This case is a declaratory judgment action brought by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company against General Dynamics Corporation seeking a ruling that Aetna has no obligation to defend, indemnify, or pay under multiple commercial general liability policies for costs arising from hazardous waste contamination at sixteen sites across eight states, including clean-up expenses, natural resource damages, and related claims under CERCLA, state statutes, and common law. The court addresses cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining issues after prior partial rulings, focusing on defense costs, settlement payments, and indemnity for sites such as the New York City Landfills, Review Avenue, and Cannons Engineering sites. The reasoning centers on policy interpretation, including whether response costs qualify as covered "damages," the scope of pollution exclusion clauses, the meaning of "occurrence," and application of Eighth Circuit precedent like Continental Ins. Co. v. NEPCCO to determine coverage for expected or intended pollution events.
The case involved a lawsuit filed in Missouri state court by C.H. on behalf of a minor child against the American Red Cross and Cardinal Glennon Children's Hospital, seeking damages for complications from cryoprecipitate transfusions allegedly contaminated with the AIDS virus between 1984 and 1985. The defendants removed the case to federal district court, asserting federal jurisdiction based on the Red Cross's status as a federally chartered corporation under statutes including 28 U.S.C. § 1349 and 36 U.S.C. § 2, along with pendent jurisdiction for the hospital. The court determined that removal was improper and remanded the case to state court, reasoning that 28 U.S.C. § 1349 limits federal jurisdiction over suits against federally incorporated entities unless the United States owns more than half of the capital stock, which does not apply to the Red Cross, and that other asserted grounds for removal, such as separate and independent claims, were not satisfied.
In Kempf v. Kempf, a wife sued her husband in federal court under the federal wiretapping statute (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968) after he recorded her telephone conversations using a device attached to a phone in their shared marital home; she also asserted a state-law invasion of privacy claim. The recordings were made while the couple was living together and were later used by the husband in state divorce proceedings where he alleged marital misconduct. The district court granted the husband's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the federal claim. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend Title III to cover interspousal wiretapping in a shared home during an intact marriage, citing legislative history and the traditional deference of federal courts to state courts on domestic relations matters.
This case concerned IRS assessments of penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 against a consulting corporation, its related partnership, and several individuals for unpaid federal withholding and FICA taxes owed by three financially distressed barge and shipyard companies. The plaintiffs sought refunds and abatements of the assessments, while the government counterclaimed to collect the balances. The court upheld the assessments against Donelan Phelps & Company, Inc., Donelan Phelps & Company, Thomas E. Phelps, Arthur Bourey, and Cynthia Kretmar, finding they were responsible persons who acted willfully by failing to pay the taxes when they had authority over the companies' finances and knew of the delinquencies. However, the court ruled for Patrick M. Donelan individually, concluding he had no control or knowledge regarding the tax payments, and awarded him a refund, abatement, and litigation costs.
This case involved a construction company's claim for an incentive fee under a contract to build a HUD-financed low-cost housing project for the elderly. The plaintiff argued it had substantially completed the project early enough to qualify for the fee based on the AIA general conditions, while the defendants applied a HUD contract provision defining substantial completion as the date of HUD's final inspection report, which occurred after the deadline. The court held that the HUD contract's provisions took precedence over inconsistent AIA terms per the contract's explicit language and statutory authority, making HUD's determination controlling absent fraud or gross mistake. It further found no basis to extend the completion date. Judgment was entered for the defendants, denying the fee.
The case concerned plaintiffs' lawsuit against a brokerage firm and associated individuals alleging violations of federal securities laws under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, state securities laws, RICO, and multiple common law claims such as fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, all arising from securities trading. Defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses in the plaintiffs' customer agreements. The court ordered arbitration of the state-law claims based on the Federal Arbitration Act and the Supreme Court's ruling in Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, but retained the federal securities and RICO claims for judicial resolution under precedents like Wilko v. Swan and Surman v. Merrill Lynch that prohibit arbitration of such federal claims, and stayed the federal proceedings pending completion of the arbitration.
