James Stuart Holden

The case involved the Graham family suing Canadian National Railway for personal injuries, property damage, and related claims after herbicides were applied along the railroad's right-of-way adjacent to their Vermont home, with the suit proceeding on negligence and nuisance theories. Jurisdiction was based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act due to the defendant's status as a Canadian Crown corporation operating in the U.S. The court, after a bench trial, issued detailed findings of fact regarding the property's location, the history of herbicide applications from the 1960s through 1984 using chemicals such as diuron, hexazinone, and bromacil, the methods of spraying, state permits, well water contamination, and reported symptoms in family members and livestock. Core reasoning centered on evidence from permits, employee testimony, chemical analysis, and health advisories to establish the timing, extent, and effects of the applications while applying Vermont statutes of limitations to the claims.

torts & liabilityenvironmentproperty

The case involved a challenge by Vermont food stamp recipients to a federal regulation implementing the Food Stamp Act's provision disqualifying households for 90 days if the head of household voluntarily quits a job without good cause. Plaintiffs argued that defining 'head of the household' as the 'principal wage earner' exceeded the statute's meaning and improperly penalized their households when other members quit jobs. The court analyzed the Act's text and legislative history, which referenced the 'primary wage earner,' and concluded the regulation was consistent with congressional intent. It granted summary judgment to the government defendants after addressing standing issues for compensatory relief.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a commercial dispute in which Mt. Everest Ski Shops sued Ski Barn and Nordica USA over an alleged conspiracy and breach of dealer agreements, after which Nordica filed a counterclaim seeking attorney’s fees under a contractual indemnity provision. The plaintiff had filed a jury demand limited to “each and every count of the complaint” but did not file a reply or separate demand addressing the counterclaim within the time required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. The court held that the plaintiff therefore waived its right to a jury trial on the remaining issue of which fees were attributable to defending the contract claim. The core reasoning was that Rule 38(b) and (d) require a timely written demand specifying the issues to be tried by jury, the plaintiff’s demand was expressly confined to the complaint, and the counterclaim presented distinct factual and legal issues arising from the litigation itself rather than the underlying transaction.

procedure

The case involves the State of Vermont and the Village of Poultney seeking to recover response costs and compel cleanup of mercury contamination in sewage facilities and private septic systems allegedly caused by Staco, Inc.'s former thermometer manufacturing plant. The plaintiffs brought claims under CERCLA, RCRA, and related state laws against the company, related corporations, and their officers. The court addressed the defendants' motion to dismiss based on a prior state court judgment, ruling that res judicata does not apply because the federal action concerns different violations, time periods, and legal provisions not available in the earlier suit, along with plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability. The core reasoning is that the state and federal actions involve distinct subject matters and causes of action, including post-judgment releases and worker-related contamination.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves consolidated class actions by Vermont applicants for Social Security disability benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, who challenged unreasonable delays in the administrative reconsideration and hearing processes for denied claims. Following remands from the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Day and the Second Circuit, the district court addressed requests for class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief without mandatory deadlines. The court granted partial declaratory relief, confirming that Section 405(b) requires hearings within a reasonable time and that prior delays in the named plaintiffs' cases violated this requirement. It considered plaintiffs' proposals for individualized notices after 90 days, expedited procedures, and quarterly reports, while noting documented improvements in processing times alongside evidence of remaining delays for some claimants. The reasoning centered on established statutory violations and the court's equitable authority to craft remedies consistent with appellate guidance.

federal powerprocedurehealthcare

This case concerned the disposition of proceeds from the sale of machinery and equipment belonging to the bankrupt debtor Kors, Inc., focusing on the Howard Bank's unperfected security interest in the collateral and its subordination agreement with the Small Business Investment Corporation of Vermont (SBIC). The bankruptcy court avoided the Bank's unperfected lien for the benefit of the estate and permitted the trustee to assert the Bank's rights under the subordination agreement. On appeal, the district court affirmed the avoidance of the unperfected security interest but reversed the portion of the order allowing the bankruptcy estate to enforce the subordination agreement, concluding that the agreement should instead be enforced according to its terms between the parties who created it.

business & regulatoryproperty

Carl Britt, a black soil scientist employed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service, sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging racial discrimination in his employment, training, and promotion to higher grades and supervisory roles. The district court conducted a bench trial and issued findings of fact tracing Britt's career from his 1971 appointment at GS-5 through his advancement to GS-9 party leader, including performance evaluations, field reviews, and correspondence with supervisors documenting both commendations for progress and later criticisms of incomplete soil descriptions, mapping errors, and missed deadlines. The court reviewed evidence of assignments, training opportunities, and comparisons to other employees, focusing on whether agency actions were motivated by race or by documented performance issues.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved two podiatrists, Kaczanowski and Guerra, who were denied full admitting and surgical staff privileges at the Medical Center Hospital of Vermont and Fanny Allen Hospital after their applications were reviewed and restricted by the hospitals' medical staff committees and boards, limiting them to consultant or soft-tissue outpatient roles. They sued the hospitals under federal antitrust law (Sherman Act Section 1), civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986), and pendent state claims, alleging exclusionary agreements to protect orthopedic surgeons. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the antitrust counts, finding no violation from the privilege denials, dismissed the civil rights counts for lack of triable claims, and dismissed the state claims without prejudice for resolution in state courts. The core reasoning was that the hospitals' decisions, based on quality-of-care considerations and staff organization, did not establish antitrust restraints or constitutional violations under the applicable standards, with no sufficient effect on interstate commerce or state action shown.

business & regulatorycivil rightshealthcare

The case concerns a dispute between former equal partners Walter G. Jennison and Eugene S. Bierer in the J & B Company real estate partnership, which was formed in connection with their ownership interests in the Thomas Turner Company furniture business; the plaintiff invoked federal diversity jurisdiction to seek an accounting after the sale of related assets. The court reviewed the history of the parties' business dealings, including the acquisition of the Moore-Thompson mill property by the partnership, the stock purchase options, and the 1979 sale of the Turner enterprise along with the leased realty. It analyzed the terms of associated agreements, such as consulting compensation and restrictive covenants, and computed each party's proportional interest in the combined sale proceeds based on their respective holdings in the Turner stock and J & B property. The court concluded that Jennison held a 37.5% share and Bierer a 62.5% share of the sale price after excluding assumed debts.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned Elizabeth Derby's Section 1983 action against the Town of Hartford, Vermont, seeking a declaratory judgment that the town's loitering ordinance was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to her after she was cited while resting on public steps during a walk recommended for her medical condition. The plaintiff had released her claim for damages, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted the plaintiff's motion and denied the defendant's, holding that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague on its face. The court determined that an actual case or controversy existed under Article III because of the genuine threat of enforcement, but found it unnecessary to address additional challenges such as those based on overbreadth or improper application.

criminal lawcivil rightsfree speech

This case involves a Title VII employment discrimination claim brought by Joanne Valente against her former employer, Moore Business Forms, Inc., alleging that she was denied promotions to positions such as personnel supervisor and purchasing agent due to her sex. The defendant moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that the claims were untimely. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the plaintiff's administrative charge was not filed within the 300-day statutory period following the alleged discriminatory acts, and that strict adherence to Title VII's procedural requirements is mandatory. Additionally, the federal lawsuit was commenced outside the 90-day window after receiving the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Foodscience Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., the plaintiff corporation sued the publisher for defamation arising from two articles in Medical World News that linked its Laetrile-related health products and executives to organized crime figures and regulatory issues. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was a public figure who failed to prove actual malice. The court granted the motion, finding no clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, as many facts came from the plaintiff's own materials, alleged errors were corrected prior to publication, and inadequate investigation alone does not establish malice under Vermont law.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure

This diversity case arose after a 1980 warehouse fire destroyed property belonging to Reader’s Digest; Eagle Star Insurance, having paid the loss, sued Metromedia for negligence in maintaining the premises and alarm systems and also sued NENC for faulty installation of the fire alarms. Metromedia responded by filing a third-party complaint against Fedders and General Electric, claiming that a defective ceiling heating unit manufactured by Fedders and containing a motor made by GE was the sole cause of the fire and seeking indemnification on theories of breach of warranty and strict products liability; NENC filed a similar cross-claim. The magistrate recommended dismissing the third-party and cross claims, but the district court sustained Metromedia’s objections and denied the motions to dismiss. Applying Vermont law, the court held that impleader under Rule 14 is proper when the third-party defendants may be secondarily liable and that factual questions remained as to whether the heating unit was the sole proximate cause, precluding dismissal as a matter of law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved New England Telephone and Telegraph Company seeking a court order under 47 U.S.C. § 401(b) to require the Vermont Public Service Board to apply FCC-prescribed depreciation methods (Remaining Life and Equal Life Group) when setting the company's intrastate rates, instead of the state's preferred Whole Life method. The FCC had issued orders on depreciation rates but left the preemptive effect on state ratemaking unresolved at the time, with related preemption questions pending on appeal in another case. After consolidating the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits, the court denied all relief, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the statute did not clearly authorize federal courts to override state ratemaking authority in this context during the pendency of the preemption litigation. The decision rested on the absence of explicit statutory authority and the need to await clarification from the ongoing federal appeal regarding Section 220(b) of the Communications Act.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involves two bankruptcy appeals by the law firm Gravel, Shea and Wright, which represented New England Carpet Co. in unsuccessful Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings that were converted to Chapter 7 liquidation. The firm sought payment of its attorney's fees as an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330, 331, and 506(c), aiming to charge the fees against assets secured by creditors since no unsecured assets remained in the estate. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of the fee application, holding that § 506(c) permits recovery only by trustees or debtors in possession—not directly by attorneys—and that the firm's services provided no benefit to the secured creditors. The court also found no implied consent by the secured parties to pay the fees and dismissed the related appeal as moot.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendants charged with conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) and mail fraud based on alleged bid-rigging for highway construction projects in Vermont. The defendants moved to dismiss the Sherman Act count for failing to expressly allege the required element of intent and to inspect grand jury minutes to check for proper instructions on intent. The court denied both motions, holding that an allegation of conspiracy under Rule 7(c) implicitly includes the intent to agree, that the indictment fairly informed the defendants and enabled double-jeopardy protection, and that United States v. United States Gypsum Co. did not require an explicit intent allegation in the indictment itself.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over regulatory authority for licensing the proposed Chace Mill hydroelectric project on the Winooski River, a navigable U.S. waterway. The plaintiffs, Burlington city entities, sought a declaratory judgment and injunction to prevent the Vermont Public Service Board from asserting jurisdiction, arguing that the Federal Power Act grants exclusive authority to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which had already taken jurisdiction. The defendants, members of the Public Service Board, and intervenor City of Winooski moved to dismiss on various grounds including lack of federal question jurisdiction and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the motions to dismiss, holding that federal preemption under the Federal Power Act bars state regulation of the project and that federal jurisdiction exists to resolve the preemption claim. The decision followed the reasoning from a prior similar case, Springfield v. McCarren, emphasizing that FERC's licensing authority is exclusive.

federal powerenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction to license a proposed hydroelectric project on the Black River in Vermont, or whether the Vermont Public Service Board could also exercise concurrent authority by requiring a certificate of public good. The plaintiffs, the Town of Springfield and the Vermont Public Power Supply Authority, sought a declaratory judgment that the Board's order asserting jurisdiction was invalid due to federal preemption. The defendants, including Board members and the Town of Cavendish, raised various procedural and jurisdictional defenses such as lack of federal question jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, res judicata, the Anti-Injunction Act, and principles of comity and federalism. The court rejected all defenses, found federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that FERC's authority under federal law preempts state regulation of the project.

federal powerbusiness & regulatoryenvironment

This case concerns plaintiffs who had received Vermont Aid to the Disabled benefits and were transitioned into the federal SSI disability program under the statutory grandfather clause. The plaintiffs challenged the termination of their benefits, contending that the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services and the state Disability Determination Agency applied current federal standards rather than the disability criteria from the former Vermont plan, in violation of the Social Security Act and constitutional due process requirements. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs' claims but not over the unnamed class members, that the defendants were required to apply the Vermont plan standards, and that declaratory relief was warranted while injunctive relief was not.

healthcarefederal powercivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a class action lawsuit by Vermont residents eligible for Social Security disability insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits who experienced delays in receiving payments after final eligibility determinations. The plaintiffs sought to compel the Secretary of Health and Human Services to process payments within specified short timeframes. The court held that the Social Security Act requires the Secretary to effectuate benefit payments within a reasonable time after eligibility is determined. Based on evidence of actual delays and the administrative processes involved, the court imposed deadlines of 60 days following decisions by administrative law judges or the Appeals Council and 120 days after federal court reversals, excluding delays attributable to claimants themselves.

federal powerprocedure