In Knapik v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, the plaintiff sued to halt foreclosure proceedings on a multi-unit Galveston County property he used partly as a weekend home, alleging a violation of Texas Property Code section 51.002(d) notice requirements for residences, various estoppel and inequitable conduct claims, that the defendant lacked possession of the original note, and seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not in default. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the entire case. The court reasoned that the statute's extra notice protections apply only to a debtor's primary residence and not to weekend homes, following an Erie guess based on Texas appellate precedent; the estoppel claims lacked sufficient factual support or were otherwise nonviable; Texas law permits foreclosure by a mortgage servicer without holding the original note; and the declaratory judgment request depended on the dismissed substantive claims.
In this foreclosure case, the Penrods sued Bank of New York Mellon (BONY) in state court, later removed to federal court, seeking to prevent foreclosure on their Texas home equity loan secured by a deed of trust; they alleged BONY was not the proper holder of the note, that required documents were not provided at closing, and that various notices and responses under federal and state statutes (including the Texas Constitution's home equity provisions, FDCPA, and RESPA) were deficient. BONY moved for summary judgment, arguing it held valid authority to foreclose following assignment of the note and deed of trust. The district court granted the motion, finding no genuine dispute of material fact because the Penrods offered no competent evidence to support their claims, many of which were abandoned or contradicted by the record, such as signed receipts and notices. The court applied the summary judgment standard under Rule 56, requiring the non-movant to designate specific facts rather than rely on allegations, and concluded BONY was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its foreclosure authority.
The case involves a contract dispute between Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. d/b/a AT&T Texas and F. Cary Fitch d/b/a Affordable Telecom over alleged failures to pay amounts due under their 2007 Two-Way CMRS Interconnection Agreement, which governs the exchange of telecommunications traffic between their networks. AT&T Texas moved for summary judgment on its claims and Affordable's counterclaims, while Affordable moved for partial summary judgment; the court granted AT&T Texas's motion in part and denied it in part, and denied Affordable's motion in full. The core reasoning centered on the regulatory framework of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and related FCC rules, prior state commission arbitration decisions that limited Affordable to paging services only (not ISP traffic), and the specific payment and service terms of the 2007 Agreement, which the court interpreted to resolve issues of liability and damages based on the record evidence. The court also addressed procedural aspects of the motions and remaining counterclaims lacking evidentiary support.
This case involves a lawsuit by Deborah Patton against her former employer, eCardio Diagnostics LLC, alleging retaliation for taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) after her daughter was injured in a car accident. The employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that Patton did not qualify for FMLA leave because her adult daughter did not have a disability preventing self-care and that the termination was for legitimate performance reasons. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether Patton was caring for her daughter during her absence and whether the decision to terminate her was made before or because of the leave, based on the timing of hiring a replacement and lack of prior performance complaints.
This case involves an insurance coverage dispute arising from a construction defect lawsuit in which Concierge Care Nursing Centers, as the purported assignee of a general contractor, sought indemnity from multiple insurers after settling claims for water damage and mold at a nursing facility. The insurers moved for summary judgment based on anti-assignment provisions in their policies that barred the assignment of rights without consent. The court granted summary judgment to the insurers, concluding that an alleged breach of the duty to defend does not estop an insurer from enforcing a valid anti-assignment clause under Texas law. The core reasoning is that Texas courts consistently enforce such clauses post-loss without requiring a showing of prejudice, distinguish them from "no action" clauses that may be subject to estoppel arguments, and have no precedent supporting the estoppel defense here.
In this case, former employee Warren Brooks sued his employer AAA Cooper Transportation for wrongful termination after he was fired following a random DOT-mandated drug test in which the testing facility reported issues with sample validity, an alleged admission of marijuana use, and failure to provide an observed specimen within the required timeframe. The employer had investigated the incident, terminated Brooks, and reported the results as required by federal regulations for commercial drivers. The court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the company was protected by qualified privilege in its communications about the test results, that Brooks failed to raise a genuine issue of malice, and that there was no private right of action under the relevant DOT drug-testing rules.
