The case involved J & J Sports Productions suing a bar and its owner for allegedly illegally intercepting and broadcasting a boxing match without a commercial license. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that they had not violated 47 U.S.C. § 553 because they had ordered and paid for the broadcast through their cable provider as commercial customers, without any interception or piracy. The reasoning was that the cable company had mistakenly sold the rights it wasn't authorized to provide, but the defendants acted in good faith without knowledge of the issue, so their conduct did not constitute the prohibited interception. The court also dismissed a state law conversion claim without prejudice.
This case involved Savannah College of Art and Design suing Philippe Houeix under the Trademark Act of 1946 for false designations of origin, false descriptions, false representations, and service mark dilution based on Houeix's use of the SCAD mark on a website. After a two-day bench trial, the court entered judgment for Houeix and dismissed all claims. The core reasoning was that Houeix's website use was non-commercial criticism rather than commercial activity in connection with goods or services, so Savannah College could not establish essential elements of its infringement or dilution claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and (c).
This case involved a former prison inmate who sued corrections officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Eighth Amendment rights through excessive force and deliberate indifference, resulting in a jury verdict awarding compensatory and punitive damages against two defendants. After the verdict and an appeal addressing administrative exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and an evidentiary issue, the plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees and costs for post-trial and appellate work under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court had previously awarded fees, offsetting a portion against the damages award per PLRA provisions, and now considered additional fees while addressing a constitutional challenge to the PLRA’s attorney fee limitations and hourly rate caps. The court analyzed whether claims of excessive force qualify as “prison conditions” subject to PLRA exhaustion, confirmed the plaintiff’s prevailing party status, and evaluated the proportionality and reasonableness of fees in light of the statute’s requirements and Sixth Circuit precedent.
The case concerns plaintiff Jeffrey Mitchell's claim for long-term disability benefits under an ERISA welfare benefit plan issued by defendant First Unum Life Insurance Company to his former employer. Mitchell was injured at work in 1992, received workers' compensation, and submitted a claim form in 1994 after being advised by the employer's HR representative that he was ineligible until reaching maximum medical improvement. Unum denied the claim for failure to provide timely notice and proof of claim as required by the policy, and rejected arguments that notice to the employer satisfied the policy or that the HR representative acted as Unum's agent. The court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the second amended complaint, focusing on the administrative record, the plaintiff's status as a plan participant, policy eligibility dates, and ERISA procedural requirements for benefit denials.
This case involves a sex discrimination lawsuit filed by Andrea Nichols against her employer, General Motors, alleging sexual harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII and Ohio law, along with state tort claims. The plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to add retaliation claims for being denied return to work after filing the suit, and disability discrimination claims under the ADA and Ohio law based on a psychiatric diagnosis. The court granted leave to amend for the retaliation claims but denied it for the disability claims, reasoning that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing EEOC charges for the disability allegations, while the retaliation claims could proceed without undue prejudice or delay. The court also declined to stay its ruling on the pending summary judgment motion.
This case involves Earl L. Strickland's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his state court conviction for murder after stabbing his former common-law wife. Strickland argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent because he was intoxicated and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress certain statements, highlight the state's failure to rebut defense evidence on intent, and seek the trial judge's disqualification. The court dismissed the petition, finding that the sufficiency of evidence claim lacked merit based on the trial record and that the ineffective assistance claim had not been fairly presented to the state courts, resulting in procedural waiver under applicable standards. The decision rested on the requirement that habeas claims must be properly exhausted in state proceedings and that the facts in the record did not support relief.
