David Brock Hornby

In this 2011 federal criminal case, the defendant moved to suppress a DNA profile that had been obtained in 2005 through a grand jury subpoena issued in connection with an unrelated investigation into a threatening letter containing white powder. The court held that any potential deficiencies in the 2005 subpoena process did not require exclusion of the DNA profile under the exclusionary rule when it was later used to support warrants and charges for separate threatening letters mailed in 2010. The decision rested on the principle that the exclusionary rule does not apply to bar evidence from a prior, uncharged matter in a new and unrelated prosecution, even assuming the original subpoena raised Fourth Amendment concerns regarding compelled production of DNA.

criminal lawprocedure

Current and former FedEx delivery drivers in Maine sued the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging they were misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees and therefore denied overtime pay for hours over 40 per week. The plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of a collective action covering Maine drivers who operate trucks under 10,001 pounds on single full-time routes. The court granted the motion, finding that the drivers had made the modest factual showing required at the initial stage by presenting evidence of similar job duties, uniform requirements, common per-package pay policies under Operator Agreements, and a shared alleged misclassification. This showing was sufficient to send notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs, with the economic-realities analysis deferred until the second stage after discovery.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In Lynch v. Christie, a Maine chiropractor sued a former patient for defamation and wrongful use of civil proceedings after she accused him of sexual assault during treatment, reported the claims to police and a licensing board, filed a federal civil lawsuit that she later dismissed with prejudice, and later posted anonymous accusations on a website and social media that eventually identified him. The defendant moved to dismiss under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing her statements and lawsuit were protected petitioning activity, and also under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court denied both motions, finding that the plaintiff had made a strong showing the prior lawsuit and statements lacked reasonable factual support and caused him actual injury, and that the amended complaint plausibly alleged the elements of the tort claims under Maine law.

free speechproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a defendant indicted and convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The defendant renewed a motion for acquittal, arguing that the government failed to prove the firearms were not antiques excluded from the statutory definition of firearm. The court denied the motion, holding that the antique firearm exception under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(16) is an affirmative defense that the defendant must timely raise and support with evidence, rather than an element of the offense that the government must disprove in every prosecution. The court noted that the defendant presented no such evidence at trial and raised the issue only after the evidentiary record closed. It aligned with decisions from other circuits on this allocation of burdens.

criminal lawguns

The case involved a dispute between United Systems Access Telecom, Inc., a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings operating as a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier, and FairPoint, an Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier, over amounts owed under agreements including the Interconnection Agreement and Wholesale Advantage Services Agreement, particularly whether Performance Assurance Plan penalties could offset debts. The debtor sought to withdraw the reference from the Bankruptcy Court to the District Court, arguing that the matter required interpretation of federal telecommunications law under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The court granted the motions to withdraw the reference, holding that adjudication would require consideration of federal law regulating interstate commerce, which mandates withdrawal under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) given the FCC's extensive regulation of telecommunications and FairPoint's commitments under Section 271 approvals.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

In United States v. Enzinger, the defendant was convicted by a jury after a brief criminal trial on charges not detailed in the opinion, and later moved for a new trial based on a post-verdict letter from one juror who claimed to have misunderstood the unanimity requirement and gone along with the guilty verdict rather than holding out. The court denied the motion to set aside the verdict. The ruling followed the longstanding rule against inquiring into jury deliberations except in narrow circumstances under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), such as extraneous prejudicial information, outside influences, or errors in recording the verdict on the form, none of which were present; a juror's misunderstanding of instructions does not qualify as an exception, even under the First Circuit's limited constitutional exception for racial bias. The judge noted that the instructions clearly required each juror to decide individually and that the verdict was confirmed by all jurors in open court without objection.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves class action antitrust litigation over alleged conspiracies to prevent the export of lower-priced Canadian motor vehicles into the U.S. market, focusing on approval of proposed settlements with Toyota and CADA along with a plan to allocate settlement funds among indirect purchasers. The court addressed objections regarding releases of state law claims and the fairness of cash distributions limited to certain jurisdictions. It ruled that the Hawaii Attorney General's waiver permitted the settlements to proceed on Hawaii claims provided Hawaii residents were added to the allocation, but excluded Alabama and Florida residents from cash recovery because Alabama's intrastate commerce limitation and Florida's loser-pays rule rendered those claims substantially less valuable. The court rejected arguments to revisit prior rulings based on Shady Grove and confirmed its authority to adjust the allocation plan separate from the settlement agreements themselves. It directed inclusion of residents from the District of Columbia, Iowa, and North Carolina while finding no need for additional notice.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in a Social Security Disability appeal, where the claimant's law firm sought the remaining portion of a 25% contingent fee agreement after successfully obtaining past-due benefits of $45,466.50. The Commissioner challenged the requested $5,366.62 as unreasonable due to the high effective hourly rate when dividing fees primarily by paralegal hours rather than attorney time. The court declined to adopt the magistrate judge's recommendation and instead followed the Supreme Court's guidance in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, holding that contingent fee agreements up to 25% are permissible and that reasonableness should be assessed by examining the agreement, the character of representation, results achieved, and any delays, rather than by applying hourly multipliers or EAJA rates to paralegal work. The court noted that the total hours worked and the contingency nature supported the fee amount without needing to adjust for paralegal billing specifics.

procedurehealthcare

This case involves pending motions to dismiss a lawsuit under Maine's anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 556, in federal court. The court ordered oral argument on the motions and directed counsel to address two main issues: the standard for reviewing pleadings and affidavits on the special motion to dismiss, including potential conflicts with federal summary judgment rules and jury trial rights under precedents like Morse Brothers and Godin v. Schencks; and whether the statute would have any continuing effect in the litigation if the motion is denied. The order notes inconsistencies among Maine cases on the review standard and compares approaches from other states like Massachusetts and California, while also referencing an upcoming Maine Law Court decision in Malenko v. Campbell that could clarify the issues.

free speechprocedurefederal power

The case involved plaintiff Robert Gross, a vocational expert for the Social Security Administration, who alleged he was removed from the roster of experts due to sex and disability discrimination in favor of female experts and because of his speech impediment; he brought claims against multiple defendants including the Estate of Robert Fiorentino. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's recommended decision and granted the Estate's motion to dismiss. The core reasoning was that the Maine Probate Code's statute of limitations under 18-A M.R.S.A. § 3-803 had forever barred the claims because they were not timely presented against the estate, publication notice was sufficient for non-ascertainable claimants under Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, the limitation ran automatically without requiring additional notice, and no liability insurance exemption applied. The claims against the Estate and its personal representative were dismissed with prejudice.

civil rightsprocedure

This case concerns Maine homeowners who sued GMAC Mortgage under the state's Unfair Trade Practices Act, alleging that the company used false affidavits and ownership certifications lacking personal knowledge in judicial foreclosure proceedings, resulting in improper foreclosures and fees. The federal district court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs' common-law claims but faced a motion to dismiss the remaining statutory claim on the ground that Maine's absolute judicial proceedings privilege barred it. Finding no clear precedent on whether this common-law privilege extends to UTPA claims seeking damages or equitable relief based on court filings, the court certified that precise question to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court for resolution under state certification procedures.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryproperty

In Bradbury v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, the remaining claim was Count I under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, alleging that the defendant engaged in unfair practices causing the plaintiffs financial loss. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Maine's common law absolute privilege for statements in judicial proceedings barred the claim. The court rejected the plaintiffs' waiver argument because the defendant's answer preserved the defense of failure to state a claim and there was no unfair prejudice. Finding no clear Maine precedent on whether the privilege extends to statutory claims like the UTPA and noting conflicting authority from other jurisdictions, the court certified the question to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court: whether the judicial proceedings privilege is an available defense to UTPA claims.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, former Maine legislative candidate James Schatz sued the Republican State Leadership Committee and related entities for defamation and related claims over pre-election flyers, ads, and mailings that accused him of voting as a town selectman to cancel a Fourth of July fireworks display while improperly directing taxpayer funds to a political group. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. It held that the First Amendment shields campaign speech—even if false—unless the plaintiff shows the statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, a standard Schatz could not meet because the materials were drawn from contemporaneous newspaper reporting and he failed to plead facts supporting actual malice. The court applied the same constitutional limits to the false-light and emotional-distress claims, which it viewed as restatements of the defamation count.

electionsfree speech

In United States v. Hardy, the district court addressed the government's motion to return the defendant—who had previously been found incompetent to stand trial, committed for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), and later restored to competency—to a federal medical center for a dangerousness evaluation under § 4246 as a potential step toward civil commitment. The court denied the motion, concluding it lacked authority under either the second or third qualifying conditions of the statute. It reasoned that the second condition applies only to defendants still in custody under a § 4241(d) commitment, not those with a prior one, and that the third condition requires actual dismissal of charges for mental-health reasons, not mere consideration of dismissal while charges remain pending.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a constitutional challenge by the National Organization for Marriage to Maine's election laws governing ballot question committees, specifically the registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements triggered when groups receive or spend over $5,000 to influence ballot measures. The district court granted summary judgment to the state defendants, holding that the requirements are constitutional under the First Amendment. The court reasoned that the disclosure rules are narrowly tailored to the state's interest in informing voters about funding sources for ballot campaigns, that the $5,000 threshold and definitions of contributions and expenditures are not vague or overbroad in the ballot-question context, and that the plaintiffs failed to show a sufficient risk of harassment to justify exempting them from disclosure. The decision incorporated and updated the court's prior analysis from the temporary restraining order stage.

electionsfree speech

This case involves Maine homeowners suing GMAC Mortgage, LLC for damages and injunctive relief on behalf of those threatened with foreclosure or eviction, alleging improper conduct by the mortgage company in state foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiffs originally filed in state court, but the defendant removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the counts for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, abuse of process, and fraud on the court, and held that the remaining count under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act must stay in federal court. The court reasoned that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed over the damages claims, that the dismissed claims failed to meet the elements required under Maine law or lacked recognition as a basis for private damages recovery, and that Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines did not mandate remand of the remaining claim.

propertyproceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a defendant charged with willful failure to pay child support under federal law, who moved to suppress emails seized from his account pursuant to a search warrant. The defendant argued that the government failed to adequately protect against seizure of privileged attorney-client communications, that such materials had in fact been accessed, that the warrant was overly broad, and that the review process was flawed. The court denied the motion, finding that the government reasonably sought and followed judicial approval for a filter-agent procedure to screen for privileged materials after discovering attorney correspondence in the headers, that no arguably privileged items remained, and that the warrant was sufficiently particularized. The court also noted that the good-faith exception would preclude suppression even if Fourth Amendment issues existed.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Worthy, the court considered motions to dismiss indictments under the Speedy Trial Act arising from an original indictment and three successive superseding indictments that expanded drug conspiracy charges and added defendants and counts against Hasan Worthy and others. The government moved to dismiss the original indictment without prejudice, which the court granted, while denying the defendant's motions to dismiss the superseding indictments with prejudice. The court reasoned that precedents in the Circuit unambiguously resolve how superseding indictments affect the Act's 30-day charging and 70-day trial timelines, finding no violation occurred. It also overruled the defendant's objection to continued detention and granted the government's detention motion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a declaratory judgment action by excess liability insurer Colony Insurance Company against its insureds (Danly, Inc., owners of a summer camp) and injured parties (the Yazdanis), arising from a tort lawsuit over a child's eye injury at an archery range. Colony argued it had no coverage obligation because the underlying suit was settled without its consent and the agreement stated the insureds had no duty to pay damages personally. The injured parties counterclaimed for the right to pursue a future reach-and-apply action against Colony, while the insureds sought coverage, attorney fees for breach of the duty to defend, and damages under Maine's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. The court denied all motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, finding unresolved issues under Maine law regarding the effect of a reservation of rights, the reasonableness of the settlement, and whether lack of consent or cooperation voids coverage in a reach-and-apply context.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, Cianbro Corp. sought a declaratory judgment under 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2) that two vessels were not subject to maritime liens claimed by George H. Dean, Inc., and after prevailing, obtained an award of $54,790.50 in attorney fees. Cianbro then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 to register that attorney fees award as a judgment in the District of Rhode Island, where Dean Steel is based. Dean Steel opposed, arguing that the award was not eligible for registration because it arose from a declaratory judgment action and that good cause had not been shown. The court granted the motion, holding that the attorney fees award qualifies as a final, appealable "judgment" for the recovery of money under the statute and that good cause exists due to Dean Steel's lack of assets in Maine and substantial assets in Rhode Island.

procedure