In Arbelaez v. United States, the plaintiff filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate her sentence after pleading guilty to conspiring to launder narcotics proceeds, claiming her attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately advise her on plea terms, sentencing exposure, and whether to testify at co-defendants' trials. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion. The court concluded that Arbelaez failed to demonstrate deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington because her testimony was inconsistent and unreliable while her attorney's account was credible, and she could not show prejudice from any alleged errors given the plea agreement terms and the record of her knowing and voluntary plea.
In United States v. Vernier, defendant Jonathan Vernier pled guilty to credit card fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property after taking possession of a van and jewelry belonging to victim Ran Mesika, who disappeared during a cross-country trip; Vernier had also used Mesika's credit card for cash withdrawals while traveling in the van. The district court granted the government's motion for an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines range of 51-63 months, increasing the offense level to 32 and imposing a sentence of 210-240 months. The court found that the evidence, including Mesika's blood and tissue in the van along with signs of attempted cleanup, established Vernier's responsibility for Mesika's death and intentional infliction of serious injury, circumstances not adequately considered in the applicable theft guidelines under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. This determination was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) when aggravating factors take a case outside the heartland of typical offenses. The court concluded that the departure was warranted to reflect the seriousness of the conduct while remaining within the statutory maximums.
This case is a securities fraud class action brought by purchasers of John Alden Financial Corporation stock against the company and several executives. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by setting an artificially low 1994 medical claims reserve to inflate earnings and stock price during the class period. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in full. It reasoned that the defendants had shown a reasonable basis for the reserve when set, that the outside auditor Price Waterhouse was heavily involved in the process, that the reserve became understated due to an unanticipated claims spike, and that the evidence did not support an inference of fraudulent motive.
The case involves plaintiffs who are current or former residents of the James E. Scott Homes public housing project in Miami-Dade County, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the county from relocating residents or demolishing the project under the federal HOPE VI revitalization program for severely distressed public housing. The court denied the motion, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation after de novo review. The core reasoning was that plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, as federal law no longer requires one-for-one replacement of demolished units and the county's minimal use of CDBG funds did not create such an obligation, along with insufficient evidence of irreparable harm.
This case involves a purported class action by current tenants of the Scott Homes public housing project in Miami-Dade County against county and federal HUD defendants, challenging the use of a $35 million HOPE VI grant to demolish all 850 existing units and replace them with fewer public housing options, which plaintiffs alleged violated the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, the Housing and Community Development Act, and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970. The County Defendants moved to dismiss four counts of the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for a more definite statement. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part after applying the liberal pleading standard from Conley v. Gibson, under which a complaint survives dismissal unless no set of facts could entitle the plaintiffs to relief, and construing the allegations in the plaintiffs' favor.
In this case, Ledford Farms sued Fireman's Fund Insurance after the insurer denied a claim under a federally regulated Multiple Peril Crop Insurance policy for rain damage to a bean crop, on the ground that it had been practical to replant. The policy contained an arbitration clause requiring disputes over factual determinations to be resolved by the American Arbitration Association, and the insurer moved to dismiss or alternatively to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. The court denied the motion to dismiss but granted the motion to compel arbitration and stay further court proceedings. It reasoned that the insurer's determination of whether replanting was practical constituted a factual determination under the policy's explicit definition, which must be arbitrated before any lawsuit could proceed, while retaining jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after arbitration concludes.
