A. Andrew Hauk

The case involved a federal prisoner's request to extend the one-year deadline under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for filing a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after his 1994 armed robbery convictions became final in October 1996. The court denied the motion for a 60-day extension, finding that the defendant had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" beyond his control that made it impossible to file on time, as required for equitable tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations. The defendant's cited reasons—limited access to transcripts and prison lockdowns restricting library time—were deemed insufficient, as he had ample prior opportunity to prepare and the issues were within his control. The ruling emphasized that the AEDPA's one-year limit, running from the finality of conviction, is subject to tolling only in exceptional cases per Ninth Circuit precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a putative class action alleging race discrimination in employment, in which four African-American employees of Walt Disney World claimed that Disney had a pattern and practice of failing to promote them to supervisory positions. Multiple similar employment discrimination suits were pending in the same district, and plaintiffs in one of them had moved before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer and consolidate all the cases. The plaintiffs here moved to stay pretrial proceedings, including class certification discovery, until the MDL Panel ruled. The court granted the stay, relying on its inherent authority to manage its docket for judicial economy and efficiency, after finding that a stay would conserve resources if consolidation occurred, that the defendant had not shown prejudice, and that any delay would be brief.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two creditors, Thomas C. Thompson Sports, Inc. (TCT) and Farmers & Merchants Bank, over priority to approximately $249,000 in funds that Championship Auto Racing Teams (CART) owed to bankruptcy debtor Norman Turley after redeeming his one share of CART stock. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the Bank, and the district court affirmed. The court held that the interpleaded funds constituted proceeds of a certificated security rather than a general intangible arising from a franchise agreement. It reasoned that the Bank had perfected its security interest by taking physical delivery of the CART stock certificate pursuant to a pledge agreement, whereas TCT had not obtained possession of the certificate despite its own security agreement and financing statement covering general intangibles. The decision turned on the characterization of the collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code and the requirements for perfecting an interest in certificated securities.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a former U.S. Postal Service employee who sued under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging she was terminated due to a foot injury that limited her ability to perform mail carrier duties. The employer countered that the termination resulted from the employee lying on her pre-employment medical questionnaire and misrepresenting the severity of her injury, as shown by surveillance video and witness statements indicating she could walk without a limp. The court applied the burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination claims, finding that the employer had produced evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the firing. Summary judgment was granted to the defendant because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that those reasons were a pretext for discrimination. A separate sexual harassment claim had been voluntarily dismissed earlier.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a state prisoner who sued Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that conditions at the County Jail, including overcrowding and exposure to inmates with tuberculosis, along with denial of medical testing, violated his Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge's amended report and recommendation and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing deliberate indifference by the defendant or the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom. Judgment was entered in favor of defendant Block, as there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding an Eighth Amendment violation.

civil rightscriminal law

In Hill v. Ralphs Grocery Co., over 250 former employees of Ralphs Grocery sued the company, its managers, and their union (Local 37) after being laid off or terminated due to the 1993 closure of the company's central bakery plant, claiming breach of the collective bargaining agreement under Section 301 of the LMRA, breach of the union's duty of fair representation, fraud, conspiracy, WARN Act violations, and other claims. The district court granted Ralphs' motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, ruling that the agreement did not prohibit the plant closure because it expressly contemplated such an event through its severance pay provisions and included no language barring shutdown before the three-year term ended. The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards, finding no genuine issue of material fact on that claim or others where the agreement's terms controlled, while denying the union's motion for summary judgment on several remaining causes of action.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a Canadian corporation suing a Canadian brokerage firm and others under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related state laws, alleging that the defendants facilitated the fraudulent issuance and sale of stock options on the NASDAQ exchange, harming the plaintiff and its U.S. shareholders. Defendant Meridian moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion, finding that personal jurisdiction existed under Section 27 of the Act because Meridian had minimum contacts with the United States through its involvement in U.S.-traded securities; that the U.S. forum was appropriate given the federal claims and U.S. shareholders; and that the complaint sufficiently pleaded the federal securities fraud claim as well as supplemental state claims for fraud, negligence, conversion, and equitable indemnification.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved the United States and California suing Montrose Chemical Corp. and other defendants under CERCLA for damages to natural resources from DDT and PCB discharges in the Southern California Bight. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the first cause of action, arguing it was barred by the statute of limitations. The court granted the motion, holding that the three-year limitations period began running no later than March 20, 1987, when the relevant DOI regulations were promulgated, making the March 19, 1990 filing date untimely. The reasoning focused on interpreting the SARA amendments' dual-prong limitations provision, determining that the promulgation date controlled over the discovery date in this instance.

environmentprocedure

This case involved homeowners suing their insurer after the 1994 Northridge earthquake damaged their home, seeking a judicial interpretation of the maximum coverage limit under a policy that included earthquake endorsements. The parties disputed whether the insurer's liability was capped at the $230,000 earthquake limit stated on the declarations page or extended to a higher $556,751 aggregate limit created by the Blanket Protection Plus and Inflation Guard endorsements. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and denied the insurer's cross-motion, ruling that the endorsements applied to all Section I coverages including earthquake losses to produce an overall blanket limit of $556,751. The core reasoning was that the policy language established a single aggregate limit incorporating the earthquake coverage and that the insurer's narrower reading was inconsistent with the contract terms as written.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs Independent Entertainment Group and ProServ, who sought to organize and broadcast a post-season pay-per-view one-on-one basketball event called "King of the Court" featuring NBA players such as Michael Jordan and Magic Johnson. The NBA refused to approve player participation, citing provisions in its collective bargaining agreement with the players' union that restrict off-season games. Plaintiffs sued under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging unreasonable restraints of trade and monopolization or attempted monopolization of markets for major-league basketball events and players. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the federal antitrust claims with prejudice on the ground that the CBA provisions, including Article XX Section 6 and the Uniform Player Contract, created exclusive employment arrangements that could not be deemed unreasonable or predatory under the antitrust laws as a matter of law, and that plaintiffs had not alleged facts supporting monopolization claims; the court also dismissed the pendent state-law tortious interference claims without prejudice.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

This case is a CERCLA action brought by the United States and California against several corporations, including Montrose Chemical and Westinghouse, alleging releases of DDT and PCBs into the San Pedro Channel and seeking natural resource damages plus site cleanup costs. The court reviewed de novo the Special Master's rulings denying Westinghouse's motions to preclude recovery for damages within the three-mile limit, to dismiss under Rule 11, and regarding regulatory presumptions, as well as the DDT Defendants' motion to bar pre-1980 damages and cap recovery at $50 million. The Special Master had also granted a motion to compel Westinghouse to respond to requests for admissions, which Westinghouse challenged. The court addressed these objections in the context of ongoing pretrial supervision by the Special Master under the reference order, applying standards for de novo review of the Special Master's decisions while noting prior consent decrees that removed some parties.

environmentprocedurefederal power

This case involved Cinemateca Uruguaya and related plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences from revoking the Oscar nomination of the film "A Place in the World" as Uruguay's entry for Best Foreign Language Film. The Academy had disqualified the film after determining that Uruguayan creative talent did not exercise the required creative control under its rules, given that the director and primary creative force was an Argentine citizen with only minimal Uruguayan contributions. Plaintiffs contended that the Academy's acceptance and nomination created a contract that was breached by the revocation, or alternatively that estoppel should apply. The court denied the injunction, holding that an Oscar nomination is an award rather than a contest giving rise to contractual obligations, that the film failed to meet the eligibility rules in any event, and that the balance of hardships favored the Academy's autonomy in enforcing its award criteria over any claimed injury to plaintiffs.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves the United States and California seeking court approval of a consent decree settling claims against the County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County and 150 local governmental entities for alleged discharges of hazardous substances such as DDT into the environment from sanitation and stormwater systems. The proposed decree requires payments totaling $45.7 million for natural resource damages and response costs at the Montrose Chemical NPL Site, with covenants not to sue in exchange, and would remove these parties from the broader CERCLA litigation. Non-settling defendants objected on grounds of procedural and substantive fairness, including the adequacy of the factual record and the government's apportionment of liability. The court, following the Special Master's recommendation, granted the motion after determining that the settlement process was conducted in good faith at arm's length and that the amount was reasonable based on the plaintiffs' methodology. The decree was approved as both procedurally and substantively fair under CERCLA standards.

environmentprocedurefederal power

In Darby v. City of Torrance, plaintiff James Darby Jr. sued the City of Torrance, a company, and two police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations, along with related state claims. After the court dismissed the plaintiff's fourth cause of action—an attempt to assign his right to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to his counsel, Michael R. Mitchell—the attorney moved to withdraw as counsel of record. The court denied the motion, holding that the attorney had not demonstrated good cause under local rules because withdrawal would delay the case, the attorney had known the risks of the fee arrangement when accepting the representation, and the attorney could still collect fees through other means.

civil rightsprocedure

This case is a consolidated securities class action brought by purchasers of Pinkerton’s common stock against the company and two of its officers, alleging violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act as well as Section 20(a) control-person liability. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants made material false and misleading statements about the company’s ability to achieve at least 25% earnings growth in fiscal 1992, that plaintiffs relied on those statements when buying shares, and that the stock price dropped sharply after a June 1992 press release disclosed that earnings would miss projections. The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the first amended complaint with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that the pleading failed to satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) for fraud claims; the amended complaint added no new substantive allegations beyond the original complaints and therefore did not identify the allegedly fraudulent conduct with the required specificity.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Darby v. City of Torrance, plaintiff James Darby Jr. sued the City of Torrance, two police officers, and another defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his federal civil rights, along with related state-law claims such as false arrest, assault, and battery. The defendants moved to strike requests for punitive damages from the complaint and to dismiss several causes of action. The court granted the motion to strike punitive damages as to the City but denied it as to the individual officers, reasoning that governmental immunity bars such damages against municipalities but not against public employees. It granted dismissal of the fourth cause of action concerning assignment of attorney’s fees with prejudice, the fifth cause with leave to amend, and the ninth and tenth causes for assault and battery with leave to amend, while denying dismissal of the sixth cause for conspiracy and of the officers themselves, finding the pleadings and legal standards did not support those dismissals.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a motion by the United States and California to enter a consent decree settling CERCLA claims against two defendants (Potlatch and Simpson) for PCB discharges into the environment, under which the settling parties would pay $12 million over four years in exchange for covenants not to sue and contribution protection. Non-settling defendants, including DDT dischargers and others, objected on grounds that the settlement was procedurally unfair due to lack of transparency in negotiations and substantively unfair because the amount was allegedly too low relative to the settlors' volumetric share of pollution. After reviewing the decree, hearing arguments, and considering a report from the supervising Special Master, the court granted the motion and entered the decree. The court reasoned that the settlement was procedurally fair because negotiations were conducted at arm's length under judicial supervision and substantively fair because the $12 million figure bore a reasonable relationship to the settlors' estimated 4,500 pounds of PCB discharges, consistent with CERCLA's goals of encouraging settlement and remediation.

environmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves the United States and California suing ten corporate defendants under CERCLA to recover natural resource damages and response costs for alleged hazardous contamination of the San Pedro Channel Areas and related wildlife destruction, plus additional response costs at a commercial site. The defendants counterclaimed against the United States, California, and the South Coast Air Quality Management District under CERCLA and tort law for contribution, indemnity, recoupment, and related relief, contending that the governments bore primary responsibility for any harm. On motions to dismiss the counterclaims, the court held that sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment bar affirmative tort-based claims and most relief against the state and federal governments but permit recoupment claims against both and limited indemnity or contribution claims against the United States, treating the underlying CERCLA action as sounding in tort and the counterclaims as compulsory.

environmentproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a petition by defendant Lothian, convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained property, and failure to file a tax return in connection with a telemarketing scheme selling precious metal contracts. After serving his prison sentence and while on probation, with his direct appeal pending, Lothian sought a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his conviction, alleging that a government witness had committed perjury regarding his use of aliases and that the prosecution knew or should have known about it. The court denied the petition, finding that the government had no actual or constructive knowledge of the perjury at the time of trial, and that even if such knowledge existed, there was no reasonable likelihood that the false testimony affected the jury's verdict given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and other impeachment of the witness. The court also noted that coram nobis relief is not typically available during a pending direct appeal but proceeded to consider the merits.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose when the City of Los Angeles refused to renew Golden State Transit Corporation's taxicab franchise and denied related requests until Golden State settled an ongoing labor dispute with its drivers, prompting Golden State to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the actions were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. After a complex procedural history with multiple appeals, including Supreme Court rulings that the City's interference violated federal labor law preemption, a jury awarded Golden State $4.5 million in damages. The present opinion addresses Golden State's motion for prejudgment interest on that verdict. The court granted prejudgment interest, reasoning that federal law governs in § 1983 actions and that such interest is appropriate to make the plaintiff whole based on considerations of fairness.

labor & employmentfederal powercivil rights