The case involved a habeas corpus petition by an individual committed to a state mental hospital after being found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges including assault and second-degree murder. The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of California's statutes governing the release and conditional release of insanity acquittees on due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment grounds, as well as an alleged improper delegation of legislative and judicial power, and claimed the trial court erred by not applying the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. The court reviewed the petition, records, magistrate's report and recommendation, and objections, then adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendations after a de novo review of objected-to portions. It dismissed the petition with prejudice, concluding that the claims lacked sufficient merit to warrant habeas relief. The decision rested on exhaustion of state remedies and determinations that the statutory scheme and trial court's actions did not violate federal constitutional standards in a way justifying federal intervention.
Petitioner, a Cuban citizen who entered the US via the 1980 Mariel Boatlift and was paroled into the country, was later convicted in Florida state court of second-degree murder, armed burglary, and armed robbery, for which he served a prison term. After completing his sentence, he was taken into INS custody for exclusion and deportation proceedings based on his criminal history and other factors reviewed under the Cuban Review Plan. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his ongoing detention in a federal facility was indefinite and violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the petition, adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation after de novo review, which concluded that the detention was lawful under immigration statutes and not unconstitutional.
This case involved a dispute over health insurance coverage under an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan, where the insurer paid only $10,000 of a $54,696.96 claim for a child's hospitalization and treatment for autism, classifying the condition as a mental illness subject to the policy's annual limit. The court held that autism is not a mental illness within the meaning of the exclusionary clause, entitling the plaintiff to the full amount. The ruling rested on expert testimony establishing that autism is a pervasive developmental disability caused by a physical organic brain disorder, with symptoms appearing early in life and unrelated to environmental or psychological factors, and that it cannot be treated through traditional psychotherapy. The court applied a standard of review requiring the administrator's decision to be neither arbitrary nor capricious and interpreted the undefined policy term according to its plain modern meaning informed by medical consensus.
In Popovich v. United States, an employee injured on the job sued the federal government for negligence under the Tort Claims Act and obtained a judgment that was later paid in full and satisfied. The employer, which had paid workers' compensation benefits and filed a notice of lien claim under California Labor Code sections 3852-3856 before trial but did not participate further, later sought to perfect and enforce the lien by reopening the federal case after satisfaction of judgment. The employee had separately petitioned the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to void the lien based on alleged employer negligence, and the Board denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court addressed the timing of lien perfection, the interplay between federal tort proceedings and state workers' compensation processes, and whether employer negligence could be litigated to defeat the lien, ultimately denying the request to reopen while noting the Board's role in credit determinations under section 3861.
The case concerned Apple's claims that Formula infringed its copyrights by selling computer kits containing unauthorized copies of Apple's software programs. Following a preliminary injunction barring Formula from copying or selling such programs, Formula sold ROM Sets that included exact copies of Apple's Applesoft and Autostart programs on silicon chips. The court found Formula in contempt, determining that its sales violated the injunction. The core reasoning was that Section 117 of the Copyright Act permits only the owner of a program copy to make an archival backup for personal use and does not authorize the manufacture or commercial distribution of copies to third parties.
The case involved Apple Computer suing Formula International for copyright infringement of its computer programs stored in ROMs and diskettes, trademark infringement through use of the 'Pineapple' name, and unfair competition, after Formula began selling computer kits containing identical copies of Apple's software. The court granted Apple's motion for a preliminary injunction, barring Formula from using the Apple or Pineapple marks, copying the protected programs, and distributing or selling items containing those copies. The ruling rested on findings that Apple had shown a probability of success on the merits of its copyright and trademark claims, as the programs were properly registered and protectable and the names were confusingly similar, while the unfair competition theory was not relied upon for relief. The injunction was issued pending trial, subject to Apple posting a bond.