This case arose from a 1988 boat collision in Louisiana waters that killed Wade Trahan, with his widow suing vessel owners and operators for wrongful death under general maritime law. The court addressed a motion to amend the judgment by allocating 20 percent fault to defendant Armogene Braus and considered whether to strike awards for loss of society damages following a Fifth Circuit ruling. The court decided that Braus bears 20 percent fault for the accident and that dependents of a non-seaman fishing boat operator cannot recover loss-of-society damages in such actions. The reasoning relied on the Fifth Circuit's reversal regarding charter arrangements and Supreme Court precedents limiting loss-of-society claims under maritime law to specific categories like longshoremen.
This case concerned challenges by Jefferson Parish residents to various federal and Louisiana state education programs, including special education services provided by public employees on sectarian school premises, statutory funding authorizations for such programs, reimbursements to nonpublic schools for administrative costs, and transportation and capital expense provisions under Chapter 1 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act. Plaintiffs alleged that these programs, both facially and as applied in the parish, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reviewed extensive trial evidence, findings of fact regarding the programs' administration and funding, and controlling precedents such as Pulido v. Cavazos to assess constitutionality under Establishment Clause standards, including issues of entanglement and neutrality.
This case arose from a Jones Act lawsuit by a crew member against his employer, Sealift, for maritime workplace injuries, after the employer's insurer Transit became insolvent and the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA) denied coverage. Sealift sought a ruling that LIGA was obligated to assume the obligations under the workers' compensation and employer's liability policy, including payment of attorneys' fees incurred in the underlying suit and in pursuing coverage. The court reviewed the magistrate judge's recommendations and, applying the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Deshotels and the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Sifers, held that the policy was not excluded 'ocean marine insurance' under La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1377, so LIGA must provide coverage and related fees. The reasoning centered on the statutory definition of covered insurance and the incidental maritime risks in standard employer's liability policies.
This case involves a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by C.G. Chartier Construction, Inc., where creditor Pelican Homestead and Savings Association sought adequate protection and sequestration of rents from the debtor's mortgaged property. The bankruptcy court ruled that Pelican perfected its security interest in the rents by filing its motion post-petition and was entitled to adequate protection. On appeal, the district court affirmed this decision, finding that Pelican had a valid perfected interest in the rents separate from the mortgage and that the lack of an equity cushion in the property value meant the creditor required additional protection for its interest in the rental income. The court remanded the case to determine the specific method and amount of adequate protection.
The case involved plaintiff Darryl Tschirn's lawsuit in Louisiana state court against Secor Bank and two employees for breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and mismanagement of assets in a lender relationship, with all parties being Louisiana residents. Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis that the claims were related to Tschirn's pending bankruptcy proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). After removal, the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the claims as burdensome to the estate in an informed and procedurally proper manner approved by the bankruptcy court. The federal court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that although removal was initially proper because the claims were part of the bankruptcy estate, the irrevocable abandonment eliminated any relationship to the bankruptcy proceedings, leaving no federal jurisdiction since the parties were non-diverse.
This case concerned whether plaintiff Lazar Pierre qualified as a seaman under the Jones Act during his employment with defendant Pontchartrain Dredging Corporation, entitling him to pursue damages for alleged injuries, or whether he was instead a longshoreman limited to remedies under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. A bifurcated jury trial had already determined that Pierre was a Jones Act seaman. The court denied Pontchartrain’s post-trial motions for summary judgment and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It reasoned that the defendant’s reliance on Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. to preclude Jones Act recovery for workers in enumerated LHWCA occupations was misplaced, because Pizzitolo had been implicitly overruled by Legros v. Panther Services Group, Inc., and the jury’s finding that Pierre’s duties contributed to the function or mission of a vessel satisfied the seaman-status test.
