District Court, S.D. Texas — appointed by Ronald Reagan
In Re Gillig
District Court, N.D. Texas · 2011-08-29 · cited 1×
This case involved a rehearing of disciplinary and sanctions proceedings against attorneys Melvin K. Silverman, S. Tracy Long, and Joseph F. Cleveland, Jr., along with their clients John P. Gillig and Triple Tee Golf, Inc., stemming from two prior lawsuits alleging misappropriation of trade secrets related to adjustable-weight golf club designs shared with a consultant later hired by Nike. The proceedings arose after Judge McBryde imposed sanctions based on declarations filed in the second suit and found violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and Northern District of Texas Local Rule 83.8(b). On rehearing, the court dismissed all disciplinary and sanctions matters with prejudice, ordered a refund of previously paid sanctions, and found no rule violations because the declarations were not improper, were at least partly substantiated by evidence, and followed an objectively reasonable prefiling investigation.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Sterling Equities, Inc. v. Chubb Custom Insurance
District Court, S.D. Texas · 2011-08-26 · cited 5×
This case involved an insurance coverage dispute in which Sterling Equities sued Chubb Custom Insurance after Hurricane Ike damaged one of its apartment complexes, seeking additional recovery beyond a prior settlement. The parties had executed a Confidential Settlement and Release Agreement that paid Sterling for losses on three named properties and released Chubb from further liability for all damages from the original claim related to Hurricane Ike, though the Greenwood Property at issue was not explicitly named in the release. Sterling argued the release was ambiguous and did not cover the Greenwood Property, while Chubb moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the release barred the claims. The court granted Chubb's motion, finding that the Greenwood Property was part of the original claim, the release broadly extinguished liability for Hurricane Ike-related losses, and Sterling's breach of contract and Texas Insurance Code claims were precluded as a matter of law.
business & regulatoryproperty
United States v. Eversole
District Court, S.D. Texas · 2011-04-26
This case involves two defendants, a county commissioner and a real estate developer, charged in a federal indictment with conspiracy and bribery related to federally funded programs, along with tax charges against one defendant. After initially severing the trials due to one defendant's continuance request, resulting in a mistrial for the first defendant, the government moved to rejoin them for a single trial. The court granted the motion, construing it as a request to reconsider severance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a). The core reasoning was the strong federal preference for joint trials in conspiracy cases, absent a serious risk of prejudice to a specific trial right or the jury's ability to render a reliable verdict, with speedy trial concerns addressable via ends-of-justice continuances.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Stanford
District Court, S.D. Texas · 2011-01-26 · cited 2×
The case involved defendant Robert Allen Stanford, who faced federal charges including securities fraud and money laundering conspiracy and was in pretrial detention. Following a head injury in jail and ongoing medication, three psychiatrists evaluated his mental state and testified at a hearing that he was incompetent to stand trial due to delirium possibly caused by over-medication, brain injury, or major depressive disorder. The court granted in part Stanford's motion for relief and medical treatment by ordering his commitment to the custody of the Attorney General for inpatient psychiatric evaluation and supervised medication withdrawal at a federal facility, while denying any request to select a private facility. The core reasoning was that 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) mandates commitment to the Attorney General upon a finding of incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence, and cited precedents did not authorize release to a facility of the defendant's choosing after due process was provided through notice and an evidentiary hearing.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Stanford
District Court, S.D. Texas · 2010-07-07 · cited 2×
In United States v. Stanford, defendant Robert Allen Stanford, facing a twenty-one count indictment for mail fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of an SEC investigation arising from his control of Stanford Financial Group and related entities, moved for release from pretrial detention or dismissal of the indictment on grounds that his continued detention violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive bail. The district court denied the motion. The court explained that pretrial detention to prevent flight serves a valid nonpunitive regulatory purpose and, evaluating the claim on a case-by-case basis using factors such as the length and non-speculative future duration of detention, case complexity, government evidence strength, and causes of delay, concluded that the detention had not become excessively prolonged so as to constitute impermissible punishment.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Rincon Del Sol, LLC v. Lloyd's of London
District Court, S.D. Texas · 2010-04-27 · cited 6×
The case involves a dispute over insurance coverage for $634,057.87 in hurricane damage to an apartment complex owned by plaintiff Rincon Del Sol, LLC, along with related claims of breach of a forbearance agreement that allegedly led to foreclosure; after the plaintiff sued multiple defendants including Texas citizens in Texas state court, certain defendants removed the action to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction based on improper joinder of the Texas defendants and federal jurisdiction arising from Fannie Mae's presence as a defendant under its charter. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court and denied the pending motions to dismiss as moot. It reasoned that although complete diversity existed, removal was barred by the presence of local defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) because the Texas defendants were not improperly joined, and that the Fannie Mae charter did not confer federal question jurisdiction here.
procedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty