This case involved a creditor, Household Finance Company, petitioning to review a bankruptcy referee's order that only partially allowed their claim of nondischargeability for a debt based on a false financial statement provided by the bankrupt during a loan renewal. The court decided to affirm the referee's ruling, holding that only the $132 in new funds obtained through the fraud was nondischargeable, not the entire outstanding balance of $1,482.84. The core reasoning was that the 1960 amendments to section 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act did not intend to create a new rule of damages, so the state law rule for fraud—measuring damages by actual pecuniary loss—applies, consistent with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to give debtors a fresh start and the legislative history limiting the use of false statements as a bar to discharge.
The case involved Emprise Corporation's petition to set aside or modify a civil investigative demand (CID) issued by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice under 15 U.S.C. § 1312, seeking documents concerning Emprise's practice of making loans to sports arenas in exchange for exclusive long-term concession rights, which the government suspected might violate federal antitrust laws. Emprise claimed the demand was improperly motivated by political or private litigation interests, sought irrelevant or confidential materials, and improperly targeted a successor corporation for a predecessor's actions; it also sought leave to serve interrogatories on the government. The court denied Emprise's petitions, granted the government's enforcement motion, and ordered compliance, reasoning that the sworn affidavit from the Acting Assistant Attorney General established the investigation's independent and proper purpose, the demanded documents were relevant under precedents like Fortner Enterprises, statutory safeguards under 15 U.S.C. § 1313(c) addressed confidentiality, and successor entities must produce documents in their possession or control.
The case involved a dispute over two trailers sold by L.B. Smith, Inc. to Schwab Bros. Trucking, Inc. under a conditional sales contract. The IRS seized the trailers after filing a federal tax lien against Schwab for unpaid taxes, and Smith sought to reclaim them based on its unfiled security interest. The court ruled for the government, holding that the tax lien had priority. The core reasoning was that under New York UCC provisions, Smith had not perfected its interest by filing a financing statement or repossessing the trailers before the tax lien was filed on February 16, 1965, making the interest inchoate and subordinate under federal tax lien priority rules.
The case involved the United States alleging that Bethlehem Steel Corporation and associated unions engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in hiring and job assignments at its Lackawanna plant, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The company admitted to practices such as preferentially hiring and assigning white applicants while directing a disproportionate share of Black applicants to hotter, dirtier departments and rejecting Black workers from traditionally white departments. The court found that these actions created lasting effects on departmental composition and ordered relief including transfer rights for employees in eleven affected departments on the basis of plant seniority without rate retention or seniority carryover, plus targeted measures for the Coke Ovens department and apprentice programs. The core reasoning was that such remedies were required to allow affected employees to escape the present-day consequences of the prior discriminatory assignment policies through voluntary transfers available equally to all.
This case involved multiple Black Muslim inmates at Attica State Prison who sought to practice their religion without the restrictions imposed by state prison officials. The court consolidated the actions and directed the Commissioner of Correction to promulgate and file within thirty days a set of rules and regulations governing the inmates' religious practices. Those rules were to recognize the rights normally associated with religious belief and practice in the state prison system, subject only to limits required for prison security, discipline, or other legitimate interests. The decision followed the Second Circuit's opinion in Sostre v. McGinnis, which had recognized the religion's status and called for state authorities to propose appropriate regulations rather than leaving the matter unresolved. The court retained jurisdiction to address any further delays or issues after the rules were issued.
The case involved a taxpayer who claimed deductions on her 1960 income tax return for expenses related to her work as a concert harpist, including lessons to improve her skills, travel, and depreciation on her harp. After the IRS disallowed the claims following an audit, the taxpayer paid the resulting deficiency and sued for a refund in federal court. The court ruled in the taxpayer's favor, finding that she was engaged in a profit-motivated business as a harpist and that the expenses were deductible as ordinary and necessary costs to maintain and improve her professional proficiency. The decision was based on findings that such lessons were customary in the profession, the taxpayer had the requisite skills and intent to profit, and items like harp repairs and transportation qualified as business expenses.