Charles Leach Hardy

The case involved an Arizona prison inmate who is deaf, mute, and has severe vision loss, who sued the Department of Corrections alleging that the failure to provide a qualified sign language interpreter violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding that the prison's receipt of federal financial assistance triggered obligations to provide auxiliary aids across its programs under the Civil Rights Restoration Act. It also denied summary judgment on the due process claim regarding the need for an interpreter in disciplinary proceedings, holding that mandatory state regulations created a protected liberty interest in the honor dorm and fair disciplinary processes. However, the court granted summary judgment on the claim of a liberty interest in avoiding protective lockdown in the general population. The core reasoning centered on the broad application of federal funding requirements to all operations of the agency and the mandatory language in prison regulations that implicated constitutional protections.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs seeking reimbursement for medical expenses incurred for their daughter's treatment of depression and cannabis dependence under an ERISA-governed group health insurance plan issued by the defendant. The insurance company denied coverage for "milieu therapy" and "speech therapy" charges based on policy exclusions for group therapy and speech therapy not correcting speech loss from a qualifying sickness. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the denials were reasonable interpretations of the plan terms and that equitable estoppel was unavailable under ERISA to recover benefits inconsistent with the written plan.

healthcarefederal power

The case involves plaintiff Dale Logan seeking judicial review under the Social Security Act of the denial of disability insurance benefits, claiming he became disabled in January 1981 due to various psychological and physical ailments, though his eligibility period ended in March 1981 and he applied later. Logan moved for summary judgment to reverse the ALJ and Appeals Council decision, while the Secretary cross-moved for affirmance. The court remanded the case to the ALJ for further findings. The core reasoning was that the ALJ did not properly consider or explain the rejection of relevant lay witness testimony from someone who observed the claimant in 1981, which is required especially where proof of disability depends substantially on subjective evidence.

federal powerprocedure

The case involved a former City of Phoenix employee who sued the city and her supervisor after being demoted to probationary status, transferred, and later terminated, bringing pendent state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract, alongside related allegations of age discrimination and retaliation. The court granted the defendants' renewed motion for partial summary judgment on the emotional distress and good faith covenant claims but denied it on the breach of contract claim. It reasoned that the defendants' conduct did not meet Arizona's standard of being extreme and outrageous, that the plaintiff had received all accrued employment benefits under precedent such as Wagenseller, and that administrative exhaustion requirements did not bar the contract claim because the available remedies were discretionary rather than mandatory.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitycivil rights

This case was a Section 1983 action brought by the United Steelworkers of America and individual plaintiffs against Arizona Department of Public Safety officers arising from a June 1984 labor strike rally and march in Clifton, Arizona, during which DPS officers used tear gas and made arrests amid confrontations with strikers. After summary judgment dismissed the union and many claims, the remaining issues at trial were excessive force from tear gassing people in a liquor store, arrests without probable cause, detention conditions, and related commander liability and qualified immunity defenses. By trial's end most parties had settled or been dismissed, and the court found that two officers violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of four remaining plaintiffs through the tear gassing and arrests, awarding compensatory damages of $1,000 each to three plaintiffs and $15,000 to one, while denying punitive damages on the ground that compensatory liability provided sufficient deterrence.

civil rightslabor & employmentcriminal law

In Marsh v. Digital Equipment Corp., plaintiff Terry Marsh, a long-term Black employee, sued his former employer for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and breach of an implied contract arising from the company's employee handbook and policies on discipline and harassment. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for Marsh on the discrimination claim, awarding compensatory damages for lost wages and emotional harm plus $50,000 in punitive damages, while ruling for Digital on the contract claim. The court found that Marsh's termination for alleged sexual harassment rested on complaints that were racially motivated, that supervisors failed to investigate adequately despite knowing of possible retaliation, and that Digital showed reckless indifference to his federally protected rights by denying him specifics of the accusations or a meaningful opportunity to respond. The opinion details the company's corrective-action procedures and concludes they were not followed in a nondiscriminatory manner.

civil rightslabor & employment

The United States sued ACB Sales & Service, Inc., its subsidiaries, and officers for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and a 1974 FTC consent order that prohibited misrepresentations about legal action, garnishment, criminal prosecution, and other debt-collection tactics, as well as certain contact practices. After a bench trial, the court found that ACB collectors and managers had engaged in prohibited communications and that senior officers had failed to adequately supervise compliance by reviewing debtor complaints. The court imposed civil penalties of $25,000 each on two individual officers and $300,000 total on the corporate defendants but denied injunctive relief because the government had not shown ongoing or imminent violations. One individual defendant was dismissed. The decision rested on the factual record of past practices and the statutory authority to assess penalties for violations of the FTC order and the Act.

business & regulatory

This case involved post-trial applications for attorneys' fees and costs after Dial prevailed on a state racketeering claim against McGraw-Edison but lost on antitrust claims, a breach of contract claim, and claims against another defendant. Dial sought fees under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-2314A for all its work, while McGraw-Edison sought fees under § 12-341.01 as the prevailing party on the contract claim. The court held that Dial could recover fees only for time reasonably spent on the racketeering claim and only ordinary taxable costs under Arizona law, requiring an amended application excluding time on unrelated antitrust and Arvin claims. The core reasoning was that unrelated unsuccessful claims must be excluded from fee awards, "costs of suit" language refers to standard taxable costs like deposition and witness fees rather than all litigation expenses, and the court has discretion to balance the competing statutory fee provisions.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by James Alan Arnett challenging his Arizona first-degree murder conviction and death sentence on 24 constitutional grounds after state courts affirmed both the original and resentencing proceedings. The district court addressed 14 issues on cross-motions for partial summary judgment, granting relief to Arnett on six claims including Miranda violations by a psychiatrist and probation officer, denial of confrontation at sentencing, lack of competent proof of aggravating factors, ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and invalidity of a prior California conviction. It denied relief to Arnett on eight other claims such as lack of impartial jury due to pretrial publicity, lack of proof of intent to kill, non-unanimous verdict, and various challenges to notice and procedures at sentencing. The court set an evidentiary hearing on the remaining coerced-confession issue after finding that state remedies were effectively exhausted or waived and that plenary federal review applied to the confession claim. The decisions rested on review of the trial record, Arizona Supreme Court opinions, and federal standards for exhaustion, Miranda, confrontation, and counsel effectiveness.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case Sinkler v. Goldsmith concerned a dispute between Lorraine Sinkler, a former collaborator and student of Joel S. Goldsmith, and Emma Goldsmith, Joel's widow, over rights to publish letters, manuscripts, and the book Horizons of Consciousness, along with counterclaims for copyright and trademark infringement, misuse of Joel's name, and breach of contract related to The Infinite Way spiritual movement. The court declined to abstain, holding that the issues involved civil property rights rather than ecclesiastical disputes within a religious organization. On the parties' summary judgment motions, the court granted judgment to Sinkler on the trademark infringement and right of publicity claims based on laches and acquiescence, denied summary judgment on certain copyright ownership and contract issues due to factual disputes over ownership and profits, and addressed related procedural matters.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a trademark infringement and unfair competition claim by Wells Fargo & Co. and related entities against Wells Fargo Construction Co., a small Arizona construction firm, seeking to prevent the use of the "Wells Fargo" name. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits because their federal trademark registration is incontestable and there is a likelihood of consumer confusion due to the strength of the mark, similarity of names, proximity of services in some areas, and evidence of actual confusion. The court also determined that there is a possibility of irreparable injury from ongoing trademark infringement, supporting the injunction despite noting the defendants' lack of intent to trade on goodwill.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involves a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud claim by a plaintiff class against bond counsel defendants regarding alleged misrepresentations or omissions about the tax-exempt status of 1976 Nursing Center bonds. The defendants sought findings on their motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to establish loss causation linking any misrepresentations to the plaintiffs' financial injury. The court denied the motion and held that in cases alleging a scheme to defraud, plaintiffs are not required to prove loss causation between each individual misrepresentation or omission and their injury. The reasoning distinguishes transaction causation (reliance inducing the purchase) from loss causation, noting that in scheme cases the causal link runs from the overall fraudulent scheme to the harm rather than from specific statements, and that loss causation is not always necessary when the fraud itself is the core wrong.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case was a Lanham Act Section 43(a) trade dress infringement action brought by Fuddruckers, Inc. against Doc's B.R. Others, Inc. and related defendants, alleging deliberate copying of restaurant concepts. After a jury trial that resulted in a verdict for the defendants, the court addressed the defendants' application for attorney's fees. The court granted the fees, concluding that the case was exceptional because circumstantial evidence indicated the suit was initiated in bad faith as a competitive ploy, including a statement by the plaintiff's president about suing similar businesses to dominate the market, groundless claims against individual defendants like Mary and Steven Koppes that appeared intended as harassment, and other factors supporting an inference of vexatious litigation. The ruling relied on interpretations of the Lanham Act authorizing fees in exceptional cases as well as general equitable principles permitting fee awards for bad faith conduct.

business & regulatory

In Jackson v. Shepard, an Arizona resident brought a diversity action for medical malpractice against a California doctor and hospital, alleging that they failed to administer medication after the birth of her child in California to prevent future harm from incompatible Rh blood factors. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, holding that Arizona's long-arm statute (Rule 4(e)(2)) was not satisfied because the defendants had not caused an event to occur in Arizona out of which the claim arose and the hospital was not doing business in the state. The court transferred the case to the Central District of California.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves a declaratory judgment action by Richard Charlton seeking to nullify the sale of real property from a bankrupt estate to Cortez Development Corporation and Seventh Camel Associates. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that there was no actual controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 because the issues had been rendered moot by the Ninth Circuit and were barred by res judicata based on prior proceedings. The court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit had already dismissed related appeals on mootness grounds and prohibited further challenges to the sale's validity, and that Charlton's attempts to vacate the bankruptcy court's orders confirming the sale were precluded by his failure to appeal properly or comply with procedural rules.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Barton alleged federal securities law violations against Merrill Lynch after its employee Mehren recommended and facilitated investments in three limited partnership tax shelters, which Barton funded through his Merrill Lynch cash management account. Two of the investments involved direct dealings with non-employee Van Houten, and Barton knew the third was a personal transaction with Mehren rather than Merrill Lynch. The court granted Merrill Lynch's motion for summary judgment, holding that the firm could not be liable as a controlling person under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because it had no knowledge of the concealed transactions, did not participate in them, and derived no benefit. The court also rejected Barton's attempt to create a factual issue via an affidavit that contradicted his prior deposition testimony and found no basis for rescission or additional discovery.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a request by the prevailing defendant in a removal action for an award of attorneys' fees totaling $53,878.90 and expenses of $2,142.36. The court found an award appropriate under applicable standards but determined the requested amounts were unreasonable after reviewing detailed time records. Following guidelines from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. and Hensley v. Eckerhart, the court identified issues including vague entries for tasks like review and analysis, significant duplication of effort between San Francisco and Phoenix counsel, excessive preparation time, and insufficient justification for expenses such as numerous photocopies and courier services. As a result, the court awarded $38,000 in attorneys' fees.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a securities fraud action against Pinal County defendants who sought to assert a defense of good-faith reliance on advice from their bond counsel regarding an improvement district bond issuance. The court initially struck the defense after finding that the defendants had delegated non-legal decisions, such as the project's economic feasibility, to counsel, creating a conflict of interest that undermined any claim of independent good-faith reliance. On reconsideration, the court vacated the broad order striking the defense and instead ruled that evidence of reliance on counsel would be admissible only to the extent it concerned legal advice on procedural compliance with securities laws, such as the sufficiency of petitions and resolutions. The court reasoned that reliance on counsel can serve as a factor showing good faith or due care in securities cases but cannot extend to business judgments or factual matters outside counsel's expertise.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Polykoff v. Collins, owners and employees of adult bookstores in Maricopa County sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to block the County Attorney from enforcing Arizona's obscenity statute (A.R.S. § 13-3502), claiming it was unconstitutionally overbroad in its definition of obscenity via the term 'prurient interest' and that its felony fines (up to $1 million for enterprises) amounted to an impermissible prior restraint on speech. The district court consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits and assumed jurisdiction based on the credible threat of prosecution. It rejected the constitutional challenges, holding that the statute tracked the Miller v. California standards as interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court, that the criminal fines were not automatic civil penalties creating prior restraint, and that any chilling effect was merely legitimate deterrence of unprotected obscenity. The court therefore denied injunctive relief and entered judgment for the defendant.

free speechcriminal lawcivil rights

This case involved the United States, acting on behalf of the FTC, suing fourteen debt collection corporations (the ACB Companies) and three individual directors for violating a 1975 FTC consent order and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act through various collection practices, such as misrepresentations about legal actions, garnishments, criminal proceedings, and improper communications with employers or at prohibited times. The government sought civil penalties and moved for summary judgment on 723 alleged violations, while certain defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The court granted both motions in part, finding liability for some violations based on undisputed evidence from collection letters and practices that clearly contravened specific prohibitions in the consent order, while excluding others due to factual disputes over intent or compliance. The decision applied the terms of the order directly to the documented conduct without piercing the corporate veil or addressing additional knowledge requirements under the statute.

business & regulatoryprocedure