleging injuries from a defective fire extinguisher under theories including negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and failure to warn. One defendant removed the case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that not all properly served defendants had joined in or consented to the removal notice within the required thirty-day period. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that removal statutes must be strictly construed against removal and that the removing party bears the burden of showing all defendants officially and unambiguously consented, which was not met here; as a result, the court lacked jurisdiction to address the pending motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
In Walker v. Star USA Federal Credit Union (In re Walker), a Chapter 7 debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of his motion for attorney fees under 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) after a creditor dismissed its adversary proceeding, which had alleged that a debt should be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2) due to alleged fraudulent misstatements of income on loan applications. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the creditor was substantially justified in filing the complaint, as it relied on discrepancies between the debtor's sworn bankruptcy schedules (reporting low income) and the higher monthly income figures provided in the loan documents. The court reasoned that creditors may rely on representations made under penalty of perjury in bankruptcy filings and that the creditor promptly sought dismissal upon learning during discovery that the loan figures had included the spouse's income.
This case involved a defamation claim brought by former employees John Collins and Debbie Southworth against Red Roof Inns, Inc., based on statements made by a company executive in correspondence responding to another former employee's challenge to the denial of severance benefits under a change-of-control plan. The statements described the circumstances of the plaintiffs' terminations and were shared with the other employee's attorney. After certifying a question to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on the scope of absolute privilege for pre-litigation statements about third parties, the district court applied the reformulated standard and found that the defendant made the statements in good-faith contemplation of judicial proceedings, that the statements were relevant to those proceedings, and that they were published only to persons with an interest in the matter. The court therefore granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on absolute-privilege grounds and denied the renewed motion as moot.
The case arose after plaintiff Hiram Lewis refused to leave a nursing home at the end of visiting hours, leading to his forcible removal and arrest by police; the facility was later cited by state regulators for violating a federal regulation on residents' visitation rights. Lewis sued in state court asserting several state-law claims, including outrage, negligence, malicious prosecution, and violation of public policy. The defendant removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction tied to 42 C.F.R. § 483.10. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, concluding that the regulation confers rights only on residents, not visitors, and therefore presented no substantial federal issue necessary to resolve the state-law claims.
This case involved a California entertainment company that held exclusive rights to broadcast a 1999 closed-circuit boxing match suing a West Virginia sports bar and its operators for intercepting and publicly exhibiting the event without authorization in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. After the defendants failed to respond to the complaint despite proper service, the court entered default against them and held a damages hearing. The court awarded the plaintiff $14,000 in statutory damages calculated by multiplying the bar's maximum occupancy of 160 by a $17.50 licensing fee and then by a factor of five to account for willfulness, plus $7,325.35 in attorneys' fees and costs, for a total judgment of $21,325.35, finding the violation was committed for commercial advantage.
In Elswick v. Apfel, the plaintiff sought judicial review of the denial of her concurrent applications for Supplemental Security Income and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, alleging disability due to depression and nerves beginning in April 1996. The district court conducted de novo review of the magistrate judge's recommendation to affirm the administrative law judge's decision that the plaintiff was not disabled under the five-step sequential evaluation process. The court reversed the Commissioner's final decision and remanded the matter, finding that the ALJ had not adequately considered the plaintiff's evidence regarding her need for daily naps and had failed to properly define and convey to the vocational expert the meaning of the term "often" in relation to her deficiencies in concentration, persistence, and pace.