Hezekiah Russel Holland

The case concerns plaintiffs' challenge to the Interior Board of Land Appeals' (IBLA) affirmance of a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) decision declaring their unpatented Silver King lode mining claims null and void. BLM issued a contest complaint alleging insufficient mineral discovery on the claims; after plaintiffs failed to file a timely answer within the 30-day regulatory period, the allegations were deemed admitted and the claims voided under 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.450-6 and 4.450-7. Plaintiffs' later motion for extension was denied as untimely, and the IBLA upheld the default on the ground that the regulations expressly warned of the consequences and provided no authority for post-deadline extensions. On cross-motions for summary judgment limited to the judicial-review claim, the court applied the standard requiring no genuine issues of material fact and concluded that the administrative decisions complied with the governing regulations.

propertyprocedurefederal power

The case concerns the punitive damages award stemming from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, which was caused by human error involving a relapsed alcoholic captain and an overworked crew member. After a jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages, the court previously reduced it to $4 billion under BMW guideposts for due process review; following the Supreme Court's State Farm decision on punitive damages limits, the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration. The court vacates its prior order but finds that State Farm sharpens focus on the existing factors without changing the outcome, resulting in retention of the $4 billion award based on the high reprehensibility of Exxon's conduct, a reasonable ratio to compensatory damages, and comparable civil penalties. The core reasoning emphasizes Exxon's knowledge of the captain's alcohol issues and the resulting environmental and economic harm without altering the constitutional analysis.

torts & liabilityenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves Exxon's renewed motion to reduce a $5 billion punitive damages award arising from the 1989 grounding of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker in Prince William Sound, Alaska, which spilled approximately 11 million gallons of crude oil. The spill resulted from the combined negligence of a relapsed alcoholic captain whom Exxon continued to employ in a command role despite knowledge of his condition, an overworked third mate, and other operational decisions. Applying the BMW guideposts, the court assessed the reprehensibility of Exxon's conduct, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages (excluding environmental cleanup costs), and comparable civil or criminal penalties, rejecting Exxon's proposed 2-to-1 ratio as too low given the facts and determining that the award did not require further reduction.

environmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the Alaska Department of Labor's Employment Security Division moving to partially quash a federal grand jury subpoena seeking unemployment compensation records for an individual designated as RRB, which the state argued were protected from disclosure by a state confidentiality statute. The government opposed the motion, contending that the Supremacy Clause required state confidentiality laws to yield to the federal grand jury's authority. The court denied the motion to quash. It reasoned that the Fifth Amendment establishes the grand jury's broad investigative powers, which preempt conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause, and that courts should defer to the grand jury absent a clear basis for intervention. The decision clarified that state agencies must comply with federal grand jury subpoenas without needing a separate court order.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involves the United States government seeking to collect unpaid federal income taxes assessed against Dietrich Rempel and Mary Rempel for the years 1982 through 1991, along with penalties and interest. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the tax liability counts, awarding judgments of over $1.15 million against each defendant plus interest. The reasoning relies on official IRS Form 4340 certificates that establish the validity of the assessments and notices, which the defendants failed to rebut with evidence, and rejects arguments regarding jury trial rights and jurisdiction as meritless.

taxesfederal power

In United States v. Saelee, the defendant was indicted on federal drug charges for importing opium concealed in candy bar packages mailed from Thailand, and the government sought to introduce testimony from a forensic document analyst comparing the defendant's known handwriting exemplars to the address labels on the packages. The government initially planned to have the analyst offer conclusions on authorship but later proposed limiting the testimony to observations of similarities and differences, arguing admissibility under Rules 701, 702, or 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Following a Daubert hearing, the court granted the defendant's motion in limine and excluded the hand printing comparison evidence, finding that the proposed testimony lacked sufficient reliability to qualify as expert opinion under Rule 702, could not be reframed as lay opinion under Rule 701, and was not independently admissible under Rule 901.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns conflicting claims to land in Alaska between the State of Alaska's material site right-of-way grants issued in 1961 and 1965 for highway construction and a Native allotment application filed in 1970 and approved in 1988 for William T. Bryant. After remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court reviewed the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) decision affirming the allotment and addressed the merits of the State's contest. The court reversed the IBLA, holding that the State's earlier right-of-way grants constituted valid and subsisting appropriations that take precedence over the overlapping portions of Bryant's Native allotment, except for a small area outside the 1961 grant boundaries. The reasoning focused on the timing of the conveyances, the federal statutes governing rights-of-way and allotments, and the principle that prior valid grants cannot be overridden by later conflicting claims once the allotment is issued.

propertyfederal power

This case involves a Jones Act seaman, Hugh Gapay, who was injured aboard the fishing vessel F/V Exito when a piece of ice fell from an ice-covered crane boom onto his hand while the crew was using the crane to move a crab sorting table in rough Bering Sea conditions. Gapay sued his employer, Q & S Enterprises, Inc., claiming negligence under the Jones Act and that the vessel was unseaworthy due to the ice on the crane. The defendant moved for summary judgment on both claims, arguing the injury resulted from a peril of the sea rather than any fault, while the plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment solely on the unseaworthiness issue. The court denied the defendant's motion and granted the plaintiff's, holding that the ice accumulation on the crane rendered it unfit for its intended use, establishing unseaworthiness as a matter of law under Ninth Circuit precedent on vessel equipment failures during normal operations. The decision rested on evidence that the crane malfunctioned under expected conditions and expert testimony that safer alternatives existed.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved plaintiff Hawa Said, a Yemeni-born Alaska resident facing removal proceedings after a state drug conviction, who claimed derivative U.S. citizenship through her father's naturalization and sought a declaratory judgment of citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that subsection 1503(a) could not be invoked because the plaintiff's nationality claim had arisen during removal proceedings. The court reasoned that the statutory exception in 1503(a) applied directly, that plaintiff could have pursued her claim through judicial review of the removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), and that the provision was constitutional both facially and as applied since no denial of citizenship rights had occurred outside the terminated administrative process.

immigrationprocedure

This case concerns a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 by plaintiff SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. to alter or amend the court's earlier judgment dismissing its complaint with prejudice on summary judgment. The plaintiff contended that the court had misinterpreted paragraph 20 of a consent decree resolving prior litigation, arguing that the decree's broad release of "any and all claims" did not bar the present dispute over whether the tanker Exxon Valdez (now SeaRiver Mediterranean) was unconstitutionally excluded from Prince William Sound. The court observed that the plaintiff and its predecessor were sophisticated parties represented by experienced counsel, that the decree's terms provided complete peace except for specifically enumerated exceptions not covering this matter, and that descriptive language following the general release did not narrow its scope. The court therefore denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment.

procedureenvironment

The case involved a lawsuit by the parents of a two-year-old boy bitten in the face by the defendants' German Shepherd dog, along with claims on behalf of the child's sister who witnessed the attack, asserting negligence, strict liability, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of society, with requests for compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on certain aspects of the complaint in federal court after removal based on diversity jurisdiction. The court reviewed largely undisputed facts including the defendants' ownership of the dog, the circumstances of the bite, and at least four prior biting incidents, while identifying material factual disputes over the characterization of those prior incidents as reflecting dangerous propensities versus natural instincts, the mother's presence during the event, and the defendants' knowledge and control measures. The opinion analyzed potential strict liability, negligence standards, and whether violations of local animal control ordinances could constitute negligence per se under Alaska law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a motion for attorneys' fees after a federal district court remanded a civil action to Alaska state court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Alaska Ex Rel. Redoubt Plumbing & Heating, sought fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) following the defendant's unsuccessful removal attempt in a diversity case. The court granted the motion and awarded $2,529 in fees. It exercised discretion to award fees because the removal petition was sufficiently weak, drawing on precedents like Bucary v. Rothrock and noting Alaska's practice under Civil Rule 82 of awarding fees to prevailing parties, without finding the removal frivolous or in bad faith. State law was applied to guide the fee determination in this diversity action.

procedure

This case involves a personal injury suit by Louisiana resident Uallen Carriere against Cominco Alaska, Inc., an Alaska fuel supplier, after Carriere was struck by a falling beam at the Red Dog Mine project in Alaska due to a crane engine failure from contaminated fuel; Carriere asserted negligence and strict products liability claims. Cominco sought a ruling allowing the jury to allocate fault among multiple potential concurrent tortfeasors (including the original fuel supplier, distributor, project owner, and others) without joining them as parties, or alternatively for leave to file third-party complaints against them. The federal court, sitting in diversity, applied Alaska choice-of-law rules and determined that Alaska substantive law governs because the injury occurred there and Alaska had the most significant relationship to the parties and events. Interpreting AS 09.17.080, the court analyzed the statute's requirement that fault be apportioned only among parties to the action, third-party defendants, and released persons, addressing whether non-parties could be included in the allocation without being joined.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Martin v. National Bank of Alaska, the Secretary of Labor alleged that NBA, acting as a fiduciary to ERISA plans, violated ERISA Sections 406(a)(1)(D), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) by using plan assets to make take-out mortgage loans that retired construction loans previously made by NBA itself to the same borrowers and by receiving origination fees from borrowers and servicing fees from the plans. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment, evaluating whether claims were time-barred under ERISA's six-year or three-year limitations periods, whether common trust funds were subject to ERISA fiduciary rules, and whether the transactions were prohibited. The court reasoned that the loans were timely challenged in part, that ERISA applied to the funds at issue, and that the transactions constituted violations because NBA knowingly arranged package deals that indirectly benefited itself as a party in interest without obtaining a statutory exemption.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a contractor holding two federal service contracts subject to the Service Contract Act and Fair Labor Standards Act whose payroll compliance was reviewed by the Department of Labor. After finding underpayment, the DOL ordered contracting agencies to withhold all further payments on the contracts—approximately $20,000 per month—totaling an estimated $98,271, without any prior hearing before a neutral decision-maker; the administrative process to resolve the dispute was expected to take six months to a year. The court held that the withholding amounted to a seizure that violated the contractor's Fifth Amendment due process rights, as no pre-seizure hearing occurred and exigent circumstances justifying immediate action without prompt post-seizure review were absent. Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff, with an injunction barring further withholdings until due process is provided, while the defendant's cross-motion was denied.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfederal power

The case involves a seaman bringing claims for personal injuries on a vessel, including negligence under the Jones Act and claims for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness under general maritime law, with a request for punitive damages on the maritime claims. On cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the court addressed whether punitive damages are available under general maritime law in a case that also includes a Jones Act cause of action. The court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiff's, holding that punitive damages are unavailable. The core reasoning relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Miles v. Apex Marine, which precludes supplementing the Jones Act's limitation to pecuniary damages with non-pecuniary punitive damages from general maritime claims, consistent with prior precedent like Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether the U.S. Department of Defense could be required to pay a share of costs assessed by the Alaska Public Utilities Commission for intervening in 1985 and 1987 utility rate hearings on behalf of military installations. The APUC moved to dismiss the federal complaint, which sought a declaration that the state cost-allocation statute violated the Supremacy Clause and conflicted with the Anti-Deficiency Act. The court denied abstention under Pullman and Burford, reasoning that the federal constitutional issues could not be avoided through state-law resolution and that jurisdiction was proper because the United States was a party. It also rejected estoppel, finding no affirmative misconduct by the government despite its prior statements accepting potential liability.

federal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Organ v. Conner, fisherman Glenn Organ sued his vessel insurer, British Marine Mutual Insurance Association, in Alaska state court for breach of contract and negligence after the insurer disclaimed coverage for an injury claim, leading to the vessel's seizure. British Marine removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration in London under its rules and the Federal Arbitration Act, while Organ sought remand and argued he was unaware of the arbitration clause. The court held it had subject matter jurisdiction under both 9 U.S.C. § 205 and admiralty jurisdiction, denied remand, and granted the motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. It reasoned that the certificate of entry referred to the rules containing the arbitration provision, making it enforceable against Organ, and found no unconscionability or public policy violation under Alaska or federal law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs' motion to disqualify the assigned federal district judge in Exxon Corp. v. Heinze on grounds that receipt of Alaska Permanent Fund dividends by judges in the district created a potential conflict of interest or appearance of bias under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144. Chief Judge Holland, after reviewing the motion referred under the court's practice, denied the request for disqualification and declined to assign an out-of-district judge. The court reasoned that Section 455 is directed to the assigned judge and that any potential impact of the underlying litigation on future dividend amounts is too speculative and indirect, given the legislature's discretion over the fund and the variable nature of its investments, to require recusal. The opinion adopted and joined the prior analysis finding no personal bias or prejudice.

procedure

In this case, plaintiff Letasky sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for loss of consortium after his then-wife was injured in a collision with a government bus in 1988; the couple divorced in 1989, the wife filed and settled her own administrative claim in 1990, and the plaintiff filed a separate claim that was denied before he sued in 1991. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Alaska law requires loss-of-consortium claims to be joined with the injured spouse's claim. The court denied the motion, holding that the wife's settlement rendered joinder legally impossible and thereby satisfied the "special case" exception recognized in Schreiner v. Fruit. The court noted that the government had received notice of the plaintiff's claim before settling with the wife and could have required joint administration but did not.

torts & liabilityprocedure