The case involved the United States seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against Arthur G. Venie, who operated a tax preparation business, to stop him from preparing federal income tax returns. The government presented evidence from IRS examinations of thousands of returns prepared by Venie for tax years 1984-86, showing average deficiencies over $1,000 per return due to improper use of "Head of Household" filing status and overstated child care expenses, along with undercover operations and taxpayer testimony. The court granted a preliminary injunction under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(a) and 7407, prohibiting Venie from unlawfully using the Head of Household status, overstating child care expenses, or preparing returns with false information, finding that he had engaged in conduct subject to penalties and that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent recurrence.
The case involves insurance companies licensed in Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting insurers from owning banks, after the Insurance Commissioner threatened to revoke their licenses due to their ownership of a federal savings bank in Texas. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court on preemption and Commerce Clause grounds, while the Commissioner moved for summary judgment based on Younger abstention, arguing that ongoing state administrative proceedings should take precedence. The court denied the abstention motion, reasoning that it was bound by the Third Circuit's prior determination in the same case that abstention would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs and that the state proceedings did not adequately protect their interests. The decision allows the federal claims to proceed despite the state revocation process.
The case involved a former hourly employee at Bethlehem Steel who accepted a salaried planner position outside the bargaining unit in 1979, received oral assurances about returning with full rights, and later faced layoff in 1985 after the union and company determined he had lost seniority under the collective bargaining agreement because the planner role was not supervisory. Plaintiff sued the union and company under federal labor law for breach of the duty of fair representation and the CBA, plus related state-law claims for conspiracy, wrongful discharge, and interference with contract. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It held that the federal hybrid claims were barred by the six-month statute of limitations from DelCostello v. Teamsters, and that the state claims were preempted because they sought to enforce rights tied to the CBA and could not be litigated separately under state law without undermining uniform federal procedures.
This case is a contract dispute between Ragnar Benson, Inc. and Bechtel Power Corp. arising from the construction of concrete cooling towers at the Limerick Nuclear Generating Station. The parties executed multiple subcontract amendments to address delays, changes in work methods such as the treatment of horizontal construction joints, and compensation adjustments, with disputes centering on the proper payment for extra work and cost savings from using smaller crews than specified. The court determined that Bechtel was entitled to a credit of $93,268.60 for cost savings realized by Ragnar Benson, offset against other amounts, and awarded Bechtel prejudgment interest at six percent. The reasoning relied on the contract's provisions for changes and extra work, including Amendment No. 25's crew-size requirements and cost-plus fallback, along with evidence of the parties' course of dealing and actual costs incurred.
This case concerns whether provisions of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code governing access by large truck combinations (twins and semis) to and from the federal national highway network are preempted by the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. The plaintiff trucking company sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the state laws facially and as applied conflict with the federal requirement of reasonable access to terminals and facilities for food, fuel, rest, and repair. The court applied Supremacy Clause preemption analysis, examining both the text of the state and federal statutes and their practical implementation and interpretation by state officials. Core reasoning focused on whether Pennsylvania's prior-approval process, access restrictions, and approval delays deny the reasonable access mandated by federal law.
This case involved a challenge by the EEOC and a state police lieutenant to Pennsylvania's law requiring members of the Pennsylvania State Police to retire at age 60 (unless they have fewer than 20 years of service), brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) as well as equal protection and due process claims. The district court, on remand from the Third Circuit, held that the mandatory retirement age qualifies as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) under the ADEA. The court reasoned that the Pennsylvania State Police is a paramilitary organization in which all officers, regardless of rank, must be ready at all times to perform physically demanding law enforcement duties, that good health and physical fitness are reasonably necessary to the job, and that it is either impractical or impossible to reliably assess individual officers' fitness on a case-by-case basis after age 60. The court reaffirmed its prior rejection of the constitutional claims.