In this criminal case, defendant Lawrence Littlefield pled guilty to conspiracy to import marijuana and later filed motions to withdraw his plea and for a new trial, claiming he had been acting as a DEA informant, along with a motion to reduce his sentence. The court denied all three motions. It reasoned that Littlefield had entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily after being advised of a potential lack-of-intent defense based on his informant story, which he reaffirmed at sentencing despite being offered the chance to withdraw. The court further held that the claims were not newly discovered evidence, that the delay in filing indicated dissatisfaction with the sentence rather than a prompt change of heart, and that no manifest injustice had occurred warranting relief under the applicable rules.
This case is a civil rights action brought by a class of black citizens of Marianna, Florida, and the local NAACP branch against the City and its officials, alleging racial discrimination in the provision of municipal services such as street paving, water systems, drainage, fire protection, parks, lighting, and sewerage, in violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to require equal services and to escrow or terminate federal revenue sharing funds. The court entered a default judgment on liability against the defendants under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37 and 55, as well as local rules, after finding that the defendants had repeatedly failed to respond to discovery requests, motions, and court orders, and had not appeared at a hearing on the plaintiffs' motions to compel and for default. The court also awarded plaintiffs' counsel $2,675.50 in attorney's fees and expenses for the discovery-related efforts, deemed unanswered requests for admissions admitted, and scheduled a later hearing on damages and equitable relief.
In this case, plaintiff Hepperle brought a Section 1983 action against judges, lawyers, parties, and court clerks involved in a prior small claims lawsuit he lost, alleging denial of federally protected rights under color of state law. Claims against the judges were dismissed, and the remaining defendants were granted summary judgment. The defendants then sought attorney's fees under Section 1988 as prevailing parties. The court awarded the fees after determining that the lawsuit was groundless, frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation, based on Hepperle's failure to produce any supporting evidence, his history of similar meritless suits, and his pattern of using litigation for personal attacks rather than advancing factual claims.
Anderson Seafoods sought a preliminary injunction to stop Florida from enforcing its state law banning the use of purse seines to catch food fish in the federal Fishery Conservation Zone, arguing that federal statutes preempted such state regulation. The court denied the injunction after applying the four-part test, concluding there was no substantial likelihood of success on the merits because Congress, while asserting exclusive authority over the zone, expressly allowed states to regulate fishing by vessels registered under their laws even beyond state boundaries. Although Anderson showed irreparable injury from lost income and seasonal mullet roe harvesting, and the balance of harms and public interest factors weighed in its favor, the preemption claim failed due to the statutory reservation of state authority and the absence of complete federal displacement of existing state rules. The decision rested on analysis of 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1812 and 1856(a) and related precedent.
The case involved petitioners convicted under Florida's trespass statute for entering a hospital's postpartum nursery area without authorization after visiting hours, as part of an inspection of maternity facilities. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and granted habeas corpus relief, overturning the convictions. The core reasoning was that the statute's definition of 'structure' as any building with a roof, when construed to cover entry into a specific part of a building, failed to provide fair warning that such conduct constituted a crime, violating due process. The court noted the petitioners left promptly when asked and suggested alternative charges like breach of the peace could have applied instead.
In this construction contract dispute, E.C. Ernst, Inc. sued the City of Tallahassee and other parties over alleged breaches related to the building of an electricity generating substation. After the court ordered arbitration between Ernst and defendant Tompkins-Beckwith under their contract and stayed proceedings, Tompkins-Beckwith moved to waive its arbitration right and lift the stay, which Ernst opposed. The court denied the motion, holding that Tompkins-Beckwith had abandoned its ability to waive arbitration by participating in the process for over a month after it began, while Ernst had timely asserted its right once circumstances changed. The decision relied on equitable principles from prior cases, noting that delay can waive rights in either direction and that arbitration was already underway.