
United States v. Collyer Insulated Wire Co.
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1950-10-09 · cited 17×
This case involved the United States suing Collyer Insulated Wire Company and several of its employees under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C.A. §§ 231-233, based on Rev. Stat. §§ 3490 and 5438) to recover forfeitures and double damages for defective wire and cable supplied to the Army and Navy under three government contracts between 1942 and 1943, along with falsified tests and claims for payment. The court determined that the defendants had conspired to submit false claims by shipping non-conforming products and concealing the defects, establishing liability on 105 separate claims despite challenges in precisely quantifying actual damages from the evidence. Applying principles of general contract law and the statutory forfeiture provision, the court awarded the government $2,000 per false claim plus nominal double damages of $412, for a total judgment of $210,412 against the defendants jointly and severally.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1950-06-12 · cited 5×
The case involved a newspaper publisher suing city officials in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, for refusing to provide access to public records of tax cancellations and abatements, alleging that the denial and a related city ordinance violated the plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and federal civil rights statutes. The court found federal jurisdiction based on the constitutional claims and amount in controversy, determined that the ordinance and officials' discriminatory actions were unconstitutional, and ruled that the records were public information that could not be withheld in a manner abridging freedom of the press. The core reasoning was that the defendants' conduct, including selective disclosure to another newspaper, purposefully restricted constitutional rights without valid basis, rebutting any presumption of constitutionality and requiring injunctive relief to permit inspection. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs against certain defendants, dismissing claims against others for lack of proof.
free speechcivil rights
Corrigan v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1950-05-26 · cited 5×
The case involved a plaintiff who purchased a credit reporting service from defendant Dun & Bradstreet and relied on its inaccurate financial rating of a prospective customer, leading to an uncollectible $7,311 sale after the customer entered receivership. The plaintiff sued for negligence and failure to provide accurate information, but the defendant moved to dismiss based on the subscription contract's clauses disclaiming any guarantee of correctness and exempting liability for negligence or errors in procuring or communicating data. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the exculpatory provisions were valid and binding under Rhode Island law, which does not recognize degrees of negligence, and that no fraud or gross negligence had been alleged to overcome the contract terms. It distinguished prior cases with different contract language and found no public-interest exception applied to this private commercial arrangement.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Andrade v. American Mail Lines, Ltd.
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1947-04-08 · cited 8×
This case involved a Rhode Island plaintiff's Jones Act claim against a Washington corporation for the death of a stevedore injured on a vessel allegedly operated by the defendant. The defendant moved to quash service of process and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing it was not doing business in Rhode Island and had not been properly served. Service had been attempted on a local sub-agent who handled the vessel during a single prior visit. The court granted the motion after finding that the sub-agent had no ongoing authority to act for the defendant, that the defendant's contacts with the state were sporadic and limited to isolated vessel calls, and that no agency relationship existed at the time of service. The court held that these facts did not establish the continuous presence required for jurisdiction under applicable precedent.
proceduretorts & liability
Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's Drive-In Theatres, Inc.
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1947-03-11 · cited 2×
This case involved a dispute between Park-In Theatres, the owner of a patent for outdoor drive-in theaters, and Loew's Drive-In Theatres, which had entered into a royalty-bearing license agreement to operate such a theater in Providence, Rhode Island. After the defendant stopped paying royalties in late 1937, the plaintiff terminated the license and sued for unpaid royalties under the agreement as well as for patent infringement from the unlicensed operation afterward. The court determined that the patent was valid, rejecting challenges to its novelty and finding no misuse or antitrust violations that would bar enforcement. It held the defendant liable for royalties due before termination and for infringement damages afterward, based on evidence of the patent's originality and the terms of the license agreement. The decision deferred calculation of the specific damages amount to a later proceeding.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat. Petroleum Trust
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1946-03-02 · cited 4×
This case involved a suit by the Continental Bank & Trust Company, as institutional trustee under a 1941 trust indenture, against the First National Petroleum Trust to recover overdue interest payments on debentures plus related charges. The complaint alleged that the trust had sufficient net income to pay the interest, which had been overdue since 1944, and that the indenture required payment to the trustee upon demand. The trust and intervening majority debenture holders raised defenses that the majority had directed the trustee to sue only as of July 1947 and had requested waiver of the default, arguing the trustee lacked independent authority to bring the action. The court entered judgment for the plaintiff for $122,605.11, holding that Section 316 of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and the corresponding indenture provisions give each security holder an absolute right to receive principal and interest when due that cannot be impaired without the individual holder's consent, though the majority may direct the trustee's exercise of remedies or waive other defaults.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Biasotti v. Clarke
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1943-09-02 · cited 2×
The case involved a petition by Mabel Biasotti to recover a house trailer seized by federal narcotics agents after a search warrant uncovered opium inside, which her husband had admitted possessing for years and for which he later pleaded guilty to narcotics violations. The respondent claimed authority to seize and forfeit the trailer under federal statutes allowing forfeiture of vehicles used to transport or possess contraband narcotics. The court determined that the trailer qualified as a "vehicle" under the statutory definition because it had been used to facilitate the transportation and possession of the illegal drugs, despite its use as a residence, and therefore upheld the seizure and denied the petition.
criminal lawproperty
Lady Esther, Limited v. Flanzbaum
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1942-03-30 · cited 3×
This case was a suit in equity by Lady Esther, Limited, an Illinois cosmetics company holding a registered trademark for 'Lady Esther' on face powders, creams, and rouge, against a Rhode Island shoe retailer for trademark infringement and unfair competition. The complainant had used the name since 1913, with extensive national and local advertising and sales in Rhode Island predating the respondent's activities. The respondent began selling shoes labeled 'Lady Esther' around 1930 and operated stores under that name in Providence. The court decided for the complainant, granting an injunction against the respondent's use of the name and dismissing the counterclaim, on the grounds that the respondent adopted the name to benefit from the complainant's reputation and that such use was likely to confuse the public into believing the goods shared an origin.
business & regulatoryproperty