Edward Francis Harrington

In this case, claimant Jen Chen sought to amend a preliminary order forfeiting a Mercedes-Benz vehicle to the United States after her son Stephen Chen pleaded guilty to a marijuana distribution conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846. The vehicle had been identified in the indictment's forfeiture allegation and was seized during the conspiracy period; the claimant asserted she held superior ownership because she had funded most of the purchase and intended only a conditional gift. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that the transaction constituted a completed inter vivos gift under Massachusetts law, with donative intent and delivery of possession and title to Stephen, so that any interest the claimant retained did not vest prior to the commission of the offense. The court therefore held that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a legal right superior to the defendant's under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) and denied the petition, entering a final order of forfeiture.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved competing claims to the proceeds from the court-ordered sale of the motor vessel Osprey. L & L Electronics and Essex Boat Works performed work on the vessel for its owner, Watersedge Group, and asserted maritime liens for necessaries totaling about $80,000; Tropical Aircraft Company held a first preferred ship mortgage securing loans made by its president to Watersedge, with an outstanding balance of roughly $725,000. The court held that the mortgage had priority over the liens and awarded the sale proceeds to Tropical. It reasoned that the mortgage was recorded before the liens arose and that there was no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, or other inequitable conduct that would warrant subordinating the mortgage. The court rejected arguments based on the "stranger to the vessel" doctrine and equitable subordination, finding the mortgage holder had not controlled the vessel's operations or engaged in unfair dealing.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involves a qui tam relator who sued his former employer, a medical device manufacturer, and its parent company under the federal False Claims Act and similar state laws, alleging five schemes to defraud Medicare, Medicaid, and other government health programs through improper billing practices such as charging for sales instead of rentals, providing free devices without adjusting prices, billing for non-covered items, submitting fitting fees without proper services, and paying illegal kickbacks. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims failed to meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court granted the motion to dismiss all claims except the wrongful termination claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), reasoning that the fraud allegations consisted of general or conclusory statements lacking details on the time, place, persons involved, or content of any false representations, while the termination claim sufficiently alleged protected conduct and causation. The court also denied leave to amend the complaint and dismissed claims against the unserved subsidiary.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Bliss v. Fisher, plaintiffs who served as commissioners of a municipal electric department sued town officials for malicious prosecution, civil rights violations, and intentional torts, claiming the defendants improperly prompted an investigation by the Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General into the use of bond funds for an internet service project, resulting in criminal charges that were ultimately dismissed. The OIG, not a party to the suit, moved to quash a deposition subpoena for an Assistant Deputy Inspector General, asserting an evidentiary privilege under Massachusetts law to prevent testimony about the investigation. The court denied the motion, declining to recognize the claimed privilege after applying the relevant federal test for adopting state privileges, and further held that any such privilege had been waived through the OIG's prior public report, follow-up letter, and testimony by its personnel in the related criminal proceedings. The decision emphasized that the OIG's testimony was sought by all parties and was necessary for a fair resolution of the dispute.

criminal lawcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case involves three former North Attleboro Electric Department Commissioners who sued the town and various officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state laws, alleging civil rights violations and intentional torts stemming from their criminal prosecution for misuse of municipal bond funds; the plaintiffs claimed an exculpatory videotape was improperly withheld at a show-cause hearing. They moved to subpoena and depose the clerk magistrate who presided over that hearing to address alleged false testimony and evidence issues. The court denied the motion, holding that judges may not be compelled to testify about their mental processes in official duties and that factual observations from the hearing could be obtained from other sources like transcripts or other witnesses, with no showing that the magistrate was the sole source of such information.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a Pakistani citizen who sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service negligently delayed processing his H-1B visa extension and work authorization applications, resulting in lost wages while he lacked legal work authorization. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the FTCA only confers jurisdiction over claims where a private person would be liable under analogous state law, and the plaintiff had identified no Massachusetts authority imposing a duty of care on a private person comparable to the government's visa-processing obligations.

immigrationfederal powertorts & liability

The case involves an appeal by Angelo DiVittorio from a bankruptcy court's dismissal of his claim seeking statutory damages, attorney's fees, and a declaration of his right to rescind a 2003 home refinance mortgage transaction under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act. DiVittorio alleged that the lender provided an inaccurate Truth-in-Lending disclosure statement, specifically by miscalculating the annual percentage rate in a manner inconsistent with official staff commentary to the federal Truth-in-Lending Act. The district court determined that the bankruptcy court had erred in concluding both that the relevant commentary language was not yet in effect on the transaction date and that compliance with the commentary was merely optional, as Supreme Court precedent treats such interpretations as dispositive when reasonable; the matter was therefore remanded for reconsideration.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a dispute over equitable contribution for defense costs paid by Stonewall Insurance and Seaton Insurance (S&S) in silicosis litigation against Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., where multiple insurers had policies covering the company. The court, applying Texas law due to the location of the manufacturing, claims, and defense work, ruled that the London Insurers must pay S&S 30 percent of the approximately $2.8 million in defense costs incurred since July 2005. The reasoning centered on the fact that S&S had taken sole control of the defense, dramatically reducing excessive costs that benefited all insurers, and that the London Insurers had a common obligation to share in those costs but had disclaimed responsibility after failing to agree on allocation during mediation. The decision was based on principles of fairness in equitable contribution under Texas law.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved former employees of Robertson Stephens, Inc. (referred to as ALT) who brought a counterclaim against FleetBoston Financial Corporation alleging breach of fiduciary duty based on their receipt of restricted stock units in RS Group, a subsidiary of FleetBoston. The court granted FleetBoston's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claim. The core reasoning was that ALT were never actual stockholders of RS Group, as confirmed by company records and the terms of the Restricted Unit Plan, and thus no fiduciary relationship existed to support the claim; judicial estoppel further barred their arguments, and they failed to qualify as equitable stockholders under Delaware law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved three former Boston Public School teachers, all minorities, who sued the City of Boston, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and NCS Pearson after losing their teaching positions for failing the Massachusetts Tests for Educator Licensure (MTEL), which they alleged had a disparate impact on minorities and non-native English speakers. The plaintiffs brought claims under Title VII, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Massachusetts Constitution, and related state laws, seeking to halt the MTEL and obtain reinstatement with back pay. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissing the entire action. It reasoned that the complaint failed to state plausible claims for relief under the standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, as the MTEL establishes minimum competency standards necessary for the teaching profession and the plaintiffs' allegations of statistical disparities and positive performance evaluations did not sufficiently support the asserted violations.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

The case involved 42 former employees (referred to as ALT) bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim against FleetBoston, the parent company of their former employer, alleging that FleetBoston diminished the value of a subsidiary, rendered their equity interests valueless, and liquidated its assets. FleetBoston moved to strike ALT's jury demand, contending that Delaware law requires breach of fiduciary duty claims to be decided by the court rather than a jury. The court denied the motion, ruling that although the claim presents an equitable issue, the remedy sought—monetary damages to compensate for alleged losses—is legal in nature under the Seventh Amendment's two-pronged federal test, which weighs the remedy more heavily and therefore requires a jury trial.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a challenge by Massachusetts and New Hampshire to Framework 42, a federal fisheries regulation issued by the Department of Commerce to conserve certain groundfish species. The court dismissed the action as moot effective May 1, 2009. This decision followed the publication of a new final interim rule that would replace Framework 42, rendering the court unable to provide relief for any alleged harms from the original regulation. The court explained that its role was limited to reviewing whether the agency had followed the law in exercising its regulatory authority, not to set the substantive terms of the rules.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves a challenge by the states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to federal fishing regulations under Framework 42, which implemented a 2:1 Days at Sea counting system for groundfish management and addressed the Mixed-Stock Exception Guideline. The court had previously suspended parts of the framework pending the federal defendants' compliance with orders to seriously consider and analyze the guideline. After determining that the defendants had fulfilled those orders, the court lifted the suspension, fully reinstated Framework 42, and granted the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment on Count II while declining to rule on the remaining counts at this time.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerns a challenge by Massachusetts and New Hampshire to federal fisheries regulations under Framework 42, which imposed 2:1 Days at Sea counting rules for certain fishing activities, and the applicability of a Mixed-Stock Exception managed by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the New England Fishery Management Council. The court had previously suspended enforcement of the 2:1 provisions and ordered the federal defendants to consider the exception. In this order, the court extends that suspension from March 27, 2009, to April 10, 2009. The reasoning is that the Council plays a key role in fisheries regulations, NMFS and the Council disagree on the exception's applicability, and additional time is needed for the agency to review the Council's input from its April meeting before filing a further report.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved the states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire challenging a federal regulation, Framework 42, promulgated by the Department of Commerce under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act to limit fishing days at sea in order to prevent overfishing of cod and flounder. The states argued that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious for failing to comply with National Standards I and II, particularly by not seriously considering the Mixed-Stock Exception guideline. The court denied the parties' summary judgment motions on those counts, directed the agency to seriously consider and analyze the Mixed-Stock Exception within a set time, and temporarily suspended the framework pending that review, later modifying the suspension to apply only to the 2:1 days at sea counting system.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves shareholders of companies acquired in leveraged buyouts suing multiple private equity firms, alleging that the firms conspired through club deals and other practices like sham bids to pay below fair value for the targets between 2003 and 2008, in violation of Sherman Act §1. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that SEC oversight of securities transactions preempted the antitrust claims under Credit Suisse v. Billing and that the complaint failed to adequately plead an illegal agreement. The court denied the motion in full, holding that preemption does not apply because the SEC lacks substantive regulatory authority over the alleged collusion (unlike in Billing), and that the specific factual allegations of nine transactions plausibly suggested a conspiracy, satisfying pleading standards under Twombly. The court limited initial discovery to those nine transactions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute between South Bay Boston Management, Inc. (the Hotel) and UNITE HERE Local 26 (the Union) over enforcement of arbitration clauses in a 2003 neutrality agreement governing union organization and collective bargaining at the hotel. After the Union was recognized in 2008 and negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement stalled, the Union sought interest arbitration pursuant to the agreement's specific and general arbitration clauses; the Hotel petitioned for a declaratory judgment that it was not required to arbitrate, claiming the agreement had expired or was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The court denied the Hotel's petition and granted the Union's motion to compel arbitration under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. The court reasoned that federal labor policy strongly favors arbitration of disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements, that such clauses survive contract expiration when the dispute arises under the contract per Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, and that the agreement's language specifically called for arbitration of these negotiations without any limiting expiration terms.

labor & employment

In United States v. Pujols, the defendant moved to suppress statements and evidence obtained after his arrest for drug-related offenses, claiming violations of Miranda rights and lack of valid consent to search his apartment. The court denied the motion in full, holding that the defendant had been read his Miranda rights in Spanish and signed the form before making any statements, that he validly consented to the apartment search by signing a consent form, and that his later statements remained admissible because the prior warnings were still effective. The decision rested on the credited testimony of the ICE agents regarding the timing of the warnings and consent, along with precedent that consent eliminates the need for probable cause and that a one-day gap does not invalidate a Miranda waiver.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between ALS & Associates (formerly Southeast Floating Docks) and AGM Marine Contractors over responsibility for the failure of a floating dock system installed in Provincetown, which led to arbitration resulting in an award of $389,703 to AGM. ALS sought to vacate the award under the Federal Arbitration Act, citing the arbitrator's refusal to postpone proceedings, evident partiality, and manifest disregard of the law, while AGM moved to confirm it. The court denied the motion to vacate and granted confirmation, reasoning that judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow and deferential under the FAA, and that ALS failed to meet the high thresholds for vacatur on any of the asserted grounds, such as showing prejudice from the denial of a postponement or specific facts establishing partiality.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Otey, the defendant pled guilty to distributing five grams of cocaine base and faced a guidelines sentencing range of 46-57 months based on a base offense level of 24. Otey argued for a lower sentence of 24 months due to inconsistencies in the crack-to-powder cocaine ratios across offense levels, but the court imposed a sentence of 30 months. The court reasoned that the effective disparity for this defendant was 4.6:1 compared to powder cocaine, and varied downward to achieve a 3:1 ratio while also considering the defendant's position at the threshold of the offense level, his criminal history, youth, and family background, finding the sentence reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

criminal lawfederal power