The case involved a Texas limited partnership that owned an apartment complex and held a commercial insurance policy from Lexington Insurance Company; after Hurricane Ike damaged the property, the plaintiff sued Lexington along with Texas-based adjusters and an insurance agent in state court, alleging negligence, breach of contract, violations of the Texas Insurance Code and DTPA, and other claims related to the handling of the insurance claim. Lexington removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, asserting that the Texas defendants had been fraudulently joined so that complete diversity existed. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that Lexington failed to meet its heavy burden of showing improper joinder because the plaintiff had a reasonable possibility of stating viable claims against the non-diverse defendants under the Texas Insurance Code. The court further noted that the claims against the local insurance agent arose from the same transaction and that joinder was not fraudulent under Texas procedural rules. The action was therefore returned to the 165th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.
The case involved a homeowner who sued his mortgage servicer, BAC Home Loans Servicing, after the bank paid overdue property taxes on his property and initiated foreclosure proceedings following his refusal to repay. The plaintiff alleged various claims including fraud, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of federal lending and debt collection laws, stemming from alleged misrepresentations about property tax amounts at the time of the loan origination in 2004. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, ruling that the fraud and tort claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations since the plaintiff knew of the tax increases by 2006, and the breach of contract claim failed to state a valid cause of action because the bank was authorized under the deed of trust to pay the taxes to protect its lien.
This case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling in an adversary proceeding where Amco Energy, Inc. (formerly Capco) sued Tana Exploration, Ryder Scott, Tristone, and others for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and related business torts arising from Capco's 2006 purchase of 13 Gulf of Mexico oil and gas properties. Capco alleged it relied on overstated reserves reports and revenue projections that led to its bankruptcy filing after the purchase closed. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants. The core reasoning was that Capco had contractually waived any reliance on the sellers' or consultants' representations in the purchase agreement, had conducted its own independent due diligence and evaluations (including by its lender), and that revenue estimates or projections could not constitute actionable misrepresentations as a matter of law.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liabilityproperty
This case involves claims by a former BP employee and an environmental group against BP for alleged non-compliance with federal safety and environmental regulations at its Atlantis offshore oil facility. The plaintiffs asserted violations under the False Claims Act, seeking recovery of oil and gas revenues obtained through allegedly false certifications to the government, and under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, seeking an injunction to halt operations until compliance is achieved. The court denied BP's motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which argued failures in pleading, lack of specificity, standing issues, and failure to join necessary parties. The reasoning centered on the sufficiency of the allegations under the relevant rules, the applicability of citizen suit provisions, and the plaintiffs' standing to enforce regulatory compliance.
This case concerns a cargo damage claim by Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Company against multiple carriers, including Seaboard Marine Ltd., for water, mold, and mildew contamination of apparel shipped from Guatemala to Texas via ocean and road transport. Seaboard moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or, alternatively, to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), citing a forum selection clause in the bill of lading designating the Southern District of Florida. The court denied both motions, holding that Seaboard waived any venue objection by failing to raise it with specificity in its answer as required by Rules 12(g) and 12(h). The court further found that the Section 1404(a) factors did not favor transfer even if the objection had been preserved.
This case involved a dispute over insurance coverage under a builders risk policy issued by Lexington Insurance Company to Diamond Beach and its contractors for a construction project in Galveston, Texas. After Hurricane Ike caused physical damage in 2008, the parties resolved claims for hard costs and initial soft costs from delays, but disputed a supplemental soft cost claim for additional expenses stemming from a roofing subcontractor's manpower shortages and overloaded city inspection services. The court granted Lexington's motion for summary judgment and denied Diamond's partial motion, holding that the policy's delay in completion coverage applied only to losses caused by direct physical damage to the insured property, which was absent here as the delays arose from external factors unrelated to the storm damage. The court also noted that the parties had already agreed on the period of indemnity ending after the resolved 51-day delay.