The case involved the Estate of Bernard L. Curry seeking a refund of estate taxes after the IRS valued shares in B.L. Curry & Sons, Inc. at $760,000 based on a National Valuation Company appraisal, leading to an assessed deficiency that the estate paid before suing in federal court. A jury found in the estate's favor, valuing the shares at $196,500, and the estate then applied for attorney fees and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The court awarded the estate $39,851.72 in fees and expenses, finding that the government's position was not substantially justified because it relied on a flawed and inconsistent appraisal that it abandoned before trial without a reasonable basis in law or fact.
The case concerns Omega Satellite Products Co., a cable television provider operating in Indianapolis by serving apartment complexes via satellite dishes and coaxial cable without using public rights-of-way, suing the City of Indianapolis over its cable television franchise ordinance. Omega sought injunctive relief and damages, claiming the ordinance improperly regulated its operations, and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The court consolidated the injunction hearing with a trial on the merits for certain counts, conducted an evidentiary hearing, and issued findings of fact detailing Omega's business model, the city's prior franchise agreements, and the applicable federal FCC regulations governing franchise fees and local cable system requirements. The court addressed whether the city's regulatory scheme, including fee limits and construction mandates, applied to Omega's non-exclusive operations and aligned with federal standards for reasonableness and preemption.
In Gunn v. Dow Chemical Co., a black female plaintiff sued her former employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging sex and race discrimination during her employment from 1974 until she resigned on June 1, 1979. She filed a charge with the EEOC on March 24, 1980, which was transmitted to the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, but the EEOC dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction and issued a right-to-sue letter. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the charge was untimely. The court treated the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 and found that the undisputed facts showed the charge was filed more than 180 days after the last alleged discriminatory act (the resignation date), exceeding both federal and state filing deadlines, with no evidence of continuing violations afterward. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding there were no genuine issues of material fact and the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This case involved City Investing Company and GDV challenging Indiana officials' enforcement of the state's Takeover Offers Act against their open-market stock purchases in an Indiana corporation, alleging due process violations and that the Act was preempted by federal securities law and burdened interstate commerce. The federal district court abstained from ruling on the constitutional claims due to an unresolved state-law question on whether the purchases qualified as a takeover offer under the Act, which could have disposed of the case. The court further held that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the requested relief, that the state Act was not preempted by the Williams Act, and that it did not violate the Commerce Clause, leading to denial of injunctive and declaratory relief and dismissal of the complaint.
This case involved a federal prisoner's habeas corpus petition challenging the U.S. Board of Parole's decision to deny parole and continue his case until December 1977. The petitioner had been convicted of bank robbery and conspiracy after a retrial, with a 25-year sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) allowing early parole consideration; the board rated the offense as greatest severity due to an included kidnapping during the robbery, based on facts from the presentence report and hearing. The court granted the respondents' motion to dismiss, finding the board's action supported by a rational basis in the record. It rejected claims of arbitrariness, due process violations from lack of rebuttal opportunity, and misuse of the (a)(2) provision, noting the board's broad discretion in parole matters, the admissibility of hearsay evidence, and that such sentences do not require early release.
This products liability case involved a plaintiff who sued the manufacturer of the drug Aralen (chloroquine) after using it from 1957 to 1963 to treat arthritis and later suffering permanent vision damage. The plaintiff filed suit in 1969 under theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty, alleging the drug caused her eye condition. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Indiana's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries barred all claims because the cause of action accrued in September 1963 when the plaintiff learned the drug had caused her eye trouble, rather than in 1969 when she discovered the damage was irreversible. The court reasoned that under Indiana precedent, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff becomes aware of both the injury and its connection to the defendant's product, and it found no privity to support a contract-based warranty claim.