The case involved Sharon McDonald, a former Records Manager at a detention facility operated by Corrections Corporation of America, who sued after her termination alleging gender and race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, age discrimination under the ADEA, breach of employment contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful termination. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss, dismissing the gender discrimination portion of Count I for lack of jurisdiction while allowing other claims to proceed. The core reasoning was that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII claims, which requires a verified EEOC charge that either expressly includes the claim or falls within an exception such as reasonable relation to the filed charge; here the plaintiff's verified charge checked only national origin, age, and retaliation boxes, alleged supporting facts solely on those bases, and provided no indication that she intended the EEOC to investigate gender discrimination.
In Varela v. Wal-Mart Stores, East, Inc., plaintiff Aurelia Varela sued defendant Wal-Mart in New Mexico state court for injuries from a slip-and-fall incident at a store, alleging she slipped on an apple peel and twisted her back and ankle, without specifying a damages amount as required by state pleading rules. After plaintiff rejected a $16,500 settlement offer and refused to stipulate that damages were under $75,000, defendant removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, citing the refusal to stipulate and a jury verdict in a similar state-court case. The court granted plaintiff's motion to remand the action to state court, holding that defendant failed to meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. The court applied a presumption against removal jurisdiction and required defendant to show more than speculation about possible jury awards or the refusal to stipulate, emphasizing that the facts at the time of removal did not establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
In this products liability case, plaintiffs Tom and Emily Couch sued Astec Industries, Southwest Crane, and Joseph Williams in New Mexico state court for injuries from an allegedly defective asphalt manufacturing machine. Astec, a Tennessee corporation, removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, arguing that the New Mexico defendants had been fraudulently joined because plaintiffs had not served them personally, conducted discovery against them, or obtained a default judgment. The court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint stated potential claims against the non-diverse defendants under New Mexico law, service by publication was valid, and there was no clear evidence of voluntary abandonment or bad-faith joinder. The court noted that failure to pursue default or discovery did not establish fraudulent joinder and that plaintiffs remained masters of their litigation strategy.
This case involved a lawsuit by the parents and estate of Theresa Apodaca against a county sheriff's department and officials after she was killed in a car accident with a deputy sheriff who was speeding excessively without lights and had consumed alcohol. The plaintiffs claimed violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, intimate familial association, and Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss these federal claims, reasoning that mere negligence does not violate substantive due process unless it shocks the conscience, that there is no recognized right to intimate familial association in this context, and that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not apply to an accidental automobile collision.
This case involved a challenge by booksellers' associations, a wholesaler, and retailers to a New Mexico statute restricting the retail display of books and magazines with sexually oriented covers or content deemed harmful to minors. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the law violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments as vague, overbroad, and a prior restraint on protected materials. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because no case or controversy existed under Article III. Its core reasoning was that the district attorney had brought no prosecutions under the statute or its predecessor, exercised complete discretion over enforcement, and had given no indication of intent to apply it, leaving plaintiffs without any objectively reasonable fear of prosecution or specific harm.
The case involved defendant Austin's motion for release pending appeal after his jury conviction for conspiracy to distribute more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana, based on evidence that planes landed on his ranch to unload large quantities of the drug as part of a scheme he had agreed to facilitate through a ranch sale. Following an initial denial and a partial remand from the Tenth Circuit, the district court reconsidered the motion under the standards set forth in United States v. Affleck. The court reviewed the historical evolution of bail-pending-appeal standards since 1891, emphasizing the balance between avoiding punishment for potentially invalid convictions and ensuring prompt service of valid sentences, and applied the current requirement that the appeal present a substantial question likely to result in reversal or a new trial. The opinion noted substantial evidence linking Austin to the conspiracy and clarified that the court had not relied on the "slight connection" rule in denying post-trial relief.
